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142Tall Tales and Testimony to the MiraculousEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (2): 39-55. 2012.In the debate over testimony to miracles, a common Humean move is to emphasize the prior improbability of miracles as the most important epistemic factor. Robert Fogelin uses the example of Henry, who tells multiple tall tales about meeting celebrities, to argue that low prior probabilities alone can render testimony unbelievable, with obvious implications for testimony to miracles. A detailed Bayesian analysis of Henry’s stories shows instead that the fact that Henry tells multiple stories abou…Read more
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120Evidential Diversity and the Negation of H: A Probabilistic Account of the Value of Varied EvidenceErgo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3. 2016.The value of varied evidence, I propose, lies in the fact that more varied evidence is less coherent on the assumption of the negation of the hypothesis under consideration than less varied evidence. I contrast my own analysis with several other Bayesian analyses of the value of evidential diversity and show how my account explains cases where it seems intuitively that evidential variety is valuable for confirmation.
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3The Reliability of Witnesses and Testimony to the MiraculousIn Jake Chandler & Victoria S. Harrison (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion, Oxford University Press. 2012.The formal representation of the strength of witness testimony has been historically tied to a formula — proposed by Condorcet — that uses a factor representing the reliability of an individual witness. This approach encourages a false dilemma between hyper-scepticism about testimony, especially to extraordinary events such as miracles, and an overly sanguine estimate of reliability based on insufficiently detailed evidence. Because Condorcet’s formula does not have the resources for representin…Read more
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124Jeffrey conditioning, rigidity, and the defeasible red jelly beanPhilosophical Studies 168 (2): 569-582. 2014.Jonathan Weisberg has argued that Jeffrey Conditioning is inherently “anti-holistic” By this he means, inter alia, that JC does not allow us to take proper account of after-the-fact defeaters for our beliefs. His central example concerns the discovery that the lighting in a room is red-tinted and the relationship of that discovery to the belief that a jelly bean in the room is red. Weisberg’s argument that the rigidity required for JC blocks the defeating role of the red-tinted light rests on th…Read more
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37Reason, Rhetoric and the Price of Linguistic RevisionPublic Affairs Quarterly 11 (3): 255-279. 1997.
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169Accounting for Dependence: Relative Consilience as a Correction Factor in Cumulative Case ArgumentsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3): 560-572. 2017.I propose a measure of dependence that relates a set of items of evidence to an hypothesis H and to H's negation. I dub this measure relative consilience and propose a method for using it as a correction factor for dependence among items of evidence. Using RC, I examine collusion and testimonial independence, the value of diverse evidence, and the strengthening of otherwise weak or non-existent cases. RC provides a valuable tool for formal epistemologists interested in analyzing cumulative case …Read more
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222Likelihoods, Multiple Universes, and Epistemic ContextPhilosophia Christi 7 (2). 2005.Both advocates and opponents of the fine-tuning argument treat multiple universes with a selection effect as a legitimate hypothesis to explain the life-permitting values of the constants in our universe. I argue that, except where there is specific relevant prior information, the occurrence of multiple instances of a low-likelihood causal process should not be treated as an alternative hypothesis to a higher-likelihood causal process. Since an ’ad hoc’ hypothesis can be invented to give high li…Read more