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112The judgement-stroke as a truth-operator: A new interpretation of the logical form of sentences in Frege's scientific languageErkenntnis 52 (2): 213-238. 2000.The syntax of Frege's scientific language is commonly taken to be characterized by two oddities: the representation of the intended illocutionary role of sentences by a special sign, the judgement-stroke, and the treatment of sentences as a species of singular terms. In this paper, an alternative view is defended. The main theses are: the syntax of Frege's scientific language aims at an explication of the logical form of judgements; the judgement-stroke is, therefore, a truth-operator, not a pra…Read more
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95"No Entity Without Identity"Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (1): 13-29. 2000.Quine has persuasively shown that the empiricist "dogma of reductionism", which is the belief that each meaningfiil statement of science can be reduced to statements about immediate sense experience, must be abandoned. However, Quine's methodology of ontology seems to incorporate an analogous physicalistic dogma according to which the identity conditions of each scientifically respectable sort of abstract objects can be reduced to the identity conditions of physical objects. This paper aims to s…Read more
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2Individuating abstract objects: the methodologies of Frege and QuineHistory of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 4. 2001.According to Frege, the introduction of a new sort of abstract object is methodologically sound only if its identity conditions have been satisfactorily explained. Ironically, this ontological restriction has come to be known by Quine's criticism of Frege's intensional semantics, as the precept "No entity without identity." The aim of the paper is to reconstruct Frege's methodology of the introduction of abstract objects in detail, and to defend it against the more restrictive methodology underl…Read more
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59Die idee hinter tarskis definition Von wahrheitJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 28 (1): 121-158. 1997.The Idea behind Tarski's Definition of Truth. In Tarski's presentations of his truth-definition, the steps of the construction are not sufficiently explained. It is not clear, on what general strategy the construction is based, what the fundamental ideas are, how some crucial steps work, and especially how the transition from the definition of satisfaction to the definition of truth should be understood. The paper shows that the account given in the model-theoretic literature, which is supported…Read more
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11Of truth1In Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, Routledge. pp. 5--90. 2007.
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„Jacksons Argument des unvollständigen Wissens und die Identitätstheorie der WahrheitFacta Philosophica: Internazionale Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsphilosophie: International Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 5 (1-2): 87-104. 2003.
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143Frege’s Performative Argument Against the Relativity of TruthJournal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (2). 2015.The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct Frege’s argument against the relativity of truth contained in his posthumous writing Logic from 1897. Two points are made. The first is that the argument is a performative version of the common objection that truth relativism is incoherent: it is designed to show that the assertion of the relativity of truth involves a performative incoherence, because the absoluteness of truth is a success condition for making assertions. From a modern point of view, …Read more
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8Das Wahre und das Falsche: Studien zu Freges Auffassung von Wahrheit (edited book)G. Olms. 2003.Frege hat in seinen Schriften zu den philosophischen Grundlagen der Logik eine eigenwillige Konzeption der Wahrheit skizziert, der zufolge das Wahre und das Falsche keine Eigenschaften von Sätzen oder Gedanken sind, sondern Gegenstände, die von Sätzen bezeichnet werden. In dem vorliegenden Sammelband werden zentrale Komponenten dieser Konzeption näher beleuchtet: die Thesen der Undefinierbarkeit der Wahrheit und der Redundanz des Wortes „wahr“, die Auffassung der Wahrheitswerte als Gegenstände, …Read more
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15Chateaubriand's view of truth as identification. Some critical remarksManuscrito 27 (1): 79-85. 2004.Chateaubriand’s view of truth as identification is based on the assumption that there is a close parallelism between sentences and definite descriptions with regard to their connection with reality. The paper aims to show that this parallelism does not actually obtain
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154What is Frege's Julius caesar problem?Dialectica 57 (3): 261-278. 2003.This paper aims to determine what kind of problem Frege's famous “Julius Caesar problem” is. whether it is to be understood as the metaphysical problem of determining what kind of things abstract objects like numbers or value‐courses are, or as the epistemological problem of providing a means of recognizing these objects as the same again, or as the logical problem of providing abstract sortal concepts with a sharp delimitation in order to fulfill the law of excluded middle, or as the semantic p…Read more
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Frege's Performative Argument against Truth RelativismJournal of the History of Analytic Philosophy 3 1-17. 2015.
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68"No Entity Without Identity"Grazer Philosophische Studien 60 (1): 13-29. 2000.Quine has persuasively shown that the empiricist "dogma of reductionism", which is the belief that each meaningfiil statement of science can be reduced to statements about immediate sense experience, must be abandoned. However, Quine's methodology of ontology seems to incorporate an analogous physicalistic dogma according to which the identity conditions of each scientifically respectable sort of abstract objects can be reduced to the identity conditions of physical objects. This paper aims to s…Read more
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31Frege's horizontal and the liar-paradoxManuscrito 26 (2): 359-387. 2003.According to Peter Aczel, the inconsistency of Frege’s system in Grundgesetze is due, not to the introduction of sets, as is usually thought, but to the introduction of the Horizontal. His argument is that the principles governing sets are intuitively correct and therefore consistent, while the scheme introducing the Horizontal amounts to an internal definition of truth conflicting with Tarski’s classic result on the undefinability of truth in the object language. The aim of this paper is to sho…Read more
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12Die impliziten Prämissen in Quines Kritik der semantischen BegriffeGrazer Philosophische Studien 51 (1): 195-235. 1996.Quines Kritik an den grundlegenden semantischen Begriffen hat zwei wesentliche Prämissen: erstens daß die Linguistik als wissenschaftliche Disziplin der methodischen Restriktion unterstellt ist, empirisch sinnlose Hypothesen und Begriffe abzulehnen, und zweitens, daß die semantischen Begriffe tatsächlich empirisch sinnlos sind. Um die Überzeugungskraft der Ausführungen Quines untersuchen zu können, werden zunächst die verschiedenen Versionen von seiner Kritik analysiert, klar gegeneinander abgeg…Read more
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82A Typology of Conceptual ExplicationsDisputatio 4 (34): 645-670. 2012.Greimann-Dirk_A-typology-of-conceptual-explications
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1Kants Derivation of the Formula of the Categorical Imperative from Its Mere ConceptHistory of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 6. 2003.This paper aims to reconstruct Kant’s derivation with the help of the resources of speech act theory. The main exegetical hypothesis is that the derivation envisaged by Kant consists in deriving the formula from the success-conditions of giving categorical imperatives. These conditions, which are analogous to the success-conditions of giving ordinary orders, contain restrictions for the successful construction of a system of moral laws that determine what the content of moral laws must be
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61Freges These der Undefinierbarkeit von WahrheitGrazer Philosophische Studien 47 (1): 77-114. 1994.Der erste Teil des Aufsatzes untersucht den Inhalt der These. Im Zentrum steht dabei die Frage, was Frege unter,,Wahrheit" versteht. Das Ergebnis der Untersuchung ist, daß Freges Undefinierbarkeitsthese (entgegen der üblichen Auffassung) sich nicht auf den „Inhalt des Wortes,wahr'" (bzw. auf das Wahrheitsprädikat) bezieht, sondern auf „die Wahrheit, deren Anerkennung in der Form des Behauptungssatzes liegt" (bzw. auf den Urteilsstrich. Das Kernstück des zweiten Teils der Arbeit ist eine Rekonstr…Read more
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130Did Frege really consider truth as an object?Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1): 125-148. 2007.It is commonly assumed that the conception of truth defended by Frege in his mature period is characterized by the view that truth is not the property denoted by the predicate 'is true', but the object named by true sentences. In the present paper, I wish to make plausible an alternative interpretation according to which Frege's conception is characterized by the view that truth is what is expressed in natural language by the "form of the assertoric sentence". So construed, truth is neither an o…Read more
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26Zum Realitätsbereich der Semantik: Skizze einer Theorie der "Semantischen Verpflichtung"Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 57 (2). 2003.Nach Auffassung von Quine ist der Realitätsbereich der Semantik auf den Bereich des beobachtbaren Sprachverhaltens beschränkt. Fragen der sprachlichen Bedeutung und sprachlichen Bezugs, die über das hinausgehen, was sich durch die Erforschung des öffentlich beobachtbaren Sprachverhalten herausbekommen lässt, sind dieser Auffassung nach keine "Tatsachenfragen", d.h. sie haben kein Fundament in der Realität. Die Arbeit verfolgt das Ziel, anhand des Aufbaus einer Theorie der "semantischen Verpflich…Read more
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Apresentação: Anais do I Simpósio Internacional de Filosofia Verdade como ValorO Que Nos Faz Pensar 5-13. 2006.
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Ontologische Einsparungen mit Hilfe von Kontextdefinitionen: Die semantische KehrseitePhilosophisches Jahrbuch 109 (n/a): 97-113. 2002.
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Study of Religion
PhD, 1991
Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |