Patrick Thomas Riley

The latest volume of Leibniz’s “General Political and Historical Correspondence” in the great Berlin-Brandenburg Academy Edition, covering the period May to December 1699, contains a number of letters bearing on Leibniz’s central practical idea—that “universal” justice, rightly conceived, is a positive, other-aiding caritas sapientis seu benevolentia universalis ; that such justice “contains” or encloses all of the moral virtues; and that it relates to “the common good” or “the perfection of the universe” or “the glory of God”— where these three distinct things are morally equivalent in Leibniz’s usual sense.

The greatest satisfaction a scholar can know is to have his work intelligently appreciated by the most competent judges. I am therefore delighted when Professor Donald Rutherford, the author of that superb book, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature, generously describes my Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence: Justice as the Charity of the Wise as “a wonderful achievement.” I am especially pleased that he thinks I made a respectable case for Leibniz’ anti-Hobbesian, Christian-Platonist definition of justice as caritas sapientis seu benevolentia universalis, “the charity of the wise, that is, universal benevolence.” For, as I said in my Conclusion, “Obviously a social world fully and completely governed by the Leibnizian principle of justice as ‘wise charity’ would be a good one, and certainly better than our present social world... Who can doubt that the world would be better if Leibnizian universal jurisprudence were in place—if every rational substance in the universe not only refrained from harm [the neminem laedere of Roman law] but rejoiced in the ‘perfection’ of others?... Only an ungenerous heart would fail to be moved by so generous a moral vision.” That generous moral vision, I suggested, comes out most eloquently in La véritable piété of 1710

For forty years all Leibniz-scholars have been deeply indebted to André Robinet, who is incontrovertibly the most important French Leibniz-interpreter since the much-lamented Gaston Grua. Indeed it was in the very year of Grua’s premature death that Robinet began four decades of Leibniz-illumination with his magisterial Malebranche et Leibniz: Rélations personnelles. The year 1962 saw the arrival of Robinet’s splendid edition of Leibniz’ Nouveaux Essais—as Volume VI, vi of the great Academy Edition of the Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe. Further important Leibniz-scholarship marked Robinet’s activity over the next quarter-century, culminating in two remarkable books from the 1980s: Architectonique disjonctive, automates systémiques et idéalité transcendentales dans l’oeuvre de Leibniz, the most penetrating general overview of Leibniz’ philosophy produced in recent decades, and G.W. Leibniz, Iter Italicum, La dynamique de la République des lettres, in which Leibniz’ many Italian concerns and rapports are brought out with astonishing thoroughness. This last book was an elaborated outgrowth of Robinet’s contribution to the 1980 Leibniz conference at Ferrara, “Leibniz as Historian”— the conference at which the present reviewer first met Professor Robinet, and learned that he is as formidably learned and eloquently persuasive in person as he is on the printed page. And that remains true to the present day: Robinet’s contribution to the celebration of Leibniz’ 350th birthday at the Berlin-Brandenburg Akademie der Wissenschaften was as masterly as ever, and was reported as such by a special article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Leibniz’s Political and Moral Philosophy in the Novissima Sinica, 1699–1999Patrick RileyThe Preface to Leibniz’s Novissima Sinica 1 contains an important but highly compressed and abbreviated quintessence of his theory of justice or jurisprudence universelle—a version so compressed and abbreviated that one must have a broader and fuller understanding of this universal jurisprudence before one can entirely appreciate what Leibniz has to say about Christian charity, Platonism, and geometry in the Novissima Sinica itself. Above all, one wants to know why Leibniz, in the key paragraph of the Preface to Novissima Sinica, should describe the Chinese emperor as just and charitable and as a (more or less) “Platonic” geometer who is as wise as he is charitable. And why should Leibniz contrast this “wisely charitable” Chinese ruler with the Pontius Pilate who irresponsibly asked, “What is truth?” and then permitted the judicial murder of the very Christ who did most to make charity and justice coextensive by saying, “A new law I give unto you, that ye love one another”? 2 The wise course, therefore, is to throw enough light on Leibnizian universal jurisprudence in general to make his moral-political utterances in Novissima Sinica intelligible in particular.In 1693, four years before the publication of Novissima Sinica, Leibniz revealed the outlines of his jurisprudence universelle in the Codex Iuris Gentium:a good man is one who loves everybody, so far as reason permits. Justice, then, which is the virtue which regulates that affection which [End Page 217] the Greeks call philanthropy, will be most conveniently defined... as the charity of the wise man, that is, charity which follows the dictates of wisdom... Charity is a universal benevolence, and benevolence the habit of loving or of willing the good. Love then signifies rejoicing in the happiness of another..., the happiness of those whose happiness pleases us turns into our own happiness, since things which please us are desired for their own sakes. 3Slightly later, in La véritable piété, Leibniz indicated what this view of justice entails:those who... reduce justice to [mere] rigor, and who fail altogether to understand that one cannot be just without being benevolent... in a word, not only those who look for their profit, pleasure, and glory in the misery of others, but also those who are not at all anxious to procure the common good and to lift out of misery those who are in their care, and generally those who show themselves to be without enlightenment and without charity, boast in vain of piety which they do not know at all, whatever appearance they create. 4The central idea of Leibniz’s “universal jurisprudence,” which aims to find quasi-geometrical, eternal moral verities equally valid for all rational beings, human or divine, is that justice is “the charity of the wise” (caritas sapientis), 5 that it is not mere conformity to sovereign-ordained “positive” law given ex plenitudo potestatis (in the manner of Hobbes); nor is it mere “refraining from harm” or even “rendering what is due” (the neminem laedere and suum cuique tribuere of Roman law). 6 The equal stress on “charity” and on “wisdom” suggests that Leibniz’s practical thought is a kind of fusing of Platonism—in which the wise know the eternal truths such as absolute goodness (Phaedo 75d), which the gods themselves also know and love (Euthyphro 93-10e) and which therefore deserve to rule (Republic 443d-e) 7 —and of Pauline Christianity, whose key moral idea is that charity or love is the first of the virtues (“though I speak [End Page 218] with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal”). 8 Historically, there is nothing remarkable in trying to fuse Platonism and Christianity. Augustine’s thought (particularly the early De Libero Arbitrio) is just such a fusion. 9 But Leibniz was the last of the great Christian Platonists, and left the world just as Hume, Rousseau, and Kant were about to transform and “secularize” it.I. If one decomposes caritas sapientis into its parts, charity and wisdom, the provenance of both elements is clear enough...

Given Leibniz’ admiration for Bayle’s Dictionnaire historique et critique, which he called “le plus beau des dictionnaires” in the Nouveaux essais, and given that Bayle’s skeptical worries provided the occasion for the writing of the Theodicée, it is appropriate to consider in the The Leibniz Review the first English-language version of those articles from Bayle’s Dictionnaire which are most important for political and moral philosophy. For it is a superb version, edited by the most knowledgeable Bayle-scholar in the Anglophone world; it will justly shape early-Englightenment studies in coming decades.

In the middle section of Theory and Practice, Kant speaks briefly `against Hobbes '; but for a fuller version of Kant's anti-Hobbesianism one must turn to the three Critiques, the Groundwork, and Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. It is in those works that one learns that, for Kant, Hobbes 's notion of `will' as fully determined `last appetite' destroys the freedom needed to take `ought' or moral necessity as the motives for self-determined action; that Hobbes ' s version of the social contract is thus incoherent; that Hobbes is not even able to show how moral ideas are conceivable through the `pressure' of `outward objects'. For Kant, in short, Hobbes has no adequate notions of will, freedom, moral necessity, ideation, or even obligatory contract, and therefore fails in his own stated aims. Key Words: Hobbes • Kant • politics • reason • teleology • will

In a few months’ time the Potsdam branch of the Berlin-Brandenburg Akademie der Wissenschaften will bring out the latest volume of Leibniz’s Political Writings, under the able editorship of Hartmut Rudolph. For Leibniz’s moral-political-juridical philosophy, the most important single item in A IV, 5 will be the “Praefatio” to the Codex Iuris Gentium—the work in which Leibniz first published his celebrated notion that justice is “the charity of the wise” or “universal benevolence”, not just Hobbesian sovereign-ordained law backed by fear of sanctions. In the crucial paragraph of the Codex, Leibniz insists that

Leibniz’s Méditation sur la notion commune de la justice is his most important writing on justice as “wise charity” and “universal benevolence” ; we now observe the 300th anniversary of its composition, and a reproduction of part of Leibniz’s manuscript appears in the Appendix to this article. But Leibniz’s essay might with equal justice be called, “Meditation on the Common Notion of Platonism”—for the Méditation opens with a nearly-verbatim paraphrase of Euthyphro 9e-10e, moves on to reduce Hobbes to Thrasymachus in Republic Book I, and ends with Platonic “ascent,” in the manner of Phaedrus and Symposium, from mere negative forbearance from harm to justice as wise love, caritas, Roman-law honeste vivere, and benevolent “aid to others”—as in Augustine’s Platonizing De Civitate Dei XIX).