Noah Lemos

Some philosophers have adopted both a commonsense approach to the theory of knowledge and held that some epistemic principles are knowable a priori. Roderick Chisholm is a prominent example of a philosopher who does both. In The Problem of the Criterion, Chisholm holds that in attempting to discover criteria of evidence we should begin with particular commonsense examples of knowledge, such as I know that I have two hands and I know that there are other people. According to Chisholm, our knowledge of these particular epistemic facts does not depend upon our knowing criteria of evidence or knowledge. Moreover, we may reject various criteria of evidence and knowledge because they do not fit with these particular epistemic facts. Thus, according to Chisholm, we may reject the empiricist criterion of knowledge held by Locke and Hume because it implies that we do not know things that we do in fact know, because it conflicts with our commonsense epistemic beliefs.

I distinguish between two theses, DPJ and DGP. DPJ asserts that one’s justification for accepting particular epistemic propositions positively depends on one’s being justified in believing general epistemic principles. DGP claims that one’s justification in believing general epistemic propositions positively depends on one’s being justified in believing particular epistemic propositions. I claim that methodism accepts DPJ and rejects DGP and particularism accepts DGP and rejects DPJ. I argue that we should reject DGP and methodism roughly because these views imply that many of us do not know epistemic propositions that we do know. This point is made by Roderick Chisholm in The Problem of the Criterion and challenged by Robert Amico. I consider Chisholm’s arguments and Amico’s objections. Finally, I argue that even if we reject DPJ and methodism, we need not embrace particularism, since we could reject both DPJ and DGP.

There is a long tradition in moral philosophy which maintains that a necessary condition for moral goodness is that one act from a sense of duty. Kant is perhaps the best known and most discussed representative of this view, but one finds others prior to Kant, such as Butler and Price, and Kant's contemporaries, such as Reid, expressing similar ideas. Price, for example writes, ". . . what I have chiefly insisted on, is, that we characterize as virtuous no actions flowing merely from instinctive desires, or from any principle except a regard to virtue itself.'' In this paper, I shall defend a version of this thesis.

In ”Epistemology and Ethics,” Noah Lemos suggests that moral epistemology is mainly concerned with “whether and how we can have knowledge or justified belief” about moral issues. After addressing skeptical arguments, he considers how the moral epistemologist and moral philosopher should begin their account of moral knowledge. Lemos favors a particularist approach whereby we begin with instances of moral knowledge and use these to formulate and evaluate criteria for moral knowledge. After relating his approach to concerns about the nature of the epistemic justification of moral beliefs as dealt with by foundationalists and coherentists, Lemos responds to arguments against particularist approaches in moral epistemology. Specifically, he addresses the claim that our moral beliefs must receive their justification from an independent moral criterion developed from nonmoral beliefs.

In this 2004 book, Noah Lemos presents a strong defense of the common sense tradition, the view that we may take as data for philosophical inquiry many of the things we ordinarily think we know. He discusses the main features of that tradition as expounded by Thomas Reid, G. E. Moore and Roderick Chisholm. For a long time common sense philosophers have been subject to two main objections: that they fail to give any non-circular argument for the reliability of memory and perception; and that they pick out instances of knowledge without knowing a criterion for knowledge. Lemos defends the appeal to what we ordinarily think we know in both epistemology and ethics and thus rejects the charge that common sense is dogmatic, unphilosophical or question-begging. Written in a clear and engaging style, this book will appeal to students and philosophers in epistemology and ethics.

essay on the theory of value. It is among the best defenses of a rational desire/preference theory of the good. Even those not inclined to accept such theories will profit from reading Carson's discussion. Moreover, it would be worthwhile reading for scholars and students in various areas of applied ethics. The book is divided into two parts. The first half of the book addresses firstorder questions about what things are good and bad. The second half discusses various metaethical questions which he takes to be relevant to answering the first order questions. In his first two chapters, Carson presents arguments for and against hedonistic theories of value. This is a thorough and fair discussion of hedonism. He then devotes a chapter each to rational desire theories of value, Nietzsche's views of value and the good life, and Aristotelian theories of value. Each of these is good, but the chapter on rational desire theories is perhaps the most important given the view that Carson ultimately defends. The second half of the book consists of three chapters. Chapter six concerns the concept of goodness. In chapter seven, Carson raises objections to various forms of moral and axiological realism. In the final chapter, entitled "The Concept of Rationality as a Basis for Normative Theories," Carson develops and defends his own views about rational preference and its role in moral and axiological theories. In most of what follows I will focus on Carson's own positive views about value and..