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14Aplicabilidad y eficacia de las normas jurídicasIsonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía Del Derecho 5 119-139. 1996.
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Legal defeasibility and the connection between law and moralityIn Jordi Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni Battista Ratti (eds.), The Logic of Legal Requirements: Essays on Defeasibility, Oxford University Press. 2012.
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19Consistencia mediante jerarquíaAnálisis Filosófico 33 (1): 94-102. 2013.En esta contribución intentaré mostrar que el criterio lex superior derogat legi inferiori conduce a una consecuencia que, al menos en lo que conozco, no ha sido todavía advertida. Si las normas de la máxima jerarquía de un sistema jurídico, verbigracia, normas constitucionales constituyen un conjunto consistente, entonces necesariamente el sistema jurídico es consistente. Dicho de otra manera, lex superior preserva necesariamente la consistencia. Si las normas del nivel más alto son miembros de…Read more
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19Nino y Dworkin sobre los conceptos de derechoAnálisis Filosófico 35 (1): 111-131. 2015.Algunos de los más relevantes filósofos del derecho de los últimos años, como Carlos S. Nino y Ronald Dworkin, han defendido que hay una pluralidad de conceptos de Derecho. Scott Shapiro ha sostenido una posición especialmente relevante acerca de ello: la palabra ‘Derecho’ es sistemáticamente ambigua, pues a veces designa un conjunto de normas y otras veces una organización social. Esta es precisamente la tesis criticada en el trabajo. Se argumenta, basándose en determinada literatura filosófica…Read more
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El encaje de las piezas del derechoIsonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía Del Derecho 15 165-192. 2001.
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Algunas observaciones sobre las nociones de orden jurídico y sistema jurídicoAnálisis Filosófico 12 (2): 125. 1992.
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29The Dynamics of Legal Positivism. Some Remarks on Shiner's Norm and NatureRatio Juris 10 (3): 288-299. 1997.
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The Reception of Norms, and Open Legal SystemsIn Stanley L. Paulson & Bonnie Litschewski Paulson (eds.), Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes, Oxford University Press. 1998.
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64Legal Gaps and Conclusive ReasonsTheoria 68 (1): 52-66. 2002.In his influential paper Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps' reprinted in The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), Raz says that legal gaps only exist when law speaks with uncertain voice or when it speaks with many voices, but there are no gaps when law is silent. In this later case, rules of closure, which are analytically true, prevent from the occurrence of gaps. According to Raz, if there is a gap in a legal system, then both the claim that there is a conclusive legal reas…Read more
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30Celano: ontological commitment and normative biteRevus 30 77-80. 2016.In his article on pre-conventions, Celano presents, what the author calls, the Ontological Commitment Thesis and the Normative Bite Thesis. In this short comment, the author argues that the two theses are together both incompatible with the idea that pre-conventions are facts which have causal powers in human behaviour; also, if the ontological thesis is abandoned, normative determination could not be obtained. In other terms, the author argues that either pre-conventions are part of our causal …Read more
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314Ways of Solving Conflicts of Constitutional Rights: Proportionalism and SpecificationismRatio Juris 25 (1): 31-46. 2012.This paper deals with the question of the conflict of constitutional rights with regard to basic rights. Two extreme accounts are outlined: the subsumptive approach and the particularistic approach, that embody two main conceptions of practical rationality. Between the two approaches there is room for a range of options, two of which are examined: the proportionalist approach, which conserves the scope of rights restricting their stringency, and the specificationist approach, which preserves the…Read more
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36On relevance and justification of legal decisionsErkenntnis 44 (1). 1996.The author discusses a question related to a certain aspect of justification of legal decisions, often so-called internal justification-a legal decision is internally justified if and only if it can be deduced from the norm(s) applicable to the case, and from the statement(s) describing the facts of the case. According to this notion, infinite irrelevant logical consequences are justified. To avoid this counterintuitive conclusion, the author analyzes three notions of relevance: Sperber-Wilson's…Read more
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El reino de los derechos y la objetividad de la moralAnálisis Filosófico 23 (2): 117-150. 2003.This paper intends to show that it is possible to take convincingly into account the platitudes which underlie our moral practice. It deals with the articulation of an indirect strategy to answer the arguments of moral scepticism: if we can generate a conceptual space that takes such platitudes into account, perhaps we could ignore the sceptic doubts.Several metaethical conceptions can ecumenically carry out this task. Particularly, even if moral realism implies cognitivism and objectivism, mora…Read more
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5Alexy und die Arithmetik der AbwägungArchiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 98 (3): 411-420. 2012.This paper deals with the question of the conflict of constitutional rights which acknowledge basic rights. Alexy’s conception of balancing is the most relevant approach to this question in legal theory. Alexy’s proportionalist account intends to conserve the scope of rights restricting their stringency. This conception is criticized defending, in a specificationist account, the preservation of the stringency of rights restricting their scope.
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The Uses of Slippery Slope ArgumentIn Christian Dahlman & Thomas Bustamante (eds.), Argument Types and Fallacies in Legal Argumentation, Springer
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132Legal positivism and legal disagreementsRatio Juris 22 (1): 62-73. 2009.This paper deals with the possibility of faultless disagreement in law. It does this by looking to other spheres in which faultless disagreement appears to be possible, mainly in matters of taste and ethics. Three possible accounts are explored: the realist account, the relativist account, and the expressivist account. The paper tries to show that in the case of legal disagreements, there is a place for an approach that can take into account our intuitions in the sense that legal disagreements a…Read more
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7Dos concepciones de la interpretación jurídicaIsonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía Del Derecho 29 7-14. 2008.En este breve texto el autor nos introduce a la polémica entre Ricardo Guastini y Rafael Hernández Marín en torno a la interpretación del derecho. En dicha polémica Guastini defiende el escepticismo, mientras que Hernández Marín defiende el cognoscitivismo. Estas maneras diferentes de entender la interpretación jurídica son puestas a prueba en un interesante intercambio de ideas que nos permite apreciar los alcances y límites de cada posición.