•  95
    Tracking, competence, and knowledge
    In Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford handbook of epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 264--287. 2002.
    In “Tracking, Competence, and Knowledge,” Ernest Sosa notes that in attempting to account for the conditions for knowledge, externalists have proposed that the justification condition be replaced or supplemented by the requirement that a certain modal relation be obtained between a fact and a subject's belief concerning that fact. While assessing attempts to identify such a relation, he focuses on an account labeled “Cartesian‐tracking”, which accounts for the relation in the form of two conditi…Read more
  •  13
    Causation and conditionals (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 1975.
    Mackie, J. L. Causes and conditions.--Taylor, R. The metaphysics of causation.--Scriven, M. Defects of the necessary condition analysis of causation.--Kim, J. Causes and events: Mackie on causation.--Anscombe, G. E. M. Causality and determination.--Davidson, D. Causal relations.--Wright, G. H. von. On the logic and epistemology of the causal relation.--Ducasse, C. J. On the nature and the observability of the causal relation.--Sellars, W. S. Counterfactuals.--Chisholm, R. M. Law statements and c…Read more
  •  289
    Knowing full well: the normativity of beliefs as performances
    Philosophical Studies 142 (1): 5-15. 2009.
    Belief is considered a kind of performance, which attains one level of success if it is true (or accurate), a second level if competent (or adroit), and a third if true because competent (or apt). Knowledge on one level (the animal level) is apt belief. The epistemic normativity constitutive of such knowledge is thus a kind of performance normativity. A problem is posed for this account by the fact that suspension of belief seems to fall under the same sort of epistemic normativity as does belie…Read more
  •  89
    Summary ofReflective Knowledge
    Philosophical Papers 40 (3): 285-285. 2011.
    Philosophical Papers, Volume 40, Issue 3, Page 285, November 2011
  •  3
    Boghossian’s Fear of Knowledge (review)
    Philosophical Studies 141 (3). 2008.
  •  165
    Privileged access
    In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford University Press. pp. 238-251. 2002.
    In Quentin Smith and Aleksander Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays (OUP, 2002).
  •  276
    Epistemic Agency
    Journal of Philosophy 110 (11): 585-605. 2013.
  • Response
    In John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell. 2004.
  •  71
    Internal Foundations or Eaternal Virtues?
    Philosophical Studies 131 (3): 761-773. 2006.
  • Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2010.
    Jaegwon Kim is one of the most pre-eminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind-body problem. A central problem in the ph…Read more
  •  1
    A Rejoinder on Actions and De Re Belief
    with Mark Pastin
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (4). 1981.
    Richard Feldman in ‘Actions and De Re Beliefs’ attacks ‘latitudinarian’ accounts of de re belief in terms of de dicta belief, including those defended in print by one or the other of us. Feldman's case against latitudinarian views rests on the claim that such accounts do not allow de re attitudes an explanatory role they obviously can fulfil.
  •  66
    On Metaphysical Analysis
    Journal of Philosophical Research 40 (Supplement): 309-314. 2015.
    What follows offers a solution for the problem of causal deviance in its three varieties. We consider Davidson on action, Grice on perception, and the account of knowledge as apt belief, as belief that gets it right through competence rather than luck. We take up the opposition between such traditional accounts and “disjunctivist” alternatives. And we explore how our take on the point and substance of metaphysical analysis bears on the problem and on competing reactions to it.
  •  8
    Water, drink, and "moral kinds"
    Philosophical Issues 8 303-312. 1997.
    Geoffrey Sayre-McCord puts before us an interesting and original line of thought. Here is its main structure: Naturalist semantics would bring important benefits to ethics. But it has very high costs. Fortunately, we can secure such benefits without the costs, by substituting, for the natural kinds of naturalist semantics, a set of moral kinds determined not by scientific but by moral theory. I find myself stumped by the preliminaries at , however, which need further support, or so I will argue …Read more
  • Philosophical Scepticism
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68 263-307. 1994.
  •  78
    Imagery and Imagination
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1): 485-499. 1985.
    1. Sensa and propositional experience. 2. An option between propositions and properties (as objects or contents of sensory experience). 3. The property option and adverbialism. 4. Sensa as images, images as intentionalia. 5. Do we refer directly to sensa? 6. Focusing and the supervenience of images and our reference to them: a question raised. 7. Internal and external properties of images and characters. Strict vistas introduced. 8. A correction on strict vistas. 9. Focusing and experience: the …Read more
  •  36
    Replies to my critics
    Critica 42 (125): 77-93. 2010.
    This paper is a response to the four critics of A Virtue Epistemology. It responds to Claudia Lorena García, Miguel Ángel Fernández, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Ram Neta, in that order. Este artículo es una respuesta a los cuatro críticos de A Virtue Epistemology. Ofrece respuestas a Claudia Lorena García, Miguel Ángel Fernández, Jonathan Kvanvig, y Ram Neta, en ese orden.
  •  7
    Metaphysics: An Anthology, 1st Edition (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 1999.
    Thoroughly updated, the second edition of this highly successful textbook continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in metaphysics. In addition to updated material from the first edition, it presents entirely new sections on ontology and the metaphysics of material objects. One of the most comprehensive and authoritative metaphysics anthologies available - now updated and expanded Offers the most important contemporary works on the central i…Read more
  •  10
    The status of becoming: What is happening now?
    Journal of Philosophy 76 (1): 26-42. 1979.
    What is the ontological status of temporal becoming, of the present, or the now? We shall consider in turn four answers to this question: (i) the objective-property doctrine, (ii) the thought-reflexive analysis, (iii) the tensed-exemplification view, and (iv) the form-of-thought account.
  •  15
    Précis of A Virtue Epistemology
    Philosophical Studies 143 (3): 395-395. 2009.
  •  3
    Human knowledge, animal and reflective
    Philosophical Studies 106 (3). 2001.
    Stephen Grimm finds me inclined to bifurcate epistemic assessment into higher and lower orders while showing awareness of this only in recent writings. Two untoward consequences allegedly follow: (a) my rejection of Virtue Reliabilism, and (b) my knowledge-based account of the value attaching to our knowledge on the higher level. By contrast, Grimm considers Virtue Reliabilism a perfectly adequate account of knowledge, while the higher epistemic state he believes to be, rather, understanding, wh…Read more
  •  4
    Roderick Milton Chisholm 1916-1999
    Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 72 (5). 1999.
  •  3
    Presuppositions of Empirical Knowledge
    Philosophical Papers 15 (2-3): 75-87. 1986.
    No abstract
  •  1
    Minimal Intuition
    In Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition, Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 257-269. 1998.
  •  3
    The essentials of persons
    Dialectica 53 (3-4): 227-41. 1999.
    This paper tries to clarify the nature of philosophical questions as to the ontological nature of things, especially persons. It considers implications of an Aristotelian account, which leads to an ontology that makes subjects and other things epistemologically remote. This makes the account doubtfully reconcilable with the special epistemic relation that each of us has to oneself, via for example the cogito.
  •  11
    Fregean reference defended
    Philosophical Issues 6 91-99. 1995.
    What is involved in acquiring a russellian proposition (x, φ) as content of an attitude: what does it take for one to acquire such an attitude de re? How do we gain access to x itself so as to be able to have (x, φ) as content of our thought?