David K. Chan

My paper critiques the comparability requirement that practical reason is limited by the possibility of comparing alternatives. I describe methods of reasoning that are compatible with choice between incomparable options, and discuss a mistake about intention that supports the view that comparing alternatives is the only way to choose rationally. I then explain how a model of rational choice that prescribes the comparison of alternatives invents unacceptable concepts to make comparability possible. Finally, I criticize the assumption of the unity of practical reason that requires that prudential and moral choices are both made by comparing alternatives. It turns out that moral conflicts that are intractable for those who reason with a method of comparison may be resolvable by using moral reasoning that does not involve the comparison of alternatives in terms of a comprehensive value. Making room for such forms of reasoning is preferable to denying incomparability.

In Chinese Confucian medical ethics, the principle of autonomy has not been recognized. Instead, the basic values of medical practice are compassion and humaneness. Patient autonomy however lies at the foundation of Western medical ethics in general and research ethics in particular. In the modern world of biotechnology, what happens when medical research is carried out in an East Asian society? Should the society adopt principles of Western medical ethics? Or can resources to ensure ethical research be found in Confucian ethics? I consider answers to these questions in the context of a recent case of unethical research in Singapore.

There are two contrasting paradigms for dealing with terrorists: war and law enforcement. In this paper, I first discuss how the just war theory assesses the military response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. I argue that the ethical problems with the U.S. attack on Afghanistan in response to 9/11 concern principles of jus ad bellum besides just cause. I show that the principles of right intention, last resort, proportionality and likelihood of success were violated. Furthermore, both jus in bello principles of proportionality and discrimination were not satisfied in targeting terrorists in places where civilians not linked to them live. The law enforcement that takes place in liberal democracies is fully respectful and protective of innocent lives. Crime is dealt with by apprehending lawbreakers and putting them on trial if possible, and by keeping criminal elements on the loose away from potential victims. Good law enforcement also includes acting to remove causes of crime. I examine how this model applies to the problem of terrorism and address objections concerning the impossibility of eliminating terrorism, the slowness of success, and the possibility that there are “nut cases” who hate America no matter what.

In this paper, I examine the difference between decision-making by soldiers and commanders, compared with leaders of the nation. Decision-making in the armed forces is prudential reasoning concerned with the best means to achieve given military objectives. I argue that those in the military cannot rationally make the moral choice to risk the lives of their own soldiers or jeopardize their mission in order to protect the lives of enemy civilians. This does not vindicate the realists who deny that morality applies to war. Moral constraints set out in war conventions foster the illusion that by following rules of war, soldiers and their leaders have done all anyone needs to do in terms of moral choice concerning war. Political leaders should instead engage in moral reasoning by considering other means besides war, even the option of changing objectives. Such reasoning differs from prudential reasoning not in scope but in type

In this paper, I discuss an example from Buchanan of active voluntary euthanasia (AVE). I first refute objections to the intuitive permissibility of the killing described in the example. After explaining why the killing is intentional, I evaluate Buchanan's solution to the ‘problem of intending death’. According to Buchanan, what justifies a physician in intentionally bringing about a patient's death by AVE is a principle that embodies the values of patient self-determination and well-being. I argue that these two considerations are not sufficient for justifying AVE. The motive of the physician matters, but it is his desire rather than his intention that is relevant. An ethical physician may bring about intentionally the death of his patient if in forming his intention, he began with an appropriate desire to keep the patient alive as well as a legitimate desire to prevent prolonged suffering, with the latter outweighing the former. The ethical physician also desires to respect the choice of his patient wherever possible. On my account, the physician should be guided by the virtues and goals of his profession rather than by strict ‘all-or-nothing’ principles. I defend my account by describing the advantages of my account, and dismissing possible objections.

The ethics of gene patenting is concerned with whether human genes are the kind of thing that is appropriate for patenting, and whether it is ethical to do so. Is genetic technology a special case compared to other medical technology that have been patented? Much of the debate has revolved around the benefits and harms of allowing gene sequences to be patented. In this paper, I am concerned with a non-consequential consideration: Can someone patent my genes? If genes are the common property of humankind, are genes patentable? I present an objection to the patenting of processes used to manipulate our genes that have the potential to change human nature. Should not all members of the human species have a say regarding genetic engineering that can be used to irreversibly change what makes each one a human? I conclude with an examination of how genetic research may be democratically controlled.

The supreme emergency exemption proposed by Michael Walzer has engendered controversy because it permits violations of the jus in bello principle of discrimination when a state is faced with imminent defeat at the hands of a very evil enemy. Traditionalists among just war theorists believe that noncombatants should never be deliberately targeted in war whether or not there is a supreme emergency. Pacifists on the other hand reject war as immoral even in a supreme emergency. Unlike Walzer, neither just war traditionalists nor pacifists make a special case for supreme emergencies. In this paper, I borrow Walzer’s concept to provide support for a different ethics of war that limits war to supreme emergencies. In non-supreme emergency situations, I agree with pacifists in rejecting war even if just war requirements are satisfied. But in supreme emergencies, I agree with just war traditionalists that war can be legitimately fought provided that moral constraints that protect noncombatants are respected.