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81The Value of Rationality, by Ralph WedgwoodMind 127 (508): 1253-1261. 2018._ The Value of Rationality _, by WedgwoodRalph. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 267.
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15The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of Legal SystemPhilosophical Quarterly 21 (85): 380-381. 1971.
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43Intention and valuePhilosophical Explorations 20 (sup2): 109-126. 2017.In previous writings, I joined those who take the view that action with an intention is an action for a reason, where whatever value there is in the action is a reason for it. This paper sketches the role of reasons and intentions in leading to action with an intention. Section 1 explains that though belief in the value of the intended action is not an essential constituent of intentions, nevertheless when humans act with an intention they act in the belief that there is value in the action. Sec…Read more
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349Practical reason and normsHutchinson. 1975.Practical Reason and Norms focuses on three problems: In what way are rules normative, and how do they differ from ordinary reasons? What makes normative systems systematic? What distinguishes legal systems, and in what consists their normativity? All three questions are answered by taking reasons as the basic normative concept, and showing the distinctive role reasons have in every case, thus paving the way to a unified account of normativity. Rules are a structure of reasons to perform the req…Read more
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288Normativity: The Place of ReasoningPhilosophical Issues 25 (1): 144-164. 2015.It is more or less common ground that an important aspect of the explanation of normativity relates it to the way Reason (our rational powers), reasons (for beliefs, emotions, actions, etc.) and reasoning, with all its varieties and domains, are inter-connected. The relation of reasoning to reasons is the topic of this this paper. It does not start from a tabula rasa. It presupposes that normativity has to do with the ability to respond rationally to reasons, and with responding to reasons with …Read more
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387The problem I have in mind is the problem of the possible justification of subjecting one's will to that of another, and of the normative standing of demands to do so. The account of authority that I offered, many years ago, under the title of the service conception of authority, addressed this issue, and assumed that all other problems regarding authority are subsumed under it. Many found the account implausible. It is thin, relying on very few ideas. It may well appear to be too thin, and to d…Read more
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333The concept of a legal system: an introduction to the theory of legal system (edited book)Oxford University Press. 1970.What does it mean to assert or deny the existence of a legal system? How can one determine whether a given law belongs to a certain legal system? What kind of structure do these systems have, that is--what necessary relations obtain between their laws? The examination of these problems in this volume leads to a new approach to traditional jurisprudential question, though the conclusions are based on a critical appraisal, particularly those of Bentham, Austin, Kelsen, and Hart.
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50Engaging ReasonPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3): 745-748. 1999.Joseph Raz presents a penetrating exploration of the interdependence of value, reason, and the will. These essays illuminate a wide range of questions concerning fundamental aspects of human thought and action. Engaging Reason is a summation of many years of original, compelling, and influential work by a major contemporary philosopher.
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20The Active and the Passive: Joseph RazSupplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 71 (1): 211-228. 1997.
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195Being in the worldRatio 23 (4): 433-452. 2010.Actions for which we are responsible constitute our engagement with the world as rational agents. What is the relationship between such actions and our capacities for rational agency? I take this to be a question about responsibility in a particular use of that term, which I shall call ‘responsibility2’. We are not responsible2 for all our intentional actions (actions under hypnosis, for example), but we can nevertheless be responsible2 for actions we do not adequately control, for negligent act…Read more
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42Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and PoliticsPhilosophical Review 106 (3): 453. 1997.Raz's method is as unusual, and as admirable, as the substance of his sometimes rather unfortunately labeled "perfectionist liberalism"—unfortunate because "it is not perfectionist in the more ordinary sense of the term" in that it recognizes that "imperfect ways of life may be the best which is possible for people" and "is strongly pluralistic", while understanding its fundamental value of well-being as the active and autonomous making of a life of one's own. Raz's approach is simultaneously al…Read more
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2AuthorityWiley-Blackwell. 1990.Authority is one of the key issues in political studies, for the question of by what right one person or several persons govern others is at the very root of political activity. In selecting key readings for this volume Joseph Raz concerns himself primarily with the moral aspect of political authority, choosing pieces that examine its justification, determine who is subject to it and who is entitled to hold it, and whether there are any general moral limits to it. The readings-by such modern pol…Read more
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29Value: a Menu of QuestionsIn John Keown & Robert P. George (eds.), Reason, morality, and law: the philosophy of John Finnis, Oxford University Press. pp. 13. 2013.
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75Moral Change and Social RelativismSocial Philosophy and Policy 11 (1): 139-158. 1994.I could not write the essay I hoped to write. I hoped to write about cultural pluralism and moral epistemology by assuming that the first is the case and exploring what implications this may have for the second. But I soon realized that I do not know what cultural pluralism is. I do not mean that I have just belatedly discovered that the phrase “cultural pluralism” is used in different ways on different occasions. I mean that I realized that I myself did not know in what sense the phrase may be …Read more
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182Reasons : Explanatory and normativeIn Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action, Palgrave-macmillan. 2009.A thesis familiar by being as often disputed as defended has it that intentional action is action for a reason. The present paper contributes to the defence of a weaker version of it, namely: Acting with an intention or a purpose is acting (as things appear to one) for a reason.
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215The Politics of the Rule of LawRatio Juris 3 (3): 331-339. 1990.The article reviews several books on the rule of law, including "International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for State Cooperation," by Victor A. Peskin, "Civil War and the Rule of Law: Security, Development, Human Rights," edited by Agnes Hurwitz and Reyko Huang, and "Plunder: When the Rule of Law Is Illegal," by Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader
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Columbia UniversityProfessor (Part-time)
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King's College LondonProfessor (Part-time)
London, London, City of, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Law |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Value Theory, Misc |