Jose Juan Moreso

We analyse the relationship between applicability and effectiveness of legal norms from a philosophical perspective. In particular, we distinguish between two concepts of applicability. The external applicability of norms refers to institutional duties; a norm N is externally applicable if and only if a judge is legally obliged to apply N to some case c. Internal applicability refers instead to the sphere of validity of legal norms. A norm N is internally applicable to actions regulated by its sphere of validity. We also explore the consequences of a thesis which maintains that applicability restricts the concept of effectiveness, so that only applicable norms can be considered effective. Our analysis illustrates that a proper reconstruction of the concept of applicability is of great importance not only for understanding the concept of effectiveness but also for providing insight into the nature of law.

This article attempts to illustrate the originality, depth, and farsightedness of Joseph Raz's conception, especially his idea that legal norms provide us with protected reasons to act, that is, with first-order reasons to behave as they prescribe, and with second-order, exclusionary reasons not to act for reasons against what they prescribe. But the article also highlights some aspects that raise doubts in my mind, especially with regard to the scope of these exclusionary reasons. This in two ways: by asking, on the one hand, in what sense and subject to what limits legal norms provide exclusionary reasons for the organs entrusted with applying the law, especially for judges, and on the other hand, how and to what extent legal norms provide citizens with exclusionary reasons. So, in recognizing the strength of the Razian conception, the article also points to some of the difficulties it faces.

This article addresses the use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication. We draw on the ideas of wide reflective equilibrium and public reason in order to defend an engagement model of comparative adjudication. According to this model, the judicial use of foreign law is justified if it proceeds by testing and mutually adjusting the principles and rulings of our constitutional doctrines against reasonable alternatives, as represented by the principles and rulings of other reasonable doctrines. By this, a court points to a wide reflective equilibrium, justifying its own interpretations with reasonable arguments, i.e. arguments that are acceptable from the perspectives defined by other constitutional doctrines, as endorsed by other courts. The point of a judicial engagement of this sort is to work out an overlap between different, reasonable, doctrines in the judicial forum, as part of a liberal forum of public reason. Here, the exercise of public reason filters out the premises of comprehensive doctrines so as to leave us in the region of an overlapping consensus: a region of mid-level principles that can be shared, notwithstanding the fact of legal pluralism.

Este trabajo presenta las ideas fundamentales de Jeremy Bentham (1848-1832) en teoría jurídica, en ética y en filosofía política. Muestra que su concepción tiene las raíces en una epistemología empirista, una ontología nominalista y una original filosofía del lenguaje. La teoría del derecho contiene una teoría de las normas que incorpora un valioso precedente de la lógica deóntica. El utilitarismo hedonista que coloca como objetivo único la maximización de la felicidad constituye a su vez el fundamento de su teoría de la democracia: una teoría que desconfía de todos los mecanismos de poder y dota de instrumentos a los ciudadanos para controlarlos. El último apartado analiza la fortuna de Bentham en la historia de las ideas, tratando de ser fiel con las luces y las sombras de su legado.

Este libro reúne seis trabajos del autor que procuran suministrar un espacio conceptual para la adecuada comprensión de las prácticas jurídicas en nuestras sociedades. Se trata de elaborar un concepto de derecho, y dar cuenta de sus relaciones con la moralidad, que acoja la posibilidad de que la aplicación judicial del derecho constituya un ámbito en donde la moralidad y de dar cuenta de sus relaciones con la moralidad, que acoja la posibilidad de que la aplicación judicial del derecho constituya un ámbito en donde la moralidad y el derecho se entrecrucen.

En este artículo, se analiza la cuestión de si la existencia del derecho depende necesariamente de la moralidad. La cuestión que ha enfrentado a las doctrinas del derecho natural con el positivismo jurídico. Se trata de mostrar que dicho debate esconde, al menos tres cuestiones diferentes, que requieren respuestas diversas: 1) La cuestión semántica de si las normas positivas injustas son derecho, 2) la cuestión metafísica de si la existencia del contenido del derecho está fundada en hechos morales y 3) la cuestión epistémica de si el contenido del derecho debe ser identificado sin recurrir a consideraciones morales. Se concluye que la primera cuestión es una mera disputa verbal. Se dan algunos argumentos para aceptar la tesis metafísica. Y una respuesta afirmativa a la tercera cuestión es puesta en duda analizando la doctrina de la autoridad de Joseph Raz y, también, tratando de mostrar que el hecho de que algo sea concebible no conlleva que sea metafísicamente posible.

RESUMEN En este trabajo se analizan las principales ideas de John Rawls acerca de la naturaleza del derecho y del razonamiento jurídico. Partiendo de un trabajo de Ronald Dworkin (2004), y básicamente de acuerdo con él, se exponen las críticas dworkinianas a la doctrina rawlsiana de la razón pública, y se presenta un modo en el cual Rawls podría replicarlas. El objetivo del trabajo es mostrar la fecundidad de las ideas rawlsianas para nuestra concepción del derecho en sociedades democráticas, caracterizadas por el hecho del pluralismo.

In this book, I present the results of an investigation which began with an extended stay at Oxford's Balliol College during the first half of 1995. My visit to Oxford was made possible by a grant from the Spanish Ministerio de Educaci6n y Ciencia. My sincere thanks go to Joseph Raz who served as my supervisor in Oxford. For several points of the present study, conversations with Timothy Endicott in Oxford were also of great help. The book is part of a larger project of investigation, directed by Albert Calsami glia, which is a joint effort of a group of legal philosophers from the Universitat Pom peu Fabra and the Universitat de Girona, and which also receives financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Educaci6n y Ciencia. An earlier version of the manuscript was presented in June 1996 to the selection committee for a tenured professorship in Legal Philosophy at the Universitat de Girona. The members of the committee were Francisco Laporta, Albert Calsamiglia, Gregorio Peces-Barba, Camilo J. Cela Conde, and Francesca Puigpelat. I am grateful to all of them for their comments, which have been extremely useful in preparing the final ver sion of this book.

Una forma clásica de explicar el significado de una oración es establecer sus condiciones deverdad. Sin embargo, dado que sólo las oraciones declarativas encajan con este tipo de análisis, las oraciones (e.g. imperativas) que carecen de valor de verdad quedan fuera de este análisis. Con el objeto de evitar esta dificultad, algunas veces se ha sugerido que el cumplimiento de un imperativo les el valor semántico de I, y que este valor depende del concepto de verdad. En este artículo, explicamos esta sugerencia mediante un lenguaje artificial: el lenguaje LN. Nuestra propuesta consiste en suministrar una reconstrucción del concepto de eficacia a partir de la relación de cumplimiento, analógamente a la reconstrucción del concepto de verdad a partir de la relación de satisfacción. Nuestras conclusiones principales son las siguientes: 1) el significado de una oración imperativa es establecido por sus condiciones de eficacia y 2) esta teoría del significado de los imperativos suministra una base semántica, adeucada para la lógica deóntica.A classical way of explaining the meaning of certain sentences is to establish their truth-conditions. However, since only declarative sentences fit this kind of analysis, sentences (e.g. imperatives) which lack truth-value remain outside the theory of meaning. In order to avoid this difficulty, it is sometimes suggested both that compliance with an imperative I is the semantic value of I, and that this value is dependent on the concept of truth. In this article, we explain this suggestion with the help of a constructed language: the artificial language NL. Our proposal Is to provide a reconstruction of the concept of effectiveness from the relation of compliance, on the analogy of the reconstruction of the concept of truth from the relation of satisfaction. Our main conclusions are: 1) the meaning of a imperative sentence would be established by its effectiveness-conditions and 2) this theory of meaning of imperatives would provide a semantic basis, suitable to the deontic logic.

This handbook offers a deep analysis of the main forms of legal reasoning and argumentation from both a logical-philosophical and legal perspective. These forms are covered in an exhaustive and critical fashion, and the handbook accordingly divides in three parts: the first one introduces and discusses the basic concepts of practical reasoning. The second one discusses the main general forms of reasoning and argumentation relevant for legal discourse. The third one looks at their application in law as well as at the different areas of legal reasoning. The handbook’s division in three parts reflects its conceptual architecture, since legal reasoning and argumentation are considered in relation to the more general types of reasoning.

Some philosophers have recently emphasized the similarities between lawmaking and the production of linguistic utterances in ordinary communication. Based on these similarities, they have defended a theory of legal interpretation that identifies the legal content of a lawmaking act with the communicative content of the authoritative “utterance”. While different versions of the theory differ with respect to which level of utterance content they regard as relevant, they agree that the theory’s scope is fully general in that it applies to all legal systems. In this paper, we argue that this commitment of the theory is problematic. By examining the role of interpretative arguments in legal interpretation, we argue that there is a tension between this commitment and the doctrine of the rule of recognition. In light of this, we argue that Hartian positivism is only compatible with a weakened or “minimal” version of the theory. Insofar as both the communication theory and Hartian positivism provide true insights on how legal content is determined, this result gives us reason to accept only a minimal version of the theory.

In this comment to the brilliant book on the Constitutionalism in Latin-America, Gargarella, it is accepted that perhaps is the equality the empty promise among the ideals of constitutionalism in this region of the world. It is also accepted that an important part of the reason for this absence of equality lies in the institutional design, in the engine room of the Constitution, concretely in an hypertrophy of presidentialism. A complementary suggestion is added: the ideal of a constitutional democracy presupposes the existence of a State with an autonomous, efficient, professional and robust public Administration. Only with a well-designed tax system and an Administration apt to carry out the proper functions it is possible to build a well-ordered society in which the Rawlsian Difference Principle is respected and honoured.

This article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended by Alchourrón and Bulygin. These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestive conception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalent to thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they defend a relativist conception of ethics. They present three objections to constructivist accounts of ethics that are not relativist: a) the argument of the burden of the proof; b) a version of the dilemma of Euthyphro, and c) the argument of particularism. This article presents counterarguments to these objections in the attempt to show that they are not conclusive and that a space therefore remains for objectivity in the normative sphere. Keywords: Alchourrón-Bulygin, ethical relativism, ethical constructivism, burden of proof, particularism.

In this paper, I intend to articulate an answer to the powerful particularist objection against the notion of moral and legal reasoning based on universal principles. I defend a particular way of specifying and contextualising universal principles. I claim that this account preserves legal and moral justification conceived as subsumption to legal and moral principles. I also try to show how virtues can be reconciled with this account, i.e. what is the right place for virtues in legal adjudication. To carry this out, I draw on a virtue epistemology.

This article provides a comment on The Force of Law, which is Schauer's new and illuminating contribution to the place of law in our societies and in our lives. It constitutes a strong defence of the importance of coercion in law. First, I consider cases where the law is not able to motivate human behaviour adequately, in order to show that legal coercion is not always justified. Second, I examine the Rawlsian distinction between the ideal and the nonideal theory and its application to the theory of law. Third, I tentatively argue that coercion has no place in ideal theory, but a core place in nonideal theory. In this way, it may be plausible to reconstruct the motivation to accept the law, at least when the law is normatively justified.

We analyse the relationship between applicability and effectiveness of legal norms from a philosophical perspective. In particular, we distinguish between two concepts of applicability. The external applicability of norms refers to institutional duties; a norm N is externally applicable if and only if a judge is legally obliged to apply N to some case c. Internal applicability refers instead to the sphere of validity of legal norms. A norm N is internally applicable to actions regulated by its sphere of validity. We also explore the consequences of a thesis which maintains that applicability restricts the concept of effectiveness, so that only applicable norms can be considered effective. Our analysis illustrates that a proper reconstruction of the concept of applicability is of great importance not only for understanding the concept of effectiveness but also for providing insight into the nature of law.

En "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz señala que las lagunas jurídicas existen sólo cuando el derecho habla con voz incierta o cuando habla con muchas voces, pero que no hay lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio. En este último caso habría reglas de clausura, analíticamente verdaderas, que impiden la ocurrencia de esas lagunas. Según Raz, si hay una laguna en un sistema jurídico, entonces no es verdadero ni falso que exista una razón concluyente para ejecutar cierta acción. Así, una de las contribuciones más importantes de Raz a la solución del problema de las lagunas jurídicas es subrayar que el discurso jurídico no está completamente controlado por la bivalencia. Sin embargo, a menudo se sostiene que el rechazo de la bivalencia conduce a contradicciones. Si esta afirmación fuese verdadera, entonces la solución de Raz al problema de las lagunas jurídicas se vería seriamente amenazada. En este artículo mostramos, con ayuda de una herramienta analítica sofisticada, i.e., la lógica de la verdad de G.H. von Wright, que el rechazo de la bivalencia sólo nos compromete a aceptar la conclusión trivial de que puede haber proposiciones que no son verdaderas ni falsas. Por esta razón, el trabajo de Raz todavía puede ser considerado un buen punto de partida para analizar las relaciones entre normas, razonamiento práctico y lagunas jurídicas. Sin embargo, también mostramos que para admitir proposiciones que no son verdaderas ni falsas, las tesis de Raz deben ser reformuladas. De otra manera, la tesis de que no existen lagunas cuando el derecho guarda silencio no sería compatible con el rechazo de la bivalencia. /// In his paper "Legal Reasons, Sources and Gaps", Raz says that legal gaps only exist when law speaks with uncertain voice or when it speaks with many voices, but there are no gaps when law is silent. In this later case, rules of closure, which are analytically true, prevent from the occurrence of gaps. According to Raz, if there is a gap in a legal system, then both the claim that there is a conclusive legal reason to perform a certain action, and its negation are neither true nor false. Therefore, one of the Raz's most important contributions to the solution of the problem of legal gaps is to remark that legal discourse is not altogether governed by the principie of bivalence. However, philosophers often claim that the denial of bivalence leads to a logical inconsistency. If this claim were true, then Raz's solution to the problem of gaps would be seriously threatened. In this paper we show--with the aid of a sophisticated analytical tool, i.e., von Wright's truth-logic--that the rejection of bivalence only commits us to accept the trivial conclusion that propositions can lack truth-values. For this reason, Raz's paper can still be regarded as a good starting-point for analyzing the relationships between norms, practical reasoning and legal gaps. However, we also show that in order to admit propositions which are neither true nor false, Raz's theses must be reformulated. Otherwise, the claim that there is no gap when law is silent would not be compatible with the rejection of bivalence.