Miroslav Imbrisevic

How complex is sex? According to this book, not nearly as complex as we’re often told these days. Author Tomás Bogardus first critically evaluates varieties of a complex view of sex—supported by Anne Fausto-Sterling, Sarah Richardson, and others—in which sex is a constellation of traits related to chromosomes, hormones, gonads, and phenotypes. Bogardus then considers several gamete-based accounts of sex, to which he is more sympathetic, including those from Alex Byrne, Laura Franklin-Hall, and Paul Griffiths. Shortcomings of these views are described, and an improved account is proposed: the sexes are activated higher-order functions. In short, to be male is to have the function of producing sperm, and to be female is to have the function of producing eggs. Bogardus develops this view, all while untangling the various meanings and definitions of 'gender' and 'gender identity', and while examining whether all of them are ultimately defined in terms of the sexes. The author then defends his methodology of deferring to biologists when figuring out the nature of the sexes and concludes with practical questions about whether we should revise the meanings of our sex terms for the sake of social justice. He asks whether pronouns like ‘he’ and ‘she’ track biological sex, and whether they should continue to do so. The Nature of the Sexes: Why Biology Matters expands current philosophical debate on sex and gender, and is essential reading for curious students and academics alike.

This paper discusses two main types of refusal to engage with teams or individuals in sports competitions on the grounds of (1) association with actions of governments or organisations that are deemed by the objector to be unacceptable, as in demands for boycotts or expulsions of specific groups, and (2) where an apparently inappropriate inclusion threatens the coherence of sport or the rights of other participants. The primary concern in this paper is the underlying moral stance of the subject who engages in such actions (rather than those actions themselves), specifically, their understanding of themselves and of others as moral subjects. It is argued that whether we think such actions are morally justified depends to large extent on whether we also think that those whom we boycott, exclude, or include are moral subjects with the right to claim consideration from us, and from whom we too can claim consideration. That is, whether recognition functions as a reciprocal action between moral subjects. This is discussed with particular reference to Darwall's second-person standpoint and de Beauvoir's criticism of abstract ideals as inadequate for an existentialist ethic that respects the autonomy of humans beings as such. It is argued that all participants in sport, as in society, have the same fundamental authority to make claims and to be accountable, and that we commit an important wrong by claiming a superior moral authority to determine action that fails to take into account the subjectivity and authority of others. Yet, at the same time, we also need to take account of the logic of sport as a particular kind of voluntary practice that incorporates critical ethical principles of equal respect through fairness.