Patrick Thomas Riley

Leibniz’s Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice is his most important writing on justice as “wise charity” and “universal benevolence” ; we now observe the 300th anniversary of its composition, and a reproduction of part of Leibniz’s manuscript appears in the Appendix to this article. But Leibniz’s essay might with equal justice be called, “Meditation on the Common Notion of Platonism”—for the Méditation opens with a nearly-verbatim paraphrase of Euthyphro 9e-10e, moves on to reduce Hobbes to Thrasymachus in Republic Book I, and ends with Platonic “ascent,” in the manner of Phaedrus and Symposium, from mere negative forbearance from harm to justice as wise love, caritas, Roman-law honeste vivere, and benevolent “aid to others”—as in Augustine’s Platonizing De Civitate Dei XIX).

It is well-known that Leibniz ends and crowns the 1714 “Monadologie” with a version of his notion of jurisprudence universelle or “justice as the charity [love] of the wise:” for sections 83-90 of the Vienna manuscript claim that “the totality of all spirits must compose the City of God . . . this perfect government . . . the most perfect state that is possible . . . this truly universal monarchy [which is] a moral world in the natural world”—a moral world of iustitia in which “no good action would be unrewarded” for those “citizens” who “find pleasure . . . in the contemplation of [God’s] perfections, as is the way of genuine ‘pure love.’” But the opening four-fifths of the work offer Leibniz’ theory of “substance” viewed as the necessary pre-condition of justice: for “on the knowledge of substance, and in the consequence of the soul, depends the knowledge of virtue and of justice” . Thus without a complete and correct notion of substance/monad, no complete and correct notion commune de la justice would be conceivable. Hence the entire “Monadologie” can be understood as a theory of justice underpinned by a Grundlegung of moral “monads” or justice-loving rational “substances.” In this connection it is revelatory that Leibniz cites the relevant sections of the 1710 Théodicée in most of the 90 articles of the “Monadologie” : for Théodicée is “the justice of God,” and Leibniz makes that justice “appear” in the opening lines of the “Monadologie” by referring the reader immediately to Théodicée #10 —which relates “im­mortal spirits” to a just God who is cherished through “genuine pure love.” This means that “the justice of God” as “higher love” colors the “Monadologie” instantly. Thus one need not “wait” for sections 83-90 to arrive in order for the “Monadologie” to be a “theory of justice:” it is such ab initio

To mark the 300th anniversary of the composition of Leibniz’ most important mature writing on justice, the Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice, I published an interpretation of this work in The Leibniz Review. But Dr. Andreas Blank, dissatisfied with my Platonizing “reading” of the Méditation, published his own commentary in the same Review —treating not just my 2003 article but also my Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence: Justice as the Charity of the Wise and several smaller writings from the period 1972-2002. Since Andreas Blank is a good Leibniz-scholar who deserves a reply, I want to attempt an answer; and to avoid any possible misrepresentation, I want to quote the beginning of his article, word-for-word.