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Elizabeth S. Radcliffe

William & Mary
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    70
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  •  Recommended
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 More details
  • William & Mary
    Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
Cornell University
Sage School of Philosophy
PhD, 1985
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Williamsburg, Virginia, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
17th/18th Century Philosophy
David Hume
Emotion and Reason
Moral Psychology
Motivation
Areas of Interest
Value Theory
Action Theory
Motivation and Will
Perceptual Theories of Emotion
History of Western Philosophy
  • All publications (70)
  •  140
    Love and benevolence in Hutcheson's and Hume's theories of the passions
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (4). 2004.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    Hume: Normative EthicsHume and Other PhilosophersHume: Philosophy of MindFrancis Hutcheson
  •  390
    Hume on Motivating Sentiments, the General Point of View, and the Inculcation of "Morality"
    Hume Studies 20 (1): 37-58. 1994.
    That Hume 's theory can be interpreted in two widely divergent ways-as a version of sentimentalism and as an ideal observer theory-is symptomatic of a puzzle ensconced in Hume 's theory. How can the ground of morality be internal and motivating when an inference to the feelings of a spectator in "the general point of view" is typically necessary to get to genuine moral distinctions? This paper considers and rejects the suggestion that in moral education, for Hume, the inculcation of morality int…Read more
    That Hume 's theory can be interpreted in two widely divergent ways-as a version of sentimentalism and as an ideal observer theory-is symptomatic of a puzzle ensconced in Hume 's theory. How can the ground of morality be internal and motivating when an inference to the feelings of a spectator in "the general point of view" is typically necessary to get to genuine moral distinctions? This paper considers and rejects the suggestion that in moral education, for Hume, the inculcation of morality internalizes the sentiments of the ideal observer. It ultimately offers a different resolution of the conflicting strains
    Hume: Moral SentimentalismHume: The Common Point of View
  •  203
    The inertness of reason and Hume’s legacy
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1): 117-133. 2012.
    Hume argues against the seventeenth-century rationalists that reason is impotent to motivate action and to originate morality. Hume's arguments have standardly been considered the foundation for the Humean theory of motivation in contemporary philosophy. The Humean theory alleges that beliefs require independent desires to motivate action. Recently, however, new commentaries allege that Hume's argument concerning the inertness of reason has no bearing on whether beliefs can motivate. These comme…Read more
    Hume argues against the seventeenth-century rationalists that reason is impotent to motivate action and to originate morality. Hume's arguments have standardly been considered the foundation for the Humean theory of motivation in contemporary philosophy. The Humean theory alleges that beliefs require independent desires to motivate action. Recently, however, new commentaries allege that Hume's argument concerning the inertness of reason has no bearing on whether beliefs can motivate. These commentaries maintain that for Hume, beliefs about future pleasurable and painful objects on their own can produce the desires that move us to action. First, I show that this reading puts Hume at odds with Humeans, since the latter are committed, not only to the view that beliefs and desires are both necessary to action, but also to the view that beliefs do not produce desires. Second, I review textual, philosophical and historical grounds for my interpretation of Hume's argument for the inertness of reason. I argue that the new line on Hume, while consistent with a certain reading of the Treatise, is not supported by the Dissertation on the Passions and the second Enquiry, where Hume argues that all motivation has an origin in “taste”, which I take to be different from belief. Thus, Hume's arguments do support the contemporary Humean theory of motivation.
    Hume: Meta-Ethics, MiscHume: MotivationHume: Philosophy of Action, MiscDesire and Reason
  •  56
    Review of Joyce Jenkins, Jennifer Whiting, Christopher Williams (eds.), Persons and Passions: Essays in Honor of Annette Baier (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (2). 2006.
    Hume: Value TheoryHume: Philosophy of Mind
  •  33
    Francis Hutcheson
    In Steven Nadler (ed.), A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, Wiley-blackwell. 2008.
    This chapter contains section titled: Hutcheson's Life and the Intellectual Climate of his Time Hutcheson's Philosophy Theory of Morality Contemporary Discussions of Hutcheson's Philosophy.
    Francis Hutcheson
  •  2
    Moral Naturalism and the Possibility of Making Ourselves Better
    In Brad Wilburn (ed.), Moral Cultivation: Essays on the Development of Character and Virtue, Lexington Books. 2007.
    Virtues and VicesVirtue Ethics, MiscMoral Naturalism
  •  97
    Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment: A Study in the Unity of A Treatise of Human Nature (review) (review)
    Hume Studies 19 (2): 324-326. 1994.
    Hume: Moral Judgment
  • Review of DANCY, J.-Practical Reality (review)
    Philosophical Books 43 (4): 312-312. 2002.
    Reasons and CausesDesire and Motivation
  •  306
    The Humean Theory of Motivation and its Critics
    In A Companion to Hume, Wiley-blackwell. 2008.
    This chapter contains section titled: The Defense of the Humean Theory of Motivation in Hume Challenges to the Humean Theory of Motivation Hume's Legacy References Further Reading.
    MotivationHume: Meta-EthicsHume: MotivationDesire and Motivation
  •  161
    Moral Sentimentalism and the Reasonableness of Being Good
    Revue Internationale de Philosophie 2013 (no. 263): 9-27. 2013.
    In this paper, I discuss the implications of Hutcheson’s and Hume’s sentimentalist theories for the question of whether and how we can offer reasons to be moral. Hutcheson and Hume agree that reason does not give us ultimate ends. Because of this, on Hutcheson’s line, the possession of affections and of a moral sense makes practical reasons possible. On Hume’s view, that reason does not give us ultimate ends means that reason does not motivate on its own, and this makes practical reasons, strict…Read more
    In this paper, I discuss the implications of Hutcheson’s and Hume’s sentimentalist theories for the question of whether and how we can offer reasons to be moral. Hutcheson and Hume agree that reason does not give us ultimate ends. Because of this, on Hutcheson’s line, the possession of affections and of a moral sense makes practical reasons possible. On Hume’s view, that reason does not give us ultimate ends means that reason does not motivate on its own, and this makes practical reasons, strictly speaking, impossible. For Hutcheson, those who are good people (benevolent people) have reasons to continue in that way. While he has nothing to say to those who are thoroughly self-interested, he thinks there are no such persons. Hume’s theory implies that one can have a motive to behave morally when one’s character does not so incline, since he believes that morality is at least sometimes in the interest of the agent. One interesting source of their differences is that Hume subscribes to an internal connection between justification and motivation, while Hutcheson argues that motivating reasons and justifying reasons are logically distinct.
    Moral Reasoning and Motivation, MiscFrancis HutchesonMoral ReasonsInternalism and Externalism about …Read more
    Moral Reasoning and Motivation, MiscFrancis HutchesonMoral ReasonsInternalism and Externalism about Moral JudgmentHume: Meta-EthicsHume and Other Philosophers
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