•  179
    Sosa on epistemic circularity and reflective knowledge
    Metaphilosophy 40 (2): 187-194. 2009.
    Abstract: Ernest Sosa has done important work on epistemic circularity, epistemic virtue, and reflective knowledge. He holds that epistemic circularity need not be vicious and need not prevent us from knowing that our ways of forming beliefs are reliable. In this article, I briefly explore Sosa's defense of this view and raise some questions about what is required for reflective knowledge.
  •  155
    Hedonism and the good life
    Philosophical Studies 136 (3): 417-423. 2007.
  •  134
    An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge
    Cambridge University Press. 2007.
    Epistemology or the theory of knowledge is one of the cornerstones of analytic philosophy, and this book provides a clear and accessible introduction to the subject. It discusses some of the main theories of justification, including foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and virtue epistemology. Other topics include the Gettier problem, internalism and externalism, skepticism, the problem of epistemic circularity, the problem of the criterion, a priori knowledge, and naturalized epistemology…Read more
  •  126
    Review: Michael Huemer: Ethical Intuitionism (review)
    Mind 117 (466): 483-486. 2008.
  •  106
    Review: The nature of intrinsic value (review)
    Mind 112 (447): 587-590. 2003.
  •  96
    Rational Desire and the Good
    Business Ethics Quarterly 14 (2): 329-336. 2004.
    essay on the theory of value. It is among the best defenses of a rational desire/preference theory of the good. Even those not inclined to accept such theories will profit from reading Carson's discussion. Moreover, it would be worthwhile reading for scholars and students in various areas of applied ethics. The book is divided into two parts. The first half of the book addresses firstorder questions about what things are good and bad. The second half discusses various metaethical questions which…Read more
  •  77
    Intrinsic Value and the Partiality Problem
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3): 697-716. 2011.
  •  76
    Common Sense: A Contemporary Defense
    Cambridge University Press. 2004.
    In this 2004 book, Noah Lemos presents a strong defense of the common sense tradition, the view that we may take as data for philosophical inquiry many of the things we ordinarily think we know. He discusses the main features of that tradition as expounded by Thomas Reid, G. E. Moore and Roderick Chisholm. For a long time common sense philosophers have been subject to two main objections: that they fail to give any non-circular argument for the reliability of memory and perception; and that they…Read more
  •  72
    A Defense of Organic Unities
    The Journal of Ethics 19 (2): 125-141. 2015.
    In this essay, I defend the Moorean position on organic unities. I will present some plausible examples of organic unites and consider some objections to them. In particular, I will consider an objection from evaluative inadequacy and an objection from Holism or Conditionalism. I will also examine one line of criticism that claims the Moorean position is incoherent
  •  66
    Organic unities
    The Journal of Ethics 2 (4): 321-337. 1998.
    I defend the view that there are organic unities mainly by presenting examples of organic unities. I also defend the view against two objections. The first objection appeals to the notion of an evaluatively incomplete state of affairs. The second objection holds that the intrinsic value of a state of affairs can be different in different contexts. I argue that neither objection provides a compelling reason for rejecting these examples.
  •  61
    Summation, Variety, and Indeterminate Value
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1): 33-44. 2010.
    In this paper, I consider two sorts of objections to summative theories of value. The first objection concerns “indeterminate” value. The second concerns the importance of variety. I argue that both objections pose serious problems for the summative approach. I also argue that if we accept certain plausible views about the value of variety, we should reject certain forms of argument concerning what sorts of states have intrinsic value.
  •  57
    Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant
    Cambridge University Press. 1994.
    This book addresses some basic questions about intrinsic value: What is it? What has it? What justifies our beliefs about it? In the first six chapters the author defends the existence of a plurality of intrinsic goods, the thesis of organic unities, the view that some goods are 'higher' than others, and the view that intrinsic value can be explicated in terms of 'fitting' emotional attitudes. The final three chapters explore the justification of our beliefs about intrinsic value, including cohe…Read more
  •  56
    Higher Goods and the Myth of Tithonus
    Journal of Philosophy 90 (9): 482-496. 1993.
  •  53
    Common Sense and A Priori Epistemology
    The Monist 81 (3): 473-487. 1998.
    Some philosophers have adopted both a commonsense approach to the theory of knowledge and held that some epistemic principles are knowable a priori. Roderick Chisholm is a prominent example of a philosopher who does both. In The Problem of the Criterion, Chisholm holds that in attempting to discover criteria of evidence we should begin with particular commonsense examples of knowledge, such as I know that I have two hands and I know that there are other people. According to Chisholm, our knowled…Read more
  •  46
  •  43
    Justification and considered moral judgments
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (4): 503-516. 1986.
  •  40
    Moral goodness, esteem, and acting from duty
    Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (2): 103-117. 1991.
    There is a long tradition in moral philosophy which maintains that a necessary condition for moral goodness is that one act from a sense of duty. Kant is perhaps the best known and most discussed representative of this view, but one finds others prior to Kant, such as Butler and Price, and Kant's contemporaries, such as Reid, expressing similar ideas. Price, for example writes, ". . . what I have chiefly insisted on, is, that we characterize as virtuous no actions flowing merely from instinctive…Read more
  •  27
    Ramon M. Lemos, 1927-2006
    with Risto Hilpinen, Leonard Carrier, and Howard Pospesel
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (5). 2006.
  •  27
    Self- Evidence and Principia Ethica
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (4): 451-464. 1985.
  •  27
    The Bearers of Intrinsic Value
    In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, Springer. pp. 181--190. 2005.
  •  16
    Chisholm's Definition of Organic Unity
    In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, Springer. pp. 319--323. 2005.
  •  16
    Epistemology and ethics
    In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 479--512. 2002.
    In ”Epistemology and Ethics,” Noah Lemos suggests that moral epistemology is mainly concerned with “whether and how we can have knowledge or justified belief” about moral issues. After addressing skeptical arguments, he considers how the moral epistemologist and moral philosopher should begin their account of moral knowledge. Lemos favors a particularist approach whereby we begin with instances of moral knowledge and use these to formulate and evaluate criteria for moral knowledge. After relatin…Read more
  •  15
    Brandt on rationality, value, and morality
    Philosophical Studies 45 (1). 1984.