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186Information dynamics and uniform substitutionSynthese 190 (1): 31-55. 2013.The picture of information acquisition as the elimination of possibilities has proven fruitful in many domains, serving as a foundation for formal models in philosophy, linguistics, computer science, and economics. While the picture appears simple, its formalization in dynamic epistemic logic reveals subtleties: given a valid principle of information dynamics in the language of dynamic epistemic logic, substituting complex epistemic sentences for its atomic sentences may result in an invalid pri…Read more
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218Measure Semantics and Qualitative Semantics for Epistemic ModalsProceedings of SALT 23 514-534. 2013.In this paper, we explore semantics for comparative epistemic modals that avoid the entailment problems shown to result from Kratzer’s (1991) semantics by Yalcin (2006, 2009, 2010). In contrast to the alternative semantics presented by Yalcin and Lassiter (2010, 2011), based on finitely additive probability measures, we introduce semantics based on qualitatively additive measures, as well as semantics based on purely qualitative orderings, including orderings on propositions derived from orderin…Read more
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174A note on cancellation axioms for comparative probabilityTheory and Decision 80 (1): 159-166. 2016.We prove that the generalized cancellation axiom for incomplete comparative probability relations introduced by Rios Insua and Alon and Lehrer is stronger than the standard cancellation axiom for complete comparative probability relations introduced by Scott, relative to their other axioms for comparative probability in both the finite and infinite cases. This result has been suggested but not proved in the previous literature
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340Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and SubjunctivismJournal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1): 1-62. 2015.Epistemic closure has been a central issue in epistemology over the last forty years. According to versions of the relevant alternatives and subjunctivist theories of knowledge, epistemic closure can fail: an agent who knows some propositions can fail to know a logical consequence of those propositions, even if the agent explicitly believes the consequence (having “competently deduced” it from the known propositions). In this sense, the claim that epistemic closure can fail must be distinguished…Read more
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104Freedom and ModalityIn John A. Keller (ed.), Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes From the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 149-156. 2017.This paper provides further motivation for a principle relating freedom and modality that appeared in “Freedom and the Fixity of the Past” (The Philosophical Review, Vol. 121), where the principle was used to argue for incompatibilism about freedom and determinism. The paper also replies to objections to that principle from Tognazzini and Fischer (“Incompatibilism and the Past,” this volume).
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University of California, BerkeleyDepartment of Philosophy
Group in Logic and the Methodology of ScienceProfessor
Berkeley, California, United States of America