Julia Driver

University of Texas at Austin
University of St. Andrews
Johns Hopkins University
Department of Philosophy
PhD
Austin, Texas, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory
Meta-Ethics
Normative Ethics
Areas of Interest
Value Theory
  •  1857
    Ethics: The Fundamentals
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2006.
    _Ethics: The Fundamentals_ explores core ideas and arguments in moral theory by introducing students to different philosophical approaches to ethics, including virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, divine command theory, and feminist ethics. The first volume in the new Fundamentals of Philosophy series. Presents lively, real-world examples and thoughtful discussion of key moral philosophers and their ideas. Constitutes an excellent resource for readers coming to the subject of ethics for the first time
  •  473
    The virtues of ignorance
    Journal of Philosophy 86 (7): 373-384. 1989.
    In The Virtues of Ignorance the author demonstrates that classical theories of virtue are flawed and developes a consequentialist theory of virtue. ;Virtues are excellences of character. They are traits which are considered to be valuable in some way. A person who is virtuous is one who has a tendency to act well. Classical philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, believed that virtues, as human excellences, could not involve ignorance in any way. On their view, the virtuous agent, when acting…Read more
  •  187
    Consequentialism and feminist ethics
    Hypatia 20 (4): 183-199. 2000.
    : This essay attempts to show that sophisticated consequentialism is able to accommodate the concerns that have traditionally been raised by feminist writers in ethics. Those concerns have primarily to do with the fact that consequentialism is seen as both too demanding of the individual and neglectful of the agent's special obligations to family and friends. Here, I argue that instrumental justification for partiality can be provided, for example, even though an attitude of partiality is not ch…Read more
  •  5
    The Ethics of Intervention
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4): 851-870. 1997.
    This essay explores the obligations that may arise from benevolently intended interventions that go awry. The author argues that even when the intervening agent has acted with good intentions and in a non-negligent manner, she may be required to continue aid in cases where her initial intervention failed. This is surprising because it means that persons who perform supererogatory acts run the risk of incurring additional heavy obligations through no fault of their own. The author also considers …Read more
  •  107
    Promises, obligations, and abilities
    Philosophical Studies 44 (2). 1983.
  •  148
  •  51
    The moral demands of affluence
    Philosophical Books 48 (1): 66-70. 2007.