Miroslav Imbrisevic

The debate about the Strategic Foul has been rumbling on for several decades and it has predominantly been fought on moral grounds. The defenders claim that the rules of a game must be supplemented by the ‘ethos’ of the game, by its conventions or informal rules. Critics of the Strategic Foul argue that to break the rules deliberately, in order to gain an advantage, is morally wrong, spoils the game, or is a form of cheating. Rather than entering the moral maze I will argue that the Strategic Foul rests on a conceptual mistake. I will contrast the Strategic Foul with the idea of Efficient Breach in the economic approach to law in order to bring out some of the salient features. While doing so I will attempt some cross-fertilisation between jurisprudential insights and philosophical reflection on game rules. Finally, I will re-cast Searle’s distinction between constitutive and regulative rules in order to bring out the conceptual mistake more clearly.

This collection of essays approaches the issue of crime from the perspective of criminology, which is traditionally concerned with the nature and causes of crime. Radical or Marxist criminology (RMC) became prominent in the late 60s. This strand of criminology is concerned with how class formation, class structure and crime are related. It is assumed that the motivation to commit crimes is not innate to individuals but is a result of social conditions. RMC’s most important premise is that the structure of the production process shapes the construction of various classes as well as shaping a concomitant power structure (i.e., who owns the means of production and who controls the labour power). Most importantly, for the discussion of crime, economic power can be translated into political power (e.g., through lobbying or funding of political campaigns/candidates).

In this paper I discuss the nature of consent in general, and as it applies to Carlos Nino’s consensual theory of punishment. For Nino the criminal’s consent to change her legal-normative status is a form of implied consent. I distinguish three types of implied consent: 1) implied consent which is based on an operative convention (i.e. tacit consent); 2) implied consent where there is no operative convention; 3) “direct consent” to the legal-normative consequences of a proscribed act – this is the consent which Nino employs. I argue that Nino’s conception of consent in crime exhibits many common features of “everyday” consent, which justify that it be classed as a form of (implied) consent. h us, Nino is right to claim that the consent in crime is similar to the consent in contracts and to the consent to assume a risk in tort law.

Gaunilo presents Anselm with a dilemma in section 7 of his Responsio: I know most certainly that I exist. But If I cannot think my non-existence at the same time, then Anselm's claim in Proslogion 3 (that my inability to think God's non-existence, while knowing most certainly that He exists, is a unique property of God) would be false. If I can do so, however, then I should also be able to know most certainly that God exists and, at the same time, think his non-existence. I will show that Anselm's response to Gaunilo's attack is not adequate because it does not address the issue of certainty, which is at the heart of Gaunilo's objection.

In this paper I will discuss two aspects of ignorance of the law: ignorance of illegality (including mistaking the law) and ignorance of the penalty; and I will look at the implications for natives, for tourists and for immigrants. I will argue that Carlos Nino's consensual theory of punishment needs to rely on two premises in order to justify that (claiming) ignorance of the law is no excuse. The first premise explains why individuals are presumed to 'know' current laws. The second premise explains why individuals are presumed to 'know' new legislation.

Recently, David Boonin has put forward several objections to Carlos S. Nino's 'Consensual Theory of Punishment'. In this paper I will defend Nino against the 'explicit denial objection'. I will discuss whether Boonin's interpretation of Nino as a tacit consent theorist is right. I will argue that the offender's consent is neither tacit nor express, but a special category of implicit consent. Further, for Nino the legal-normative consequences of an act (of crime) are 'irrevocable', i.e. one cannot (expressly and successfully) deny liability to them. I will suggest an explanation for Nino's irrevocability claim.