Andrew Arato

El concepto de sociedad civil ha cobrado especial relevancia en el ámbito de la teoría política de la democracia por su potencialidad analítica para el estudio de las transiciones desde regímenes dictatoriales a otros democráticos, así como para identificar nuevas esferas susceptibles de profundización democrática en el seno de las democracias realmente existentes. Tomando como base empírica de referencia las experiencias democratizadoras acaecidas en Europa Central y del Este, en el artículo se pasa revista a las principales objeciones teóricas al uso contemporáneo del concepto de sociedad civil y se apuntan algunas áreas de investigación que contribuirían al proyecto permanente de ensanchamiento democrático.

The article is an exposition of lukacs' famous 'verdinglichung' chapter of "history and class consciousness." after a brief discussion of the historical roots of the concept of 'thingification', i try to follow the dialectic of the concept from two starting points: first, from that of lukacs' rediscovery of the subject-object dialectic in german classical philosophy and in marx, and second, from that of lukacs' 'critique' of sociology, of the categories of max weber, of the immediately given world of bourgeois society. the article culminates with a distinction between philosophy of praxis and dialectical social theory, and with a proposal toward a social theory.

Constitutional politics has returned in our time in a truly dramatic way. In the last 25 years, not only in the new or restored democracies of South and East Europe, Latin America and Africa, but also in the established liberal or not so liberal democracies of Germany, Italy, Japan, Israel, New Zealand, Canada and Great Britain, issues of constitution-making, constitutional revision and institutional design or redesign have been put on the political agenda. Even in the United States, given the new or renewed problems of our versions of presidentialism, federalism and electoral regime, Article V has come to be experienced as a veritable prison house, and judicial constitution-making (think of Buckley v Valejo) is often seen as much as a threat to, as the protection of, democratic mechanisms. And, most recently, in countries currently experiencing externally imposed revolutions, namely Afghanistan and Iraq, constitution-making has turned out to be a central stake in the ongoing political process. We are living in an epoch in which the nations seem to be slouching, or being prodded, toward Philadelphia and Americans, as the heirs of Madison and MacArthur, are sorely tempted to try teaching others the secrets of its success as a supposedly continuous 200-year-old constitutional democracy. But to be an effective teacher, it is not enough to be in a position of political-military superiority. One must first relearn to learn and even to re-learn.