Alain Boyer

Since at least as far back as the seventeenth century, the “Quarrel Between the Ancients and the Moderns” has figured on the philosopher’s agenda, in aesthetics and in natural philosophy as well as in ethics and in politics. In this last field, one of the most important stakes of the quarrel turns on the distinction which Benjamin Constant drew in 1819, between two different conceptions of liberty: that of the Ancients and that of the Moderns. The problem of freedom lies at the very heart of all philosophical reflection: in metaphysics and in theology, as well as in ethics and in social and political philosophy. Being founded on a very strong affirmation of the preeminent value of individual freedom, liberalism has, for at least two centuries, been at the centre of the discussion both in modern political philosophy and in economics. Not only were its first rivals, namely anarchism, socialism and a reactionary mode of thought together with its nostalgia for a hierarchical society, defined against the background of liberalism; but the internal discussions within liberalism itself have not been any the less intense, as is realized when comparing its “solidarist” with its “proprietarist” or “libertarian” versions. Some liberals claim descent from Burke, others from Condorcet, some from Humboldt and others from the early Fichte. Liberalism can indeed be spelt out in different ways. One can anyway perceive in present-day objections to liberalism the reappearance of a good many classical philosophical theses. Thus the communitarian criticism of abstract universalism and of state neutrality reminds one of the Hegelian and romantic criticism of the Enlightenment; while some arguments advanced by “leftist” communitarians recall the Marxist criticisms aimed at the formal idealism inherent in the Declaration of the Rights of Man.

‘Evolutionary epistemology’, of which Popper was one of the promoters, comprises two programmes : a ‘literal’ programme which consisted in recognising knowledge in terms of Darwinian adaptation, and a ‘analogical’ programme, which based itself on a comparison between scientific progress and the evolution of life-forms. Quine is credited with the ‘strong’ programme : the ‘naturalization’ of epistemology. Popper is supposedly responsible for the ‘weak’ programme. Why then draw inspiration from such an analogy to think about something as sophisticated as the ‘growth of scientific knowledge’? Such an analogy might have heuristic value, but the differences between science and evolution are so apparent that this approach quickly shows its limits. But the Popperian philosophy of evolution does not reduce itself to an analogy.

En 1950, Paul Ricœur publia une imposante Philosophie de la volonté, vite brocardée par la vague structuraliste et les critiques de toute « philosophie de la conscience ». On y trouve notamment une analyse du phénomène de l’hésitation qui contient bien des éléments encore pertinents. Phénomène bien connu, l’hésitation n’a pas été vraiment thématisée en tant que telle, même si, comme le montre Ricœur, l’histoire de la philosophie est susceptible d’aider à le faire. Mais le doute cartésien, par exemple, n’est guère hésitant. Ce chapitre fourmille d’analyses denses mais claires, d’allusions qu’il faut expliciter, de métaphores « vives » très riches, qui permettent de concevoir un sujet se cherchant dans l’hésitation avant de se choisir dans la décision. Il y a là un concept indispensable à toute théorie de l’action.Philosophie de la volonté, a major work published by Ricœur in 1950, was quickly derided by members of the structuralist trend and by those critical of every single « philosophy of consciousness ». The book includes notably an analysis of the phenomenon of hesitation, many elements of which are still relevant. Although a well known phenomenon, hesitation has never been fully analyzed in itself, even though the history of philosophy, as Ricœur shows, might be helpful in such an endeavor. Cartesian doubt, for instance, shows hardly any hesitation. This chapter is replete with dense yet clear discussions, with allusions that require elucidation, and with a wealth of vivid metaphors which help us to envisage a subject in search of himself through hesitation, before choosing himself through decision. Such a concept is indispensable for any theory of action.

The fundamental concept of Popperian philosophy is openness. This conception of rationality, based on the theme of fallibility, escapes the question of closure of dominant modern reason. Rationality is less a set of techniques than an open moral attitude towards others, residing in the idea that violence can be replaced by a polemical exchange and critical discussion, codified by rules. ‘You may be right, and I may be wrong, but by common effort, by confronting our points of view, we can get close to the truth’ and ’Never consider others simply as passive recipients of your ideas, but always as a potential critique of these!’, such are the formulas which characterise ‘critical rationalism’.

On oppose traditionnellement deux approches méthodologiques en sciences sociales : le holisme et l'individualisme. Il est tentant d'identifier cette opposition à celle du structuralisme et de l'atomisme. Ainsi, dans Les institutions du sens, Vincent Descombes propose de récuser l'individualisme méthodologique et de lui substituer une approche « holiste structuraliste », susceptible de permettre d'échapper aux mirages des « entités collectives » aussi bien qu'aux aportes de l'atomisme logique et du psychologisme, en mettant en avant la notion d'institution et celle d'esprit objectif. Cette analyse passe par une critique logique radicale des arguments de Karl Popper en faveur du « nominalisme méthodologique ». On conteste cette présentation des thèses de l'auteur de Misère de l'historicisme, en montrant que sa philosophie n'est en rien un psychologisme et un atomisme, mais qu'elle accorde au contraire une importance capitale à la notion de « causalité structurale » comme à celles d'institution et d'esprit objectif. L'individualisme institutionnel n'est peut-être pas en ce sens un obstacle à la compréhension du problème plus général du tout et des parties. La querelle des sciences sociales et celle des universaux sont décidément solidaires l'une de l'autre. One commonly distinguishes two different approaches in the methodology of the social sciences, namely (methodological) individualism and holism. One can be tempted to identify this opposition to that between atomism and structuralism. For instance, in his book Les institutions du sens, Vincent Descombes argues that we have to substitute for methodological individualism a holistic but not collectivistic approach, so as to be able to escape the illusions of collectivism as well as the traps of logical atomism and of psychologism, putting a premium on the notions of institution and of « objective spirit ». (Similar proposals had been made independently by Philipp Pettit in his The Common MindJ. Descombes' target is mainly Popper's argument against essentialism and holism in The Poverty of Historicism, which he submits to a radical logical criticism. This paper disputes this rendering of Popper's view, which is emphatically anti-psychologistic and not ontologically nominalistic, and which gives a great significance to the very notions of institution, of objective spirit and even of structural causality. His « institutional individualism » is perhaps not a bad tool for handling partially the notorious problem of the hole and the parts. The modern controversy about the methods used in the social sciences and the venerable one about universals are decidely interconnected.

The din and deadlock of public life in America--where insults are traded, slogans proclaimed, and self-serving deals made and unmade--reveal the deep disagreement that pervades our democracy. The disagreement is not only political but also moral, as citizens and their representatives increasingly take extreme and intransigent positions. A better kind of public discussion is needed, and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson provide an eloquent argument for "deliberative democracy" today. They develop a principled framework for opponents to come together on moral and political issues.Gutmann and Thompson show how a deliberative democracy can address some of our most difficult controversies--from abortion and affirmative action to health care and welfare--and can allow diverse groups separated by class, race, religion, and gender to reason together. Their work goes beyond that of most political theorists and social scientists by exploring both the principles for reasonable argument and their application to actual cases. Not only do the authors suggest how deliberative democracy can work, they also show why improving our collective capacity for moral argument is better than referring all disagreements to procedural politics or judicial institutions. Democracy and Disagreement presents a compelling approach to how we might resolve some of our most trying moral disagreements and live with those that will inevitably persist, on terms that all of us can respect.

Ce qui compte, ce n'est pas la question "aristocratique" des fondements d'une proposition, mais la question "démocratique" de la valeur de ses conséquences pratiques : en morale, ce n'est pas l'expérience, mais notre conscience qui décide d'accepter telle ou telle conséquence. Rawls oppose déontologie et téléologie : la première classe de théories définit le juste indépendamment du bien, la seconde le définit comme maximisation du Bien. Mais les approches déontologiques ne sont pas anti-conséquentialistes : "Ne pas prendre en compte les conséquences serait irrationnel, fou". Toute théorie morale rationnelle est une "morale de la responsabilité", et non de la conviction, même si certains énoncés de base de l'intuition sont pour nous des "points fixes". Le conséquentialisme n'est pas nécessairement utilitariste, car l'on peut vouloir minimiser l'injustice. Ces considérations sont appuyées sur l'analyse de plusieurs exemples juridiques, dont celui de la responsabilité civile.