•  10
  •  8
    Knowing full well: The normativity of beliefs as performances
    Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 4 (5): 81--94. 2015.
    [ES] La creencia es considerada como una especie de expresión, que alcanza un nivel de éxito si es verdadera, un segundo nivel si es competente, y un tercero si es verdadera por ser competente. El conocimiento a un nivel es una creencia apta. La normatividad epistémica que constituye tal conocimiento es, de esta manera, una especie de normatividad de la expresión. Un problema surge para esta explicación del hecho de que la suspensión de la creencia parece caer bajo la misma especie de normativid…Read more
  •  6
    Between internalism and externalism
    Philosophical Issues 1 179-195. 1991.
  •  94
    Replies to commentators on A Virtue Epistemology
    Philosophical Studies 144 (1): 137-147. 2009.
    Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.
  •  7
    Two conceptions of knowledge
    Journal of Philosophy 67 (3): 59-66. 1970.
    Knowledge of the nature of knowledge is deplorably scarce. Fortunately, the reason is not lack of interest. On the contrary, the bewildering variety of competing theories is part of the problem. It is to, be hoped, however, that intensive discussion of such theories will help reduce the scarcity. In what follows I want to contribute to this end by briefly discussing two of the theories.
  •  17
    Replies
    Philosophical Issues 10 (1): 38-42. 2000.
  •  58
    II_— _Ernest Sosa: Knowledge, Animal and Reflective: A Reply to Michael Williams
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1): 113-130. 2003.
    I give an exposition and critical discussion of Sellars’s Myth of the Given, and especially of its epistemic side. In later writings Sellars takes a pragmatist turn in his epistemology. This is explored and compared with his earlier critique of givenist mythology. In response to Michael Williams, it is argued that these issues are importantly independent of philosophy of language or mind, and that my own take on them does not commit me to any absurd radical foundationalism on language or mind. M…Read more
  •  4
    Are there two grades of knowledge?
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1). 2003.
    [Michael Williams] A response to Sosa's criticisms of Sellars's account of the relation between knowledge and experience, noting that Sellars excludes merely animal knowledge, and hopes to bypass epistemology by an adequate philosophy of mind and language. /// [Ernest Sosa] I give an exposition and critical discussion of Sellars's Myth of the Given, and especially of its epistemic side. In later writings Sellars takes a pragmatist turn in his epistemology. This is explored and compared with his …Read more
  •  26
    Reflective knowledge in the best circles
    Journal of Philosophy 94 (8): 410-430. 1997.
    According to Moore, his argument meets three conditions for being a proof: first, the premiss is different from the conclusion; second, he knows the premiss to be the case; and, third, the conclusion follows deductively.2 Further conditions may be required, but he evidently thinks his proof would satisfy these as well. As Moore is well aware, many philosophers will feel he has not given “...any satisfactory proof of the point in question."3 Some, he believes, will want the premiss itself proved.…Read more
  •  9
    On our knowledge of matters of fact
    Mind 83 (331): 388-405. 1974.
    The traditional conception of knowledge as justified true belief has collapsed under weighty objections. Some of these are well known; but others, though equally weighty and puzzling, have attracted comparatively little attention, and still demand careful study. Only through such study can we approach correct understanding of propositional knowledge.
  •  490
    Epistemology: An Anthology (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2000.
    This volume represents the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in theory of knowledge. It is ideal as a reader for all courses in epistemology
  •  93
    Pyrrhonian skepticism and human agency
    Philosophical Issues 23 (1): 1-17. 2013.
  •  21
    Imagery and Imagination
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1): 485-499. 1985.
    1. Sensa and propositional experience. 2. An option between propositions and properties (as objects or contents of sensory experience). 3. The property option and adverbialism. 4. Sensa as images, images as intentionalia. 5. Do we refer directly to sensa? 6. Focusing and the supervenience of images and our reference to them: a question raised. 7. Internal and external properties of images and characters. Strict vistas introduced. 8. A correction on strict vistas. 9. Focusing and experience: the …Read more
  •  22
    The epistemology of testimony (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2006.
    Testimony is a crucial source of knowledge: we are to a large extent reliant upon what others tell us. It has been the subject of much recent interest in epistemology, and this volume collects twelve original essays on the topic by some of the world's leading philosophers. It will be the starting point for future research in this fertile field. Contributors include Robert Audi, C. A. J. Coady, Elizabeth Fricker, Richard Fumerton, Sanford C. Goldberg, Peter Graham, Jennifer Lackey, Keith Lehrer, …Read more
  •  4
    Boghossian’s F ear of Knowledge (review)
    Philosophical Studies 141 (3). 2008.
  •  19
    Contextualismo y escepticismo
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3): 9-25. 2000.
  •  28
  •  1295
    The place of reasons in epistemology
    In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Oxford University Press. 2018.
    This paper considers the place of reasons in the metaphysics of epistemic normativity and defends a middle ground between two popular extremes in the literature. Against members of the ‘reasons first’ movement, we argue that reasons are not the sole fundamental constituents of epistemic normativity. We suggest instead that the virtue-theoretic property of competence is the key building block. To support this approach, we note that reasons must be possessed to play a role in the analysis of ce…Read more
  •  12
    Replies
    Philosophical Papers 40 (3). 2004.
    Philosophical Papers, Volume 40, Issue 3, Page 341-358, November 2011
  •  6
    Mind-body interaction and supervenient causation
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1): 271-81. 1984.
    The mind-body problem arises because of our status as double agents apparently en rapport both with the mental and with the physical. We think, desire, decide, plan, suffer passions, fall into moods, are subject to sensory experiences, ostensibly perceive, intend, reason, make believe, and so on. We also move, have a certain geographical position, a certain height and weight, and we are sometimes hit or cut or burned. In other words, human beings have both minds and bodies. What is the relation …Read more
  •  41
    Chapter five. Contextualism
    In Knowing Full Well, Princeton University Press. pp. 96-107. 2010.
  •  971
    For the Love of Truth?
    In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue epistemology: essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 49-62. 2001.
    Rational beings pursue and value truth . Intellectual conduct is to be judged, accordingly, by how well it aids our pursuit of that ideal. I ask whether these platitudes mean, and whether they are true.
  •  5
    The truth of modest realism
    Philosophical Issues 3 177-195. 1993.
    True, the believing could not in those cir- cumstances be there the object of belief being there. accept a notion of correspondence or reference according to which a word or a brain state of ours can refer to some external or or independent (This no more forces
  •  21
    Quality and Concept by George Bealer (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 82 (7): 382-387. 1985.
  •  5
    Knowledge in Context, Skepticism in Doubt
    Philosophical Perspectives 2 139. 1988.