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44Eliminativism and the theory of referenceIn Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 14--62. 2009.
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120Causal Roles and Higher-Order PropertiesTen Problems of ConsciousnessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3): 657. 1998.I discuss whether Michael Tye, in Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1966, holds that phenomenal properties are neurological properties, but that what gives them their phenomenal property names are their highly complex interconnections with other neurological properties and, most especially, subjects' surroundings. Or, alternatively, whether he holds that they are higher-level, wide functional properties in the sense of being properties of having properties that …Read more
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33Critical noticeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4). 1992.This Article does not have an abstract
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233Colour for representationalistsErkenntnis 66 (1-2): 169--85. 2007.Redness is the property that makes things look red in normal circumstances. That seems obvious enough. But then colour is whatever property does that job: a certain reflectance profile as it might be. Redness is the property something is represented to have when it looks red. That seems obvious enough. But looking red does not represent that which looks red as having a certain reflectance profile. What should we say about this antinomy and how does our answer impact on the contest between realis…Read more
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89Conceptual analysis for representationalistsGrazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1): 173-188. 2010.We use words to mark out patterns in nature. This is why a word like 'nutritious' is so useful. One way of thinking about conceptual analysis is as the business of capturing the structure in the patterns so picked out, for it is not credible that the patterns are one and all sui generis. This paper spells out this way of thinking about conceptual analysis. Along the way we discuss: the role of intuitions about possible cases with some reference to the experimental philosophy debate, why analyses…Read more
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65Confirmation and the NomologicalCanadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3). 1980.We argue that it is a mistake to approach goodman's new riddle of induction by demarcating projectible from non-Projectible predicates and hypotheses, And put forward an alternative way of looking at the whole question
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39Conditionals and PossibiliaProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81. 1981.Frank Jackson; VIII*—Conditionals and Possibilia, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 125–138, https://doi.org/10.10.
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119Color and contentBehavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1): 34-34. 2003.Those who identify colours with physical properties need to say how the content of colour experiences relate to their favoured identifications. This is because it is not plausible to hold that colour experiences represent things as having the physical properties in question. I sketch how physical realists about colour might tackle this item of unfinished business.
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1Block's challengeIn Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays in Honour of D M Armstrong, Cambridge University Press. 1993.
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67A priori physicalismIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2007.
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15A slightly radical neuron doctrineBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5): 840-841. 1999.The element of truth in behaviorism tells us that some versions of a radical neuron doctrine must be false. However, the representational nature of many mental states implies that neuroscience may well bear on some topics traditionally addressed by philosophers of mind. An example is the individuation of belief states.
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A priori biconditionals and metaphysicsIn David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, Mit Press. 2009.
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5An objectivist's guide to subjectivism about colorRevue Internationale de Philosophie 41 (1): 127-141. 1987.
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129A note on physicalism and heatAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (1): 26-34. 1980.This Article does not have an abstract
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263A causal theory of counterfactualsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (1). 1977.This Article does not have an abstract
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15A Companion to David Lewis, edited by Barry Lower and Jonathan SchafferGrazer Philosophische Studien 93 (2): 323-327. 2016.
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1ConsciousnessIn Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press New York. pp. 310--333. 2005.
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PITCHER, G.: "A Theory of Perception" (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (n/a): 85. 1973.
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1DRETSKE, Fred: Seeing and Knowing (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (n/a): 148. 1970.
Acton, Australian Capital Territory, Australia