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194Voluntary Obligations and Normative PowersAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 46 (1). 1972.
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114The truth in particularismIn Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral particularism, Oxford University Press. pp. 48--78. 2000.Particularism's model of explanation is challenged on the ground that a sensible intelligibility principle requires that there must be an explanation for the difference between a good and a bad action. Raz is concerned with what it is to be guided by reason, as well as with the results of the fact that reason can often undermine particular outcomes. What determines the moral status of an action must extend beyond what the agent's reason for acting is. It is argued that there is a clear distincti…Read more
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246Reasons : Practical and adaptiveIn David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action, Cambridge University Press. 2009.The paper argues that normative reasons are of two fundamental kinds, practical which are value related, and adaptive, which are not related to any value, but indicate how our beliefs and emotions should adjust to fit how things are in the world. The distinction is applied and defended, in part through an additional distinction between standard and non-standard reasons (for actions, intentions, emotions or belief).
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1064Human rights without foundationsIn J. Tasioulas & S. Besson (eds.), The Philosphy of International Law, Oxford University Press. 2010.Using the accounts of Gewirth and Griffin as examples, the article criticises accounts of human rights as those are understood in human rights practices, which regard them as rights all human beings have in virtue of their humanity. Instead it suggests that (with Rawls) human rights set the limits to the sovereignty of the state, but criticises Rawls conflation of sovereignty with legitimate authority. The resulting conception takes human rights, like other rights, to be contingent on social con…Read more
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83My remarks will focus primarily on the connection between the thesis of the Guise of the Good, and actions under the Guise of the Bad. I distinguish and discuss separately two versions of the Guise of the Bad thesis. The normative version claims that it is possible to perform an action that one believes to be bad (to have bad-making features) and for the reason that it is, as the agent believes, bad. The motive version claims that an agent can, without having any relevant false beliefs, perform …Read more
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Columbia UniversityProfessor (Part-time)
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King's College LondonProfessor (Part-time)
London, London, City of, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Law |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Value Theory, Misc |