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Noah Lemos

William & Mary
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Brown University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1983
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Value Theory
  •  39
    Ramon M. Lemos, 1927-2006
    with Risto Hilpinen, Leonard Carrier, and Howard Pospesel
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (5). 2006.
  •  210
    An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge
    Cambridge University Press. 2007.
    Epistemology or the theory of knowledge is one of the cornerstones of analytic philosophy, and this book provides a clear and accessible introduction to the subject. It discusses some of the main theories of justification, including foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. Other topics include the Gettier problem, internalism and externalism, skepticism, the problem of epistemic circularity, the problem of the criterion, a priori knowledge, and naturalized epistemology…Read more
    Epistemology, General Works
  •  177
    Hedonism and the good life
    Philosophical Studies 136 (3): 417-423. 2007.
    Hedonist Accounts of Well-Being
  • Moore and Skepticism
    In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism, Oxford University Press. pp. 330. 2008.
    History: SkepticismDogmatist and Moorean Replies to Skepticism
  •  217
    Sosa on epistemic circularity and reflective knowledge
    Metaphilosophy 40 (2): 187-194. 2009.
    Abstract: Ernest Sosa has done important work on epistemic circularity, epistemic virtue, and reflective knowledge. He holds that epistemic circularity need not be vicious and need not prevent us from knowing that our ways of forming beliefs are reliable. In this article, I briefly explore Sosa's defense of this view and raise some questions about what is required for reflective knowledge.
    Epistemology, MiscVirtue Epistemology
  •  75
    Summation, Variety, and Indeterminate Value
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1): 33-44. 2010.
    In this paper, I consider two sorts of objections to summative theories of value. The first objection concerns “indeterminate” value. The second concerns the importance of variety. I argue that both objections pose serious problems for the summative approach. I also argue that if we accept certain plausible views about the value of variety, we should reject certain forms of argument concerning what sorts of states have intrinsic value.
    Value TheoryValue Theory, Miscellaneous
  •  109
    Intrinsic Value and the Partiality Problem
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3): 697-716. 2011.
    Intrinsic Value
  •  23
    Objective Value and Requirements
    In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, Springer. pp. 21--31. 2013.
    Rational Requirements
  •  22
    Book Review: Against Absolute Goodness, written by Richard Kraut (review)
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (5): 661-664. 2014.
    Value TheoryValue Theory, MiscellaneousMoral Value
  •  112
    A Defense of Organic Unities
    The Journal of Ethics 19 (2): 125-141. 2015.
    In this essay, I defend the Moorean position on organic unities. I will present some plausible examples of organic unites and consider some objections to them. In particular, I will consider an objection from evaluative inadequacy and an objection from Holism or Conditionalism. I will also examine one line of criticism that claims the Moorean position is incoherent
    Value TheoryMoral Value