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498In defense of folk psychologyPhilosophical Studies 59 (1): 31-54. 1990.It turned out that there was no phlogiston, no caloric fluid, and no luminiferous ether. Might it turn out that there are no beliefs and desires? Patricia and Paul Churchland say yes} We say no. In part one we give our positive argument for the existence of beliefs and desires.
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1192The Two Envelope 'Paradox'Analysis 54 (1). 1994.This paper discusses the finite version of the two envelope paradox. (That is, we treat the paradox against the background assumption that there is only a finite amount of money in the world.)
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104Mind, morality, and explanation: selected collaborationsOxford University Press. 2004.Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith have been at the forefront of philosophy in Australia for much of the last two decades, and their collaborative work has had widespread influence throughout the world. Mind, Morality, and Explanation collects the best of that work in a single volume, showcasing their seminal contributions to philosophical psychology, the theory of psychological and social explanation, moral theory, and moral psychology.
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2694Conceptual analysis and reductive explanationPhilosophical Review 110 (3): 315-61. 2001.Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes. Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no.
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321Locke, expressivism, conditionalsAnalysis 63 (1): 86-92. 2003.The sentence ‘x is square’ might have had different truth conditions from those it in fact has. It might have had no truth conditions at all. Its having truth conditions and its having the ones it has rest on empirical facts about our use of ‘x is square’. What empirical facts? Any answer that goes into detail is inevitably highly controversial, but we think that there is a rough answer that is, by philosophers’ standards, relatively uncontroversial. It goes back to Locke 1689 and beyond, and is…Read more
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288Causation and the philosophy of mindPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (n/a): 195-214. 1990.
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2150Program explanation: A general perspectiveAnalysis 50 (2): 107-17. 1990.Some properties are causally relevant for a certain effect, others are not. In this paper we describe a problem for our understanding of this notion and then offer a solution in terms of the notion of a program explanation
Acton, Australian Capital Territory, Australia