Eduardo Garcia

Synaesthesia is a condition in which one type of stimulation evokes the sensation of another, as when the hearing of a sound produces photisms, i.e. mental percepts of colours. R is a 20 year old colour blind subject who, in addition to the relatively common grapheme-colour synaesthesia, presents a rarely reported cross modal perception in which a variety of visual stimuli elicit aura-like percepts of colour. In R, photisms seem to be closely related to the affective valence of stimuli and typically bring out a consistent pattern of emotional responses. The present case study suggests that colours might be an intrinsic category of the human brain. We developed an empirical methodology that allowed us to study the subject's otherwise inaccessible phenomenological experience. First, we found that R shows a Stroop effect elicited by photisms despite the fact that he does not show a regular Stroop with real colours. Secondly, by manipulating the colour context we confirmed that colours can alter R's emotional evaluation of the stimuli. Furthermore, we demonstrated that R's auras may actually lead to a partially inverted emotional spectrum where certain stimuli bring out emotional reactions opposite to the normal ones. These findings can only be accounted for by considering R's subjective colour experience or qualia. Therefore the present paper defends the view that qualia are a useful scientific concept that can be approached and studied by experimental methods

This paper proposes a radical reconfiguration of medical ethics by placing suffering—not as a clinical symptom or ancillary datum, but as an ontological category—at the center of ethical deliberation. In the face of a fragmented and technified clinical practice, we argue that suffering is the only truly universal human experience, irreducible to cultural, linguistic, or ideological variations. As such, it offers a potent, immanent foundation for a non-relative ethics in medicine. Drawing on the philosophical contributions of Heidegger, Levinas, Jonas, Jaspers, Butler, and Schopenhauer, we develop a model of medical ethics rooted in the shared and asymmetrical vulnerability that suffering reveals. Rather than abstract principles or procedural deontology, this model emphasizes narrative, responsibility, and hospitality as structural dimensions of the clinical act. We contend that medicine must move from being a problem-solving technique to becoming a space of presence, attention, and recognition—where suffering is not erased but welcomed. The clinical encounter is thus reimagined as a site of ontological unveiling, where the physician’s role is not merely to diagnose or intervene, but to bear witness, to accompany, and to share in the exposure of the other. This ethics of suffering entails epistemological shifts (through narrative and phenomenology), spatial transformations (via architecture of care), and institutional reforms (integrating patients’ voices and lived experience). Ultimately, we propose suffering not as a failure of health, but as the ethical ground from which a truly human medicine must begin.

El presente trabajo se propone analizar la intersección entre estética y retórica en Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers de Walter Benjamin. En función de ello, mediante una vía de interpretación expositiva, abordaremos cómo se articulan una serie de mediaciones entre traducción, Sprache, y lectura, tales como el fundamento retórico-estético del simbolismo verbal de la poesía y del discurso de la crítica, la condición póstuma de la vida de las obras y el carácter paradójico del imposible de la traducción. A partir de la exposición de estos momentos, arribaremos a las consideraciones finales de que estas mediaciones entre traducción y lectura encuentran tanto su condición de posibilidad como su lugar de convergencia en el carácter no comunicativo que constituyen las obras de arte y en la heterogeneidad irreductible entre las lenguas.

This paper is concerned with the metaphysics of created repeatable objects, such as musical works and literary fictions. In section 2 we lay out what we take to be intuitive and plausible desiderata for any theory of created repeatable objects. In sections 3 and 4 we proceed with an extended disjunctive syllogism. Created repeatable objects are either concrete universals, concrete particulars, abstract universals, or abstract particulars. We show how accounts that take them to be either one of the latter three fail egregiously. Therefore, we must take them to be concrete universals. In section 5 we offer a brief account of the metaphysical nature of concrete universals and then show how concrete universals can account for the desiderata while avoiding the objections presented against alternative theories.

Klimovsky (1984) and (1982) presents a dilemma against any semantics of natural language while offering an objection against the syntactist view of it. As a reply, Moretti (2011) offers a “minimally” syntactist solution to Klimovsky’s objections. In this paper I have two goals. First, I want to rescue Klimovsky’s general dilemma and his objections against syntactism. Second, I argue that Moretti’s way out of the dilemma does not fully succeed. The paper concludes by arguing that the dilemma is still standing and should concern our best available semantic theories.

Este artículo trata el problema de los objetos creados que pueden ser repetidos, como las obras musicales y las literarias. En la sección 2 presentamos una serie de desiderata intuitivos que toda teoría debe satisfacer. En las secciones 3 y 4 presentamos un silogismo disyuntivo extendido. Los objetos en cuestión pueden ser o bien universales concretos, particulares concretos, universales abstractos o particulares abstractos. Mostramos cómo es que las teorías que consideran que son cualquiera de las tres últimas opciones fracasan. Por lo tanto, debemos entender a dichos objetos como universales concretos. En la sección 5 ofrecemos una teoría breve pero detallada de la naturaleza metafísica de los universales concretos para después mostrar cómo esta propuesta permite dar cuenta de los desiderata intuitivos a la vez que se evitan las objeciones presentadas en contra de teorías alternativas.

Faria (2021) presenta una extraordinaria discusión sobre temas que rara vez suelen entrelazarse en la tradición analítica: el cambio en el contenido mental, su relevancia para la validez inferencial y las consecuencias que esto tiene para la responsabilidad (tanto en la acción como en el pensamiento). La meta de Faria (2021) es defender que la impermanencia del contenido, la vulnerabilidad de nuestras inferencias, el azar y la falta de control en nuestros pensamientos y acciones forman parte ineludible de nuestra forma de vida. En este trabajo argumentaré que dichos argumentos son exitosos, aunque pondré en duda las consecuencias específicas que Faria (2021) obtiene de estos, argumentando que si bien hay impermanencia, vulnerabilidad y azar, no son tan radicales como para afectar nuestra concepción intuitiva de contenidos, creencia y racionalidad.

La filosofía del lenguaje de Wittgenstein está influida por las aportaciones tanto de Frege como de Bertrand Russell. Si bien, en su obra el Tracttaus puso su propio estilo. Para incluso llegar a decir que sus aportaciones eran el punto clave para que las teorías tanto de Russell como de Frege terminaran con algunos inconvenientes que surgían en sus teorías. Como ejemplo baste las tablas de Verdad de función que introduce Wittgenstein. Sin embargo, es importante que se tengan en cuenta que tomó de estos filósofos, y la manera en que fue modificando sus ideas, para entender la obra del Wittgenstein del Tractatus.

In this paper, we delimit the moments in which, in “Doctrine of the Similar” and in “On the Mimetic Faculty”, reading and Sprache (speech, language, language) are inseparably linked to the category of “non-sensuous similarities.” In this conception, the analogical-proportional representation of traditional mimesis is dislocated by a rhetori- cal conception of symbolic experiences given by different semiotic forms. Moreover, the idealist ground of the symbolic is relocated in the specific area of language, in which the perception of similarities is mediated by the instance of reading under the predominance of the dissimilar. Our fundamental purpose resides in exposing how this production of similarities, in contrast to those of the relational schematism of classical logicism and with the ground of idealistic determination of Kantian aesthetics, shows its paradoxical grounds in the mimetic reading.

We offer an empirical assessment of description theories of proper names. We examine empirical evidence on lexical and cognitive development, memory, and aphasia, to see whether it supports Descriptivism. We show that description theories demand much more, in terms of psychological assumptions, than what the data suggest; hence, they lack empirical support. We argue that this problem undermines their success as philosophical theories for proper names in natural languages. We conclude by presenting and defending a preliminary alternative account of reference from a developmental perspective

In the context of European Convergence, it has non-stop been encouraged a revolution in higher education in order to face up to challenges thrown down by the socalled "knowledge society". Nevertheless, as it happens in all revolutions, by means of the revolutionary legislation we risk destroying completely what we were trying to legislate on. This essay aims to attract academic circles attention to this matter so 225 LOGOS. Anales del Seminario de Metafísica ISSN: 1575-6866 Vol. 37 (2004): 225-253 Carlos Fernández Liria La revolución educativa Luis Alegre Zahonero that, at least, this disaster is not consolidated with our collaboration