Eduardo Garcia

Ordinary use of empty names encompasses a variety of different phenomena, including issues in semantics, mental content, fiction, pretense, and linguistic practice. In this paper I offer a novel account of empty names, the cognitive theory, and show how it offers a satisfactory account of the phenomena. The virtues of this theory are based on its strength and parsimony. It allows for a fully homogeneous semantic treatment of names coped with ontological frugality and empirical and psychological adequacy

According to Lewis, causal claims must be analysed in terms of counterfactual conditionals, and these in turn are understood in terms of relations of comparative similarity among single concrete possible worlds. Lewis also claims that there is no trans-world causation because there is no way to make sense of trans-world counterfactuals without automatically making them come out to be false. In this paper I argue against this claim. I show how to make sense of trans-world counterfactuals in a non-trivial way that can make them come out to be true, by appealing to relations of comparative similarity among concrete possible worlds (i.e., assuming modal realism). I argue that either merely making such sense of a relevant counterfactual is not enough to have causation, or that Lewis’ modal realism must be given up

We offer an empirical assessment of description theories of proper names. We examine empirical evidence on lexical and cognitive development, memory, and aphasia, to see whether it supports Descriptivism. We show that description theories demand much more, in terms of psychological assumptions, than what the data suggest; hence, they lack empirical support. We argue that this problem undermines their success as philosophical theories for proper names in natural languages. We conclude by presenting and defending a preliminary alternative account of reference from a developmental perspective

In the context of European Convergence, it has non-stop been encouraged a revolution in higher education in order to face up to challenges thrown down by the socalled "knowledge society". Nevertheless, as it happens in all revolutions, by means of the revolutionary legislation we risk destroying completely what we were trying to legislate on. This essay aims to attract academic circles attention to this matter so 225 LOGOS. Anales del Seminario de Metafísica ISSN: 1575-6866 Vol. 37 (2004): 225-253 Carlos Fernández Liria La revolución educativa Luis Alegre Zahonero that, at least, this disaster is not consolidated with our collaboration

There is a long-standing discussion concerning the nature of moral discourse. Multiple views range from realism—according to which moral discourse is closer to scientific discourse than to fictional discourse—to anti-realism—according to which moral discourse is rather closer to fictional discourse. In this paper, I want to motivate a novel anti-realist account. On this view, there are no moral properties or truths, neither mind-independent nor mind-dependent ones (i.e., anti-realism). However, moral cognition results from the use of higher order cognitive abilities with enough resources to grant moral discourse with all the features of a realist talk (i.e., cognitive quasi-realism). I defend this view based on empirical evidence on human moral development and by showing that the resulting account can meet the demands of robust moral realism. The paper concludes by placing the proposed view within the metaethical landscape by comparing it against other forms of anti-realism, most significantly against expressivism.

Fregeans follow Frege in accepting informativeness and substitution failure as reliable criteria for the existence of senses as objects of thought. In this paper I show that if we accept this, we must also accept the existence of an infinite hierarchy of senses as objects of thought. This is a bad result since it turns Fregeanism into a doctrine according to which object-related thoughts either have an infinite number of objects as contents or none at all. This shows, against the Fregean, that senses cannot themselves be constituents of thought. Los fregeanos aceptan, siguiendo a Frege, que los criterios de informatividad y falla de sustitución son guías confiables de la existencia de sentidos como objetos del pensamiento. En este artículo muestro que si aceptamos esta tesis también debemos aceptar la existencia de una jerarquía infinita de sentidos como objetos del pensamiento. Esta es una mala consecuencia pues convierte al fregeanismo en una doctrina según la cual los pensamientos dirigidos a objetos o bien tienen un número infinito de objetos como contenido o ninguno. Esto muestra, contra los fregeanos, que los sentidos no pueden ellos mismos ser objeto del pensamiento

En esta discusión abordo la hermenéutica analógica de Mauricio Beuchot comparándola con la hermenéutica filosófica de Hans-Georg Gadamer. Argumento que Beuchot vuelve a la idea clásica de la hermenéutica como método de interpretación y no la juzga, como Gadamer, como una fenomenología de la comprensión. Sin embargo, Beuchot no atiende las razones de Gadamer en contra de concebir la hermenéutica como una metodología. Si se considera como metodología centrada en la analogía, la hermenéutica analógica deja de lado otros recursos interpretativos importantes. Finalmente, Beuchot adopta una teoría correspondentista de la verdad contra la que argumenta Gadamer y que es incompatible con una hermenéutica filosófica. In this paper I analyze Mauricio Beuchot's analogical hermeneutics by contrasting it with Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. I argue that Beuchot goes back to the classical idea of hermeneutics as a method of interpretation, and does not see it, as Gadamer does, as a phenomenology of understanding. However, Beuchot does not address Gadamer's arguments against using hermeneutics as a methodology. Considered as a methodology centered on analogy, analogical hermeneutics overlooks other important interpretation resources. Finally, Beuchot adopts a correspondence theory of truth, which Gadamer objects and is incompatible with philosophical hermeneutics.

Background. The study of entrepreneurial activity has undergone intense development in recent decades. Traditionally this topic has been addressed from three approaches: economic, sociological and psychological. In the study of enterprising personality, two fundamental perspectives stand out: the use of general personality traits, like the Big Five, and the use of more specific traits related to entrepreneurial spirit, such as self-efficacy, autonomy, innovation, optimism, and others. The objective of this study is to provide validity evidence for a new instrument for measuring eight specific dimensions of entrepreneurial personality (BEPE). Method. The sample was composed of 1,170 adults from the general population (59.9% women). The average age was 42.34 years with a standard deviation of 12.96. Of the sample, 13% were self-employed. Internal factorial structure and reliability of BEPE were examined. The relationships with other variables and the discriminative capacity of the BEPE between different groups of workers were analyzed. Results. First order factor analyses show the essential unidimensionality of each of the eight proposed sub-scales, with factorial weights ranging between 0.341 and 0.825. A second-order factor analysis was carried out, obtaining a general dimension of entrepreneurial personality. With regards to reliability, the eight BEPE sub-scales gave high alpha coefficient values, between 0.825 and 0.899, as did the total battery (0.97). BEPE sub-scales show a high canonical correlation with the Big Five personality factors (.795), and with the sub-scales of the Measure of Entrepreneurial Talents and Abilities questionnaire (.815). Conclusions. The BEPE questionnaire for the evaluation of the eight fundamental specific dimensions of the entrepreneurial personality presents adequate psychometric properties. Its relationships with other measures of personality traits are in line with what is expected. Therefore, the BEPE is a new measurement instrument that can be used with confidence both in the applied field and in research.

AbstractIn many cultures, interactions between humans and plants are rooted in what is called “relational values”—values that derive from relationships and entail reciprocity. In Mexico, biocultural diversity is mirrored in the knowledge and use of some 6500 plant species and the domestication of over 250 Mesoamerican native crop species. This research explores how different sets of values are attributed to plants and how these influence management strategies to maintain plant resources in wild and anthropogenic environments. We ran workshops in two communities in a highly biodiverse region in western Mexico, to ascertain the values and management activities related to important plant resources. The relationship between values attributed to plants and management activities was examined through redundancy analysis. A total of 180 plant resources were mentioned during the workshops, with a broad spectrum of values attributed to them, including material, non-material, and regulatory dimensions. We divided plant management strategies into three general categories of increasing intensity and complexity. We found that participants in the Indigenous community value and manage more wild plant resources than people in the non-Indigenous community. We also identified relationships between plant resource values and the type of management performed; for example, more intensive forms of management, such as sowing seeds, were used for seasonal plants that had a food value. By valuing and managing different sets of plant resources from forest, agricultural plots, and home gardens, people enabled multi-functional landscapes to form, illustrating a key feature of relational values in agroecosystems, which promotes both conservation and domestication of plants.

Hay usos de nombres vacíos de los que no podemos justificadamente decir que el hablante está comprometido con la existencia de un referente para el nombre en cuestión. Estos usos aparecen dentro de construcciones lingüísticas de la forma ‘X no existe', donde ‘X es un nombre vacío. Sin embargo, los hablantes logran comunicar información no trivial e incluso verdadera mediante dichos usos. Según la tradición metalingüística iniciada por R. Stalnaker (1978), una aseveración de ‘X no existe' comunica que "‘X' no refiere". En este trabajo desarrollo una explicación hipotética que busca hacer avanzar esta tradición. De acuerdo con esta hipótesis, los actos de habla en cuestión son denegaciones metalingüísticas. Defiendo esta hipótesis comparándola con una propuesta metalingüística alternativa de L. Clapp (2008). There are uses of empty names where the speaker cannot justifiably be said to be committed to there being a referent for her use of the relevant name. These appear within negative existential constructions of the form ‘X doesn't exist' where ‘X' is an empty name. Yet, speakers manage to convey non-trivial and sometimes even truthful information with such uses. According to the metalinguistic tradition initiated by R. Stalnaker (1978) assertions of ‘X doesn't exist' convey the information that " ‘X doesn't refer". In this paper I develop a hypothetical account that purports to advance this tradition. On this view, these speech acts are understood as metalinguistic denials. I defend this hypothesis by comparing it against a recent metalinguistic proposal owed to L. Clapp (2008)

Firm managers play an important role in the implementation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) actions. Education is emerging as the key factor in developing a sense of moral responsibility amongst the business students who will eventually become company managers and decision makers. The aim of this research is, thus, twofold. First, to analyze the existence of a direct positive correlation between university students’ perception of CSR and its impact on business performance; and second, to examine the extent to which two factors (advantages brought by CSR and responsibilities toward stakeholders) act as mediation variables in the aforementioned correlation. The analysis was performed with a sample of 390 business‐related university students. Amongst the potential contributions made by this study we can highlight the possibility of knowing future managers’ way of thinking and of knowing the aspects where educational centers might improve their CSR teaching.

In this paper, we delimit the moments in which, in “Doctrine of the Similar” and in “On the Mimetic Faculty”, reading and Sprache (speech, language, language) are inseparably linked to the category of “non-sensuous similarities.” In this conception, the analogical-proportional representation of traditional mimesis is dislocated by a rhetori- cal conception of symbolic experiences given by different semiotic forms. Moreover, the idealist ground of the symbolic is relocated in the specific area of language, in which the perception of similarities is mediated by the instance of reading under the predominance of the dissimilar. Our fundamental purpose resides in exposing how this production of similarities, in contrast to those of the relational schematism of classical logicism and with the ground of idealistic determination of Kantian aesthetics, shows its paradoxical grounds in the mimetic reading.

Faria (2021) presenta una extraordinaria discusión sobre temas que rara vez suelen entrelazarse en la tradición analítica: el cambio en el contenido mental, su relevancia para la validez inferencial y las consecuencias que esto tiene para la responsabilidad (tanto en la acción como en el pensamiento). La meta de Faria (2021) es defender que la impermanencia del contenido, la vulnerabilidad de nuestras inferencias, el azar y la falta de control en nuestros pensamientos y acciones forman parte ineludible de nuestra forma de vida. En este trabajo argumentaré que dichos argumentos son exitosos, aunque pondré en duda las consecuencias específicas que Faria (2021) obtiene de estos, argumentando que si bien hay impermanencia, vulnerabilidad y azar, no son tan radicales como para afectar nuestra concepción intuitiva de contenidos, creencia y racionalidad.

En su más reciente libro, Eleonora Orlando nos presenta una provocadora propuesta que busca cuestionar el éxito de la tradición fregeana en filosofía del lenguaje siguiendo líneas contextualistas y relevantistas. Este libro constituye una valiosa aportación a la filosofía del lenguaje contemporánea. Es una lectura obligatoria para todo aquel interesado en entender el estado actual de la filosofía del lenguaje. Además, la gran variedad de textos y posturas que lo comprenden constituyen por sí mismos valiosas y en ocasiones controvertidas contribuciones a la discusión actual. De ahí que este libro sea también una extraordinaria invitación a continuar la ya centenaria discusión sobre la visión fregeana del lenguaje y si el contextualismo presenta una manera conveniente de mejorarla. En este artículo me propongo hacer un estudio crítico de este libro, particularmente de su desafío al fregeanismo. Para ello discutiré a detalle sus argumentos más antifregeanos, preguntándome al mismo tiempo si se trata de posturas incompatibles con la semántica fregeana o si, por el contrario, constituyen propuestas enteramente compatibles con esta.

Las Comunidades de Castilla, como movimiento social y político, pueden caracterizarse como una tentativa de renovación de la monarquía carolina como forma de gobierno. El creciente conocimiento sobre la circulación de ideas políticas que informaron el corpus doctrinal comunero permite precisar conceptual y terminológicamente un debate revisitado con frecuencia sobre la naturaleza revolucionaria o no de tal proceso. Acudir a los textos de los principales sustentadores teóricos de las Comunidades, tanto como a los documentos de sus reivindicaciones, y no solo a una interpretación de síntesis ex post, contribuye a perfilar el alcance sobre sus pretensiones de reforma respecto a la forma del Estado o a la forma del gobierno, sobre la base de la participación y la igualdad. Apoyarse en las nociones de régimen político y sistema político a la luz de tales textos permite una mejor comprensión del movimiento como reformista más que como revolucionario.

Hegel’s theory of reflection plays both a logical and ontological role in Marx’s theory of labour and private property. What is the point of comparison between a Hegelian and a Marxian theory of reflection? The theory of alienation. In Hegel, one has the alienation of thought in reflective thinking – the understanding’s mode of operation; in Marx, the alienation of labour under private property. As an activity, labour has, according to Marx – like the activity of thinking, in Hegel – the structure of negativity: the structure of externalization and return to the self. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, in particular, Marx developed a theory of the externalization of labour in which alienation prevents the latter from fulfilling its return to itself. Labour becomes alienated, leaves itself and remains outside of itself, for it is appropriated by private property.

La filosofía del lenguaje de Wittgenstein está influida por las aportaciones tanto de Frege como de Bertrand Russell. Si bien, en su obra el Tracttaus puso su propio estilo. Para incluso llegar a decir que sus aportaciones eran el punto clave para que las teorías tanto de Russell como de Frege terminaran con algunos inconvenientes que surgían en sus teorías. Como ejemplo baste las tablas de Verdad de función que introduce Wittgenstein. Sin embargo, es importante que se tengan en cuenta que tomó de estos filósofos, y la manera en que fue modificando sus ideas, para entender la obra del Wittgenstein del Tractatus.