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Jack Zupko

University of Alberta
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  •  Publications
    103
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 More details
  • University of Alberta
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Cornell University
Sage School of Philosophy
PhD, 1989
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Religion
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
  • All publications (103)
  •  18
    Utrum potentia motiva secundum locum sit vegetativa vel sensitiva vel intellectiva vel appetitiva vel aliqua alia potentia animae praeter istas
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 944-957. 2023.
    Et arguitur quod non sit vegetativa, quia tunc conveniret plantis, quod est falsum, quia semper manent in eodem loco affixis terrae, nisi per violentiam auferantur.
  •  16
    Utrum intellectus humanus sit forma inhaerens corpori humano
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 674-689. 2023.
    Arguitur quod sic, etiam auctoritate Alexandri et fidei catholicae.
  •  18
    Utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis animati
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 188-217. 2023.
    Arguitur primo quod non quia sequeretur quod pes equi esset animal et etiam pes hominis esset homo, quod est falsum, quia non posset dici rationabiliter quod animal esset pes equi nisi esset equus, nec pes hominis nisi esset homo, et absurdum esset dicere quod pes equi sit unus equus vel pes hominis unus homo.
  •  19
    Utrum actus vel etiam habitus intellectualis sit idem quod anima intellectiva vel sit res sibi addita
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 800-821. 2023.
    Propter quamdam opinionem antiquissimam et iam in istis temporibus ab aliquibus resumpta, quaeritur undecimo utrum actus vel etiam habitus intellectualis sit idem quod anima intellectiva, vel sit res sibi addita.
  •  22
    Does the intellect preserve intelligible species once the actual act of thinking has ceased?
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 866-889. 2023.
    It is argued that it does not, because sense and intellect should be treated analogously.
  •  10
    Utrum punctum monstretur vel intellegatur ut privatio
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 854-865. 2023.
    Et arguitur quod non: vel punctum nihil est vel aliquid est. Si nihil est, tunc non intelligitur secundum dicta in alia quaestione. Et si aliquid est, tunc debet intelligi positive, cum omne ens sit positive, et cum si punctum est aliquid, ipsum est magnitudo, quae positive intelligitur.
  •  13
    Utrum species qualitatum proprie et per se sensibilium habeant in medio vel in organo instantaneam generationem et multiplicationem
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 402-489. 2023.
    Et arguitur quod sic, quia sicut videmus de lumine et de spe-ciebus colorum, ita debemus imaginari de speciebus aliarum qualitatum sensibilium, vel oportet assignare causam diversitatis, quod non apparet facile.
  •  14
    Should the powers of the soul be distinguished by their acts or objects?
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 174-187. 2023.
    And it is argued that they should not be distinguished by their acts, because powers are principles (either active or passive) and so they are naturally prior to their acts, and things that are prior do not have their distinctness from things that are posterior.
  •  17
    Utrum necesse sit ad hoc quod homo intelligat concurrere active intellectum agentem, praeter intellectum possibilem
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 782-799. 2023.
    Et arguitur quod non, quia Şsicut sensus ad sensibilia,Ť etc. Sed non est dare sensum agentem praeter sensum possibilem, id est receptivum sensationum, cum Aristoteles eum non posuit; igitur, etc.
  •  19
    Utrum intellectus humanus sit perpetuus
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 702-717. 2023.
    1. Arguitur quod non, quia sequitur quod homo esset perpetuus, quod est falsum, cum generatur et morietur.
  •  10
    Is one appetite contrary to another in a human being?
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 922-933. 2023.
    I do not take ŚappetiteŠ here for the appetitive power of the soul, but for the appetitive act.
  •  17
    Utrum non ens possit intelligi
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 838-853. 2023.
    Quia Aristoteles determinat de modo intelligendi punctum, et hoc nomen punctum videtur significare indivisibile in magnitudine et nihil est tale, prout debet videri sexto Physicorum, ideo quaeritur utrum non ens possit intelligi.
  •  18
    Utrum natura faciat aliquid frustra vel etiam deficiat aliquando in necessariis
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 934-943. 2023.
    Arguitur quod aliquid faciat frustra, quia facit aliquando sextum digitum in manu, qui frustra est quia nullius utilitatis est. Im- mo utilius et melius esset quod essent tantum quinque.
  •  14
    Is it necessary to postulate a single common sense?
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 548-559. 2023.
    We argue that it is not, neither on account of the proper sensibles nor on account of the common sensibles, since we cognize all these by the external senses.
  •  13
    Utrum sensibilia communia sint per se sensibilia
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 306-319. 2023.
    Arguitur quod non, quia illud non est per se sensibile quod non potest sentiri nisi per aliud vel cum alio quod sibi non determinat, immo cum quo coniungitur per accidens et contingenter. Sic autem est de sensibilibus communibus.
  •  20
    Utrum intellectus prius intelligat universale quam singulare, vel e converso
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 728-763. 2023.
    1. Et quia praeter animam nostram, scilicet extra, non est equus universalis distinctus ab equo vel equis singulari vel singula- ribus, nec lapis universalis praeter lapides singulares, et sic de aliis, prout supponimus ex septimo Metaphysicae, ideo dicta quaestio in propriis verbis formanda est: utrum easdem res vel eandem rem intellectus intelligit prius universaliter, scilicet secundum conceptum communem, quam singulariter, id est, secundum conceptum singu- larem, vel e converso.
  •  22
    Utrum oporteat intellectum esse denudatum ab eo quod ipse intelligit
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 646-657. 2023.
    Arguitur quod non per similem de sensu. Nam organum tactus non est sine calido et frigido, humido et sicco, quorum ipse est perceptivus, nec lingua sine sapore, nec oculus sine colore; ergo, etc.
  •  17
    Utrum omnis anima sit actus primus corporis organici
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 104-123. 2023.
    Et arguitur quod non sit actus primus, quia solus Deus est actus primus; omnia enim alia sunt ipso posteriora. Et etiam formae elementorum sunt priores naturaliter formis aliis; ideo formae mixtorum, cuiusmodi sunt animae, non sunt primi actus.
  •  18
    Circa secundum librum de anima quaeritur primo utrum omnis anima sit actus substantialis
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 86-103. 2023.
    Arguitur primo quod non sit actus, quia potentia animae est anima, ut dicetur post. Sed potentia non est actus, quia dicit Aristoteles in prooemio huius quod actus et potentia differunt non parum. Et Commentator similiter dicit quod sunt differentiae oppositae.
  •  23
    Utrum sensus sit virtus passiva
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 238-265. 2023.
    Arguitur quod non quia materiae est pati et formae est agere, agit enim agens secundum quod est in actu et patitur passum secundum quod est in potentia, ut patet tertio Physicorum et primo De generatione et ubicumque Aristoteles loquitur de ista materia; sensus autem est forma et non materia; ergo etc.
  •  17
    Utrum potentiae animae sint distinctae ab ipsa anima
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 156-173. 2023.
    Et arguitur quod sic, quia aliter non essent distinctae ab invicem. Sed ego probo quod sint distinctae ab invicem etiam in eodem supposito, ubi tamen dictum est quod non est nisi unica anima. Et hoc probo multipliciter.
  •  29
    Utrum intellectus possibilis sit pura potentia sic quod non sit aliquis actus, sicut nec materia prima
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 718-727. 2023.
    Arguitur quod sic, per Aristotelem dicentem quod Şnullam habet naturam, nisi quod possibilis est vocatus.Ť.
  •  14
    Utrum in homine sit anima intellectiva alia ab anima sensitiva
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    In Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, Peter Hartman & Jack Zupko (eds.), John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima, Springer Verlag. pp. 908-921. 2023.
    Arguitur quod sic, quia sensitiva in omni actu suo indiget organo corporeo, et est extensa et divisibilis et generabilis, quia secundo huius dicit Aristoteles quod Şsensitivi prima immutatio est a generante.Ť.
  •  76
    John Buridan’s Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima – Iohannis Buridani Quaestiones in Aristotelis De Anima
    with Gyula Klima, Peter G. Sobol, and Peter Hartman
    Springer Verlag. 2023.
    This book provides the Latin text and its annotated English translation of the question-commentary of John Buridan (ca. 1300-1360) on Aristotle’s “On the Soul”. Buridan was the most influential Parisian nominalist philosopher of his time. His work speaks across centuries to our modern concerns in the philosophy of mind. This volume completes the project of a volume published earlier in the same series: “Questions on the Soul by John Buridan and Others”. An appealing book for scholars of Aristotl…Read more
    This book provides the Latin text and its annotated English translation of the question-commentary of John Buridan (ca. 1300-1360) on Aristotle’s “On the Soul”. Buridan was the most influential Parisian nominalist philosopher of his time. His work speaks across centuries to our modern concerns in the philosophy of mind. This volume completes the project of a volume published earlier in the same series: “Questions on the Soul by John Buridan and Others”. An appealing book for scholars of Aristotle and those who are in the field of Medieval philosophy.
    AristotleJean Buridan
  •  50
    Sacred Doctrine, Secular Practice: Theology and Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts at Paris, 1325–1400
    In Jan A. Aertsen & Andreas Speer (eds.), Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? Qu'est-ce que la philosophie au moyen 'ge? What is Philosophy in the Middle Ages?: Akten des X. Internationalen Kongresses für Mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société Internationale pour l'Etude de la Philosophie Médiévale, 25. bis 30. August 1997 in Erfurt, De Gruyter. pp. 656-666. 1998.
  •  4
    On the Several Senses of “Intentio” in Buridan
    In Gyula Klima (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy, Fordham University Press. pp. 251-272. 2020.
  •  44
    Relation als Vergleich: Die Relationstheorie des Johannes Buridan im Kontext seines Denkens und der Scholastik by Rolf Schönberger
    The Thomist 60 (3): 497-502. 1996.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 497 Both theologians and philosophers need to see a completely integrated treatment of both rational and faith aspects of Aquinas's theology of creation. To this end, more work on theology as science also would be helpful. Emery's treatment of the end and subject of a science is not quite neoplatonic enough. His presentation of the subject of theology forces God, its subject in the Summa theologiae, on earlier texts of A…Read more
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 497 Both theologians and philosophers need to see a completely integrated treatment of both rational and faith aspects of Aquinas's theology of creation. To this end, more work on theology as science also would be helpful. Emery's treatment of the end and subject of a science is not quite neoplatonic enough. His presentation of the subject of theology forces God, its subject in the Summa theologiae, on earlier texts of Albert (49) and Aquinas (302). In I Sent. Aquinas says the subject is ens divinum, "being as related to the divine," which is much wider than God, who is the end but not subject oftheology. His model is Avicenna's ens commune as the subject of a metaphysics with God as its end. More work also must be done on the articles of faith, part of the subject of theology for Albert; but theology's proper principles for Aquinas. How primordial the articles are, and the interplay of reason and faith in knowing them, are still unresolved issues. In sum, one hopes this fine book by Fr. Emery will be the first of many helping give Thomism the new look it deserves. Centerfor Tlwmistic Studies Houston, TX R. E. HOUSER Relation als Vergleich: Die Relationstheorie des Johannes Buridan im Kontext seines Denkens und der Scholastik. By ROLF SCHONBERGER. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, Band 43. Leiden/New York/Koln: E. J. Brill, 1994. Pp. 489. $108.75 (cloth). This book is a revised version of the author's 1990 Habilitationsschrift at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat in Munich. It aims to articulate the theory of relations developed by the noted Parisian philosopher, John Buridan (ca. 1295-1358), "in connection with the extensive scholastic discussion of this problem," and, in particular, to show how the same arguments were advanced or refuted by different philosophers from "fundamentally different starting points" (ix, 59). This stems from the author's working hypothesis that the medieval debate on the nature of relations proceeded dialectically, and that Buridan's contribution to it can be better understood by taking its argumentative context into consideration. The scope of the book is wide-ranging, to say the least. Readers expecting a book about Buridan's theory of relations will find the title somewhat misleading, however, since background material and a survey of the "scholastic context" of Buridan's theory fill up the first 372 pages, with the author's presentation and discussion of the theory itself limited to the final 498 BOOK REVIEWS 75. Furthermore, the author seems to regard the relevance of the former discussion to the latter as self-evident. This is fine where the connections are fairly uncontroversial, as in the case of William of Ockham, but where they are less so, as in the cases 0f Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Meister Eckhart, Durand of St. Pour~ain, and Peter John Olivi, one is left in the dark about why separate chapters are devoted to each. Giles and Olivi are not even mentioned in the chapters on Buridan. Henry and Durand make one appearance each, both in the course of the trivial observation that unlike in their theories, "consideration of the doctrine of the Trinity plays no role in Buridan's theory of relations" (399). Eckhart is mentioned a few times, but in terms so speculative as to be useless for the general reader. For example, the author finds Jan Pinborg's characterization of Buridan as a someone who "took the arbitrariness of language seriously" to be "of course... too microscopic " (393). The reason is that Pinborg allegedly failed to see the radicalization of conventionality in the fourteenth century in terms of an "epochal shift" from "the symbolic and quasi-naturalistic conception of language in the early Middle Ages," a conception that, the author parenthetically notes, "is perhaps still to be found (or further strengthened) in Bonaventure or Meister Eckhart" (ibid.). But even bracketing the question of how this description fits the latter authors, the Buridan story is more complex than this. Buridan does emphasize that spoken and written expressions signify conventionally, but he never abandons the Aristotelian/Boethian tripartite conception of language, according to which concepts are said to...
  •  48
    Natural Philosophy: On Retrieving a Lost Disciplinary Imaginary by Alister E. McGRATH (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 77 (1): 158-159. 2023.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Natural Philosophy: On Retrieving a Lost Disciplinary Imaginary by Alister E. McGRATHJack ZupkoMcGRATH, Alister E. Natural Philosophy: On Retrieving a Lost Disciplinary Imaginary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. viii + 248 pp. Cloth, $39.95This book attempts to retrieve and reimagine the tradition of natural philosophy as an antidote for what the author sees as the fragmented, instrumentalized, and ethically diseng…Read more
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Natural Philosophy: On Retrieving a Lost Disciplinary Imaginary by Alister E. McGRATHJack ZupkoMcGRATH, Alister E. Natural Philosophy: On Retrieving a Lost Disciplinary Imaginary. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. viii + 248 pp. Cloth, $39.95This book attempts to retrieve and reimagine the tradition of natural philosophy as an antidote for what the author sees as the fragmented, instrumentalized, and ethically disengaged understanding of the natural world most of us have today. The idea is not to reinstate the older vision of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, with its final causes and animated spheres, or even the early modern culmination of natural philosophy in Newton’s universe of mathematically fixed natural laws; rather, the author hopes to engender a newer and deeper understanding of nature that is at once scientific, ethical, and poetic, which he explains in terms of the conceptual framework of Popper’s “Three Worlds”: objective, subjective, and theoretical. What is recovered thereby is said to be a “lost conceptual space” wherein human beings learn both about and from nature, modes of knowing rendered obsolete by disciplinary specialization in the sciences as well as our commitment to objective methods that leave no room for ethical or spiritual approaches to understanding the natural world and our place in it.The author covers quite a bit of ground on the historical side, from the ancient Greeks through the Middle Ages, moving on to the idea of natural philosophy as it was gradually transformed during the early modern period by Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Bacon, Boyle, and Newton—a picture finally eclipsed by the objective, empirical concept of natural science familiar to us today. Curiously, the book says very little about the Platonic tradition of natural philosophy that grew up around the Timaeus. Because it was available in Latin (or the first half of it, anyway, in a Latin translation by the Roman Neoplatonist Calcidius, who also wrote an influential commentary on the work), the Timaeus was, for almost a millennium, the authoritative text in natural philosophy in the West, at least until Aristotle’s nonlogical and scientific writings were recovered in the twelfth century. The Timaeus was the subject of many commentaries and philosophical discussions, from Calcidius in the fourth century to Bernardus Silvestris, William of Conches, and Alan of Lille in the twelfth. It fell out of favor among philosophers with the rise of Aristotle’s Physics and Aristotelian natural philosophy, though it continued to shape the popular imagination of nature in other genres, such as art and literature—recall, for example, the well-known image of “God the Geometer” (c. 1230), measuring the cosmos with a compass. If the author’s project is about “retrieving” natural philosophy “as a lost disciplinary imaginary” (the book’s subtitle), then surely the Platonic vision of the universe deserves equal billing with the Aristotelian. [End Page 158]That said, there is much to like in the project sketched here. The author’s diagnosis of the epistemic malaise of modern-day science sounds right to anyone familiar with the history of philosophy and natural science. So, even though we can now correctly describe the velocity constant of earth’s gravity as 9.8 m/s2, among other scientific achievements, we take ourselves to be wearing a different hat when we wax poetic at the beauty of the sky and the stars. Early-and pre-modern authors were more adept at bringing together science and poetry, but that might be because their epistemic position was radically different from our own. Calcidius, for example, finds it easy to draw moral and aesthetic conclusions from the motions of the cosmos because he really believed heavenly bodies are, like us, animated by souls. Even a materialist like Lucretius accepts that the gods exist; his (still) very radical thesis is that they don’t care about us. (And why should they? The Pythagorean theorem is much more beautiful and edifying to consider than the troubles of ignorant and weak-willed mortals.) Enlightened moderns that we are, we no longer believe the heavens are populated by super-intelligent beings; yet we continue to marvel at Van Gogh’s Starry Night and feel it is wrong to cause gratuitous...
  •  52
    Introduction
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2): 153-160. 2023.
  •  172
    European and American Philosophers
    with John Marenbon, Douglas Kellner, Richard D. Parry, Gregory Schufreider, Ralph McInerny, Andrea Nye, R. M. Dancy, Vernon J. Bourke, A. A. Long, James F. Harris, Thomas Oberdan, Paul S. MacDonald, Véronique M. Fóti, F. Rosen, James Dye, Pete A. Y. Gunter, Lisa J. Downing, W. J. Mander, Peter Simons, Maurice Friedman, Robert C. Solomon, Nigel Love, Mary Pickering, Andrew Reck, Simon J. Evnine, Iakovos Vasiliou, John C. Coker, Georges Dicker, James Gouinlock, Paul J. Welty, Gianluigi Oliveri, Tom Rockmore, Wayne M. Martin, Ladelle McWhorter, Hans-Johann Glock, Georgia Warnke, John Haldane, Joseph S. Ullian, Steven Rieber, David Ingram, Nick Fotion, George Rainbolt, Thomas Sheehan, Gerald J. Massey, Barbara D. Massey, David E. Cooper, David Gauthier, James M. Humber, J. N. Mohanty, Michael H. Dearmey, Oswald O. Schrag, Ralf Meerbote, George J. Stack, John P. Burgess, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Nicholas Jolley, Adriaan T. Peperzak, E. J. Lowe, William D. Richardson, Stephen Mulhall, and C.
    In Robert L. Arrington (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophers, Wiley-blackwell. 2008.
    Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categ…Read more
    Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action.
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