C. D. C. Reeve

In his much-explored argument for the tripartition of the soul in book IV of the Republic, Socrates makes use of two principles, which I shall call the principle of opposition and the principle of qualification. The aim of the present paper is to explain, in particular, the second of these principles, so as to reveal its role in that argument and in the conception of an appetite and of the appetitive part that is central to the larger argument of the Republic as a whole. Section 1 briefly introduces the principle of opposition, analyzes the principle of qualification, and presents the argument for tripartition. Section 2 uses the analysis of the principle of qualification to interpret a claim Socrates makes about the soul and its relation to the good, which seems at odds with the account of appetites uncovered in Sect. 1. Then, in Sect. 3, the relevance of the principle of qualification to Socratic intellectualism—the view that knowledge is sufficient for virtue—is explored. In Sect. 4, appetites are returned to with the focus now on the varieties of them that Socrates recognizes. In Sect. 5, a view is put forward about the nature of the appetitive part (Appetite), its beliefs, and its ability to be persuaded by the rational part (Reason). In Sect. 6, it is argued that Appetite and Reason are both souls, capable of working in harmony, but also of being opposed, thereby underwriting an important part of the analogy between the polis and the soul on which much of the Republic relies.

This new translation of _On Coming to Be and Passing Away _and_ Meteorology 1 and 4_ fits seamlessly with the other volumes in the New Hackett Aristotle Series, enabling Anglophone readers to study these works in a way previously not possible. The Introduction describes the book that lies ahead, explaining what it is about, what it is trying to do, how it goes about doing it, and what sort of audience it presupposes. Sequentially numbered, cross-referenced endnotes provide the information most needed at each juncture, while a detailed Index indicates the places where focused discussion of key notions occurs.

This book shows you what it is like to think along with Aristotle and helps you to see the universe and our place in it as he thought they had to be seen to be scientifically intelligible. As a portrait is composed of colors and shapes that collectively represent someone, so Aristotles works are composed of arguments that collectively represent the causal structure of the universe, from the stones, plants, and animals around us to the starry heavens above and the god beyond them. The aim of this brief immersion is to guide you through those arguments in a way that lets you understand for yourself why they proceed as they do and end where they do."--Publisher.

This book provides an exploration of the epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological foundations of the Nicomachean Ethics. Rejecting current orthodoxy, this book argues that scientific-knowledge (episteme) is possible in ethics, that dialectic and understanding (nous) play essentially the same role in ethics as in an Aristotelian science, and that the distinctive role of practical wisdom (phronēsis) is to use the knowledge of universals provided by science, dialectic, and understanding so as best to promote happiness (eudaimonia) in particular circumstances and to ensure a happy life. Turning to happiness itself, the book develops a new account of Aristotle's views on ends and functions, exposing their twofold nature. It argues that the activation of theoretical wisdom is primary happiness, and that the activation of practical wisdom — when it is for the sake of primary happiness — is happiness of a second kind. He concludes with an account of the virtues of character, external goods, and friends, and their place in the happy life.

In Aristotle's views on cognition a series of terms – hupolêpsis, doxa, and epistêmê – play key roles. But it has not been noticed that each of these comes in two kinds – one unqualified and the other qualified. When these and their interrelations are properly explored, a deeply systematic picture of cognition emerges, in which doxa is best understood as ‘belief’, hupolêpsis as ‘supposition’, and epistêmê as a sort of belief, so that – contrary to orthodoxy – we can have belief and knowledge of the same things at the same time. Many of these conclusions are shown to mark a continuity with Plato, in that neither thinker, it is argued, holds a so-called ‘two-worlds’ picture of cognition.

"It is... remarkable that Reeve's is the first new English translation since Fowler's Loeb edition of 1926. Fortunately, Reeve has done an excellent job. His version is not slavishly literal but is in general very accurate. It is also very clear and readable. Reeve is particularly to be congratulated for having produced versions of some of the more torturous passages, which are not only faithful to the text but also make good sense in English. The long and detailed introduction is worth reading in its own right." --R. F. Stalley, _The Classical Review_.

Soon after its publication, _Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy_ was hailed as the favorite to become "the 'standard' text for survey courses in ancient philosophy."_*_ More than twenty years later that prediction has been borne out: _Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy_ still stands as the leading anthology of its kind. It is now stronger than ever:_ The Fifth Edition of _Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy_ features a completely revised Aristotle unit, with new translations, as well as a newly revised glossary. The Plato unit offers new translations of the _Meno_ and _Republic_. In the latter, indirect dialogue is cast into direct dialogue for greater readability. The Presocratics unit has been re-edited and streamlined, and the pages of every unit have been completely reset. *__ APA Newsletter for Teaching Philosophy_.

Among the topics discussed in detail are: the concept of an amount; the notion of an extensive dimension ; the 'is' of constitution; sortal predicates; and atomism. ;Writers discussed are: W. V. O. Quine; Vere Chappell; Tyler Burge; Terence Parsons; Henry Laycock; and Helen Cartwright. ;I argue that mass nouns should be uniformly analyzed as logical predicates which are satisfied by objects of a distinctive kind called quantities. I show how to define the notion of a quantity in a rigorous way by giving existence and identity conditions for quantities. I argue on those grounds, both that mass nouns are sortal predicates, and that quantities are physical objects. ;I use the notion of a quantity to state existence and identity conditions for stuffs: A stuff F exists, I claim, just in case a quantity of F exists; and F is the same stuff as G just in case . Thus there need by nothing above and beyond physical objects in a world in which a stuff exists. ;My aim is to give a philosophical analysis of mass nouns and the stuffs they pick out. Thus I give an account of the meaning of mass nouns, i.e., of the systematic contribution they make to the truth-conditions of sentences; assign logical forms to those sentences; explain their ontological presuppositions; and define and defend the entities whose existence they presuppose

A problem is posed: Is pleasure choiceworthy, or not? The answerer claims that yes, it is. The questioner must refute him by asking questions—by offering him premises to accept or reject. The questioner succeeds if he forces the answerer to accept a proposition contrary to the one he undertook to defend, and fails if the answerer always accepts or rejects premises in a way consistent with that proposition. To a first approximation, dialectic is the distinctive method of Aristotelian philosophy. At the heart of dialectic is the dialectical deduction. This article discusses Aristotle's philosophical method, focusing on dialectical premises, endoxa, and aporiai. It also examines the uses of dialectic in intellectual training, ordinary discussion, and the philosophical sciences, as well as in regard to scientific starting points or first principles. The article concludes by returning to dialectic and philosophy and an important difference between them.