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412The Way of the WantonIn Catriona Mackenzie & Kim Atkins (eds.), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency, Routledge. 2008.Harry Frankfurt's philosophy of action as a prolegomenon to the Zhuangzi.
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1105Physicalist theories of colorPhilosophical Review 100 (January): 67-106. 1991.The dispute between realists about color and anti-realists is actually a dispute about the nature of color properties. The disputants do not disagree over what material objects are like. Rather, they disagree over whether any of the uncontroversial facts about material objects--their powers to cause visual experiences, their dispositions to reflect incident light, their atomic makeup, and so on--amount to their having colors. The disagreement is thus about which properties colors are and, in par…Read more
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115Self to Self: Selected EssaysCambridge University Press. 2005.Self to Self brings together essays on personal identity, autonomy, and moral emotions by the distinguished philosopher J. David Velleman. Although each of the essays was written as an independent piece, they are unified by an overarching thesis, that there is no single entity denoted by 'the self', as well as by themes from Kantian ethics, psychoanalytic theory, social psychology, and Velleman's work in the philosophy of action. Two of the essays were selected by the editors of Philosophers' An…Read more
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35Review: Replies to Discussion on "The Possibility of Practical Reason" (review)Philosophical Studies 121 (3). 2004.
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2918Narrative explanationPhilosophical Review 112 (1): 1-25. 2003.A story does more than recount events; it recounts events in a way that renders them intelligible, thus conveying not just information but also understanding. We might therefore be tempted to describe narrative as a genre of explanation. When the police invite a suspect to “tell his story,” they are asking him to explain the blood on his shirt or his absence from home on the night of the murder; and whether he is judged to have a “good story” will depend on its adequacy as an explanation. Can we…Read more
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1335Family HistoryPhilosophical Papers 34 (3): 357-378. 2005.Abstract I argue that meaning in life is importantly influenced by bioloical ties. More specifically, I maintain that knowing one's relatives and especially one's parents provides a kind of self-knowledge that is of irreplaceable value in the life-task of identity formation. These claims lead me to the conclusion that it is immoral to create children with the intention that they be alienated from their bioloical relatives?for example, by donor conception.
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46Willing the Law J. David VellemanIn Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 27. 2004.
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1321Distortions of NormativityEthical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3): 329-356. 2011.We discuss some implications of the Holocaust for moral philosophy. Our thesis is that morality became distorted in the Third Reich at the level of its social articulation. We explore this thesis in application to several front-line perpetrators who maintained false moral self-conceptions. We conclude that more than a priori moral reasoning is required to correct such distortions
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303Derek Parfit finally meets the Buddha -- on Tralfamadore! This paper is also archived at SSRN
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645Practical ReflectionPrinceton University Press. 1989.“What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, Practical Reflection develops philosophical accounts of inten…Read more
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2198How to Share an IntentionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1): 29-50. 1997.Existing accounts of shared intention (by Bratman, Searle, and others) do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally shared…Read more
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208DoablesPhilosophical Explorations (1): 1-16. 2013.Just as our scientific inquiries are framed by our prior conception of what can be observed ? that is, of observables ? so our practical deliberations are framed by our prior conception of what can be done, that is, of doables. And doables are socially constructed, with the result that they vary between societies. I explore how doables are constructed and conclude with some remarks about the implications for moral relativism.
Princeton
Department Of Philosophy
Alumnus
Areas of Specialization
Moral Psychology |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Meta-Ethics |