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8Be Careful What You GrantPhilosophia 1-23. forthcoming.I examine the concept of granting for the sake of the argument in the context of explanatory reasoning. I discuss a situation where S wishes to argue for H1 as a true explanation of evidence E and also decides to grant, for the sake of the argument, that H2 is an explanation of E. S must then argue that H1 and H2 jointly explain E. When H1 and H2 compete for the force of E, it is usually a bad idea for S to grant H2 for the sake of the argument. If H1 and H2 are not positively dependent otherwis…Read more
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701The Argument from Miracles: A Cumulative Case for the Resurrection of Jesus of NazarethIn William Lane Craig & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, Blackwell. pp. 593--662. 2009.This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Goal and Scope of the Argument The Concept of a Miracle Textual Assumptions Background Facts: Death and Burial The Salient Facts: W, D, and P Probabilistic Cumulative Case Arguments: Nature and Structure The Testimony of the Women: Bayes Factor Analysis The Testimony of the Disciples: Bayes Factor Analysis The Conversion of Paul: Bayes Factor Analysis The Collective Force of the Salient Facts Independence Hume's Maxim and Worldview Worries Plan…Read more
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639Probabilities and the fine-tuning argument: A sceptical viewMind 110 (440): 1027-1038. 2001.Proponents of the Fine-Tuning Argument frequently assume that the narrowness of the life-friendly range of fundamental physical constants implies a low probability for the origin of the universe ‘by chance’. We cast this argument in a more rigorous form than is customary and conclude that the narrow intervals do not yield a probability at all because the resulting measure function is non-normalizable. We then consider various attempts to circumvent this problem and argue that they fail.
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131Foundationalism, Probability, and Mutual SupportErkenntnis 68 (1): 55-77. 2008.The phenomenon of mutual support presents a specific challenge to the foundationalist epistemologist: Is it possible to model mutual support accurately without using circles of evidential support? We argue that the appearance of loops of support arises from a failure to distinguish different synchronic lines of evidential force. The ban on loops should be clarified to exclude loops within any such line, and basing should be understood as taking place within lines of evidence. Uncertain propositi…Read more
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48On the Rational Reconstruction of the Fine-Tuning ArgumentPhilosophia Christi 7 (2): 425-443. 2005.
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14Agency and the metalottery fallacyAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4). 2002.In deciding whether an event was caused by chance or agency, it is incorrect to attribute the event to chance on the grounds that there have been enough broadly similar situations in the universe to provide opportunities for the event to occur by chance somewhere or other. In order to include a set of instances in an inference as opportunities for the event to occur by chance, we must calculate the impact of the other proposed opportunities upon the prior probabilities of chance and design and a…Read more
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Probabilities and the fine-tuning argument : a skeptical viewIn Neil A. Manson (ed.), God and design: the teleological argument and modern science, Routledge. 2003.
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Internalism and epistemology : the architecture of reasonIn Jennifer A. McMahon (ed.), Aesthetics and Material Beauty: Aesthetics Naturalized, Routledge. 2007.
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Internalism and epistemology : the architecture of reasonIn Heather Dyke (ed.), Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy, Routledge. 2007.
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164Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier ProblemJournal of Philosophical Research 23 239-256. 1998.On the “Russellian” solution to the Gettier problem, every Gettier case involves the implicit or explicit use of a false premise on the part of the subject. We distinguish between two senses of “justification” ---“legitimation” and “justification proper.” The former does not require true premises, but the latter does. We then argue that in Gettier cases the subject possesses “legitimation” but not “justification proper,” and we respond to many attempted counterexamples, including several variant…Read more
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59Foundationalism, Transitivity and ConfirmationJournal of Philosophical Research 25 47-66. 2000.John Post has argued that the traditional regress argument against nonfoundational justificatory structures does not go through because it depends on the false assumption that “justifies” is in general transitive. But, says Post, many significant justificatory relations are not transitive. The authors counter that there is an evidential relation essential to all inferential justification, regardless of specific inference form or degree of carried-over justificatory force, which is in general tra…Read more
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37Confirmation, Coincidence, and ContradictionSynthese 199 (3-4): 6981-7002. 2021.While it is natural to assume that contradiction between alleged witness testimonies to some event disconfirms the event, this generalization is subject to important qualifications. I consider a series of increasingly complex probabilistic cases that help us to understand the effect of contradictions more precisely. Due to the possibility of honest error on a difficult detail even on the part of highly reliable witnesses, agreement on such a detail can confirm H much more than contradiction disc…Read more
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11Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of ReasonRoutledge. 2006.This book is a sustained defence of traditional internalist epistemology. The aim is threefold: to address some key criticisms of internalism and show that they do not hit their mark, to articulate a detailed version of a central objection to externalism, and to illustrate how a consistent internalism can meet the charge that it fares no better in the face of this objection than does externalism itself. This original work will be recommended reading for scholars with an interest in epistemology
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50Becoming a Christian: Combining Prior Belief, Evidence, and Will (review)Philosophia Christi 20 (2): 599-603. 2018.
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29Foundationalism, Transitivity and ConfirmationJournal of Philosophical Research 25 47-66. 2000.John Post has argued that the traditional regress argument against nonfoundational justificatory structures does not go through because it depends on the false assumption that “justifies” is in general transitive. But, says Post, many significant justificatory relations are not transitive. The authors counter that there is an evidential relation essential to all inferential justification, regardless of specific inference form or degree of carried-over justificatory force, which is in general tra…Read more
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29Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier ProblemJournal of Philosophical Research 23 239-256. 1998.On the “Russellian” solution to the Gettier problem, every Gettier case involves the implicit or explicit use of a false premise on the part of the subject. We distinguish between two senses of “justification” ---“legitimation” and “justification proper.” The former does not require true premises, but the latter does. We then argue that in Gettier cases the subject possesses “legitimation” but not “justification proper,” and we respond to many attempted counterexamples, including several variant…Read more
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53Why Bayesian Coherentism Isn't CoherentismEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy 11 (1): 37-56. 2015.It is sometimes assumed in the Bayesian coherentist literature that the project of finding a truth-conducive measure of coherence of testimonial contents will, if successful, be helpful to the coherentist theory of justification. Various impossibility results in the Bayesian coherentist literature are consequently taken to be prima facie detrimental to the coherentist theory of justification. These attempts to connect Bayesian coherentism to the coherentist/ foundationalist debate in classical e…Read more
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122Probabilistic Issues Concerning Jesus of Nazareth and Messianic Death PropheciesPhilosophia Christi 15 (2): 311-328. 2013.While one strand of ramified natural theology focuses on direct evidence for miracles, another avenue to investigate is the argument from prophecy. Events that appear to fulfill prophecy may not be miraculous in themselves, but they can provide confirmation, even substantial confirmation, for a supernatural hypothesis. I examine the details of a small set of passages from the Old Testament and evaluate the probabilistic impact of the occurrence of events surrounding the death of Jesus of Nazare…Read more
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70Undesigned Coincidences and Coherence for an HypothesisErkenntnis 85 (4): 801-828. 2020.Testimonial evidence that is particularly helpful to confirmation combines agreement on some content with variation of detail. I examine the phenomenon of “undesigned coincidences” from a probabilistic point of view to explain how varied reports, including those that dovetail in detail, assist confirmation of an hypothesis. The formal analysis uses recent work in probability theory surrounding the concepts of dependence, independence, and varied evidence. I also discuss the connection between th…Read more
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62Of Generic Gods and Generic Men: The Limits of Armchair Philosophy of ReligionJournal of Analytic Theology 6 183-203. 2018.Thomas Crisp has attempted to revive something akin to Alvin Plantinga’s Principle of Dwindling Probabilities to argue that the historical case for the resurrection of Jesus does not make the posterior probability of the resurrection very high. I argue that Crisp’s argument fails because he is attempting to evaluate a concrete argument in an a priori manner. I show that the same moves he uses would be absurd in other contexts, as applied both to our acquaintance with human beings and to evidence…Read more
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103Four (Or So) New Fine-Tuning ArgumentsEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Religion 8 (2): 85--106. 2016.Both proponents and opponents of the argument for the deliberate fine-tuning, by an intelligent agent, of the fundamental constants of the universe have accepted certain assumptions about how the argument will go. These include both treating the fine-tuning of the constants as constitutive of the nature of the universe itself and conditioning on the fact that the constants actually do fall into the life-permitting range, rather than on the narrowness of the range. It is also generally assumed th…Read more
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34Probability Kinematics and Probability DynamicsJournal of Philosophical Research 35 89-105. 2010.Richard Jeffrey developed the formula for probability kinematics with the intent that it would show that strong foundations are epistemologically unnecessary. But the reasons that support strong foundationalism are considerations of dynamics rather than kinematics. The strong foundationalist is concerned with the origin of epistemic force; showing how epistemic force is propagated therefore cannot undermine his position. The weakness of personalism is evident in the difficulty the personalist ha…Read more
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163On Not Counting the Cost: Ad Hocness and DisconfirmationActa Analytica 29 (4): 491-505. 2014.I offer an account of ad hocness that explains why the adoption of an ad hoc auxiliary is accompanied by the disconfirmation of a hypothesis H. H must be conjoined with an auxiliary a′, which is improbable antecedently given H, while ~H does not have this disability. This account renders it unnecessary to require, for identifying ad hocness, that either a′ or H have a posterior probability less than or equal to 0.5; there are also other reasons for abandoning that condition. I distinguish betwee…Read more
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3The Reliability of Witnesses and Testimony to the MiraculousIn Jake Chandler Victoria S. Harrison (ed.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion, Oxford University Press. 2012.The formal representation of the strength of witness testimony has been historically tied to a formula — proposed by Condorcet — that uses a factor representing the reliability of an individual witness. This approach encourages a false dilemma between hyper-scepticism about testimony, especially to extraordinary events such as miracles, and an overly sanguine estimate of reliability based on insufficiently detailed evidence. Because Condorcet’s formula does not have the resources for representin…Read more
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49Testability, Likelihoods, and DesignPhilo 7 (1): 5-21. 2004.It is often assumed by friends and foes alike of intelligent design that a likelihood approach to design inferences will require evidenceregarding the specific motives and abilities of any hypothetical designer. Elliott Sober, like Venn before him, indicates that this information is unavailable when the designer is not human (or at least finite) and concludes that there is no good argument for design in biology. I argue that a knowledge of motives and abilities is not always necessary for obtain…Read more
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28Evidential Diversity and the Negation of H: A Probabilistic Account of the Value of Varied EvidenceErgo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3. 2016.The value of varied evidence, I propose, lies in the fact that more varied evidence is less coherent on the assumption of the negation of the hypothesis under consideration than less varied evidence. I contrast my own analysis with several other Bayesian analyses of the value of evidential diversity and show how my account explains cases where it seems intuitively that evidential variety is valuable for confirmation.