C. D. C. Reeve

Did Oedipus kill his father and marry his mother? Are the various oracles dealing with the matter fulfilled? The evidence the play _Oedipus Tyrannus_ presents is inconsistent, but audiences and interpreters are almost unanimous in treating it as if it yielded decisive positive answers to these questions. In treating inadequate evidence as decisive they follow in Oedipus’s footsteps, since he does the very same thing. That, indeed, is his tragedy, but also ours—which is precisely the point of the play. True reverence requires a degree of sensitivity to evidence, which—often with disastrous consequences—we are prone not to exhibit.

Krzystof Kieslowski’s _A Short Film_ deals with the sixth commandment, yet the film seems to be about voyeurism not adultery. The connection is made in Matthew 5.27-8, where Christ broadens the notion of adultery to include _looking_ at a woman with lust. In the course of _A Short Film_, Tomek’s adolescent, lustful, and masturbatory looking at Magda is transmuted into interpersonal love, so that the look of love—how love looks to people and at them—becomes the film’s subject. The power of love to transform is real, but so too are the personal and social obstacles to transformation. People are caught in circles of repetition and convention, yet by understanding the role that choice, necessity, and luck play in them, they can sometimes make them serve life.

In _Republic_ 2, Glaucon and Adeimantus want to be shown that justice pays higher eudaimonistic dividends to the individual who has it in his soul than does injustice. Yet Glaucon later worries that precisely because philosophers have just souls they will consent to rule Kallipolis, even though they will “live a worse life when they could lead a better one” as a result. This chapter explains how Glaucon’s worries are resolved. It includes a new reading of the ship-of-state simile from Book 6 whose relevance to Glaucon’s worries has previously gone unnoticed.

This chapter argues that the notion of a _technē_ (craft) provided a template for the wisdom Socrates searched for in vain, and for the Platonic conception of philosophy. Some crafts treat their first principles as accessible to perception; others treat them as hypotheses. In _Republic_ 5–6, Socrates shows that ethics cannot do either. Dialectic (a successor of the elenchus) is introduced to solve the problem of first principles, rendering them unhypothetical by defending them against all aporetic objection. The good, as a paradigm of rational order, raises special problems for ethics, since there it must be a pleasant object of desire. Is it desired, then, because it is an ideal of rational order, or because it is pleasant? A discussion of the _Philebus_ shows how Plato resolved this problem.

This chapter discusses the education program designed to produce philosopher-kings. It explains the difference between knowledge and belief, their respective relations to the form of beauty and the many beauties, and the vexed question of their scope: is knowledge only of forms or is it also of the world of becoming? This chapter develops a new account in terms of cognitive reliability of the characterization of belief as dealing with “what partakes in both being and not being,” of dialectic and its role in leading to unhypothetical cognition, and of whether or not Plato’s epistemology is holistic. A final topic is the epistemic status of the _Republic_ itself.

This chapter discusses the nature of beauty and goodness and the relationship between them in part by exploring Diotima’s speech in the _Symposium_. It argues that her account of “begetting in beauty” includes important gaps that the _Republic_ will then fill. It also addresses the apparently paiderastic nature of philosophy (shared with the _Phaedrus_), in which the ascent to knowledge of Platonic forms must apparently begin in the correct sort of boy-love. The _Republic_, it argues, includes not just a radical reconception of the family, but of sexuality itself, severing, in the process, the connection between _paiderasteia_ and Platonic philosophy.

As part of his defense against the charge of impiety brought against him by Meletus in 399 BC, Socrates represents himself as the servant of Apollo, the possessor of a divine sign (_daimonion_), and as having elenchus-based human wisdom rather than the craftlike ethical wisdom that the Sophists claim but the gods alone possess. This chapter discusses this Socratic self-portrait, showing how the various elements in it get transformed by Plato. Reason becomes the divine element in all of us, the largely negative elenchus becomes positive dialectic, and ethical craft-knowledge become accessible to properly educated philosophers.

A text and translation, with analytical commentary, of the so-called philosophical digression (340b–344d) section of the Seventh Letter attributed to Plato. The digression’s central argument concerning the “weakness of language” (343a1), I argue, has been misrepresented by friend (e.g., Vasilis Politis) and foe (e.g., Myles Burnyeat) alike, as has the overall purport of the digression, which has been taken to show that “the highest philosophical insight” (Terence Irwin) cannot be expressed in speech or in writing. When properly understood it doesn’t show this and is not intended to. Though the digression, like the rest of the Seventh Letter, almost certainly isn’t by Plato, it is as competent as what is said by Plato himself on its topic and seems to owe much to his arguments.

Soon after its publication, _Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy_ was hailed as the favorite to become "the 'standard' text for survey courses in ancient philosophy."_*_ More than twenty years later that prediction has been borne out: _Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy_ still stands as the leading anthology of its kind. It is now stronger than ever:_ The Fifth Edition of _Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy_ features a completely revised Aristotle unit, with new translations, as well as a newly revised glossary. The Plato unit offers new translations of the _Meno_ and _Republic_. In the latter, indirect dialogue is cast into direct dialogue for greater readability. The Presocratics unit has been re-edited and streamlined, and the pages of every unit have been completely reset. *__ APA Newsletter for Teaching Philosophy_.

In the early fourth century B.C., Plato founded his famous Athenian school, the Academy. Among the students who came to study there were two women, Axiothea of Phlius, who wore men's clothes, and Lasthenia of Mantinea. In five dialogues, inspired by those of Plato, C. D. C. Reeve imagines these women in conversation with one another, with Plato himself, and with their fellow Academician, Aristotle. The topics they discuss--women, art, justice, freedom, and the nature of reality--are all drawn from Plato's _Republic_. Their lively exchanges, which quickly engage the reader, are at once an exciting and accessible introduction to some of Republic's central themes and an exploration of some of the most controversial questions we face in trying to make sense of our complexly shared lives.

In this groundbreaking work, C. D. C. Reeve uses a fundamental problem--the Primacy Dilemma--to explore Aristotle's metaphysics, epistemology, dialectic, philosophy of mind, and theology in a new way. At a time when Aristotle is most often studied piecemeal, Reeve attempts to see him both in detail and as a whole, so that it is from detailed analysis of hundreds of particular passages, drawn from dozens of Aristotelian treatises, and translated in full that his overall picture of Aristotle emerges. Primarily a book for philosophers and advanced students with an interest in the fundamental problems with which Aristotle is grappling, _Substantial Knowledge's_ clear, non-technical and engaging style will appeal to any reader eager to explore Aristotle’s difficult but extraordinarily rewarding thought.

"Reeve's book is an excellent companion to Plato's Apology and a valuable discussion of many of the main issues that arise in the early dialogues. Reeve is an extremely careful reader of texts, and his familiarity with the legal and cultural background of Socrates' trial allows him to correct many common misunderstandings of that event. In addition, he integrates his reading of the apology with a sophisticated discussion of Socrates' philosophy. The writing is clear and succinct, and the research is informed by a thorough acquaintance with the secondary literature. Reeve's book will be accessible to any serious undergraduate, but it is also a work that will have to be taken into account by every scholar doing advanced research on Socrates." --Richard Kraut, Northwestern University.

Six types of value have important interrelated roles in Aristotle’s practical and theoretical philosophy. The six are: value expressed in terms of goodness (agathonic value), that expressed in terms of happiness (eudaimonic value), that expressed in terms of pleasure (hedonic value), that expressed in terms of the noble (kalonic value), that expressed in terms of aptness, and that expressed in intrinsic terms (intrinsic value). In the present paper the nature of these types of value and of their interrelations are explored and explained. The central importance of hedonic value to the other sorts of value is shown, and hedonic value is explained in terms of aptness value, which stems from the relation between a mode of cognition or perception and its object. Intuitively put, an object (O) has the highest aptness value when the active cognition or perception of O is identical to O. Identity, as we might put it, is the maximum of aptness.

The Clarendon Aristotle Series is designed for both students and professionals. It provides accurate translations of selected Aristotelian texts, accompanied by incisive commentaries that focus on philosophical problems and issues, The volumes in the series have been widely welcomed and favourably reviewed. Important new titles are being added to the series, and a number of well-established volumes are being reissued with revisions and/or supplementary material. Christopher Shields presents a new translation and commentary of Aristotle's De Anima, a work of interest to philosophers at all levels, as well as psychologists and students interested in the nature of life and living systems. The volume provides a full translation of the complete work, together with a comprehensive commentary. While sensitive to philological and textual matters, the commentary addresses itself to the philosophical reader who wishes to understand and assess Aristotle's accounts of the soul and body; perception; thinking; action; and the character of living systems. It aims to present controversial aspects of the text in a neutral, fair-minded manner, so that readers can come to be equipped to form their own judgments. This volume includes the crucial first book, which the original translation in the Clarendon Aristotle Series omitted. A complete English edition of one of the most influential of all philosophical works ; Clear and accurate translation ; A substantial philosophical commentary guides the reader through the work ; A comprehensive introduction Aristotle's theories within their intellectual and historical context.--Publisher website.

Soon after its publication, _Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy_ was hailed as the favorite to become _the 'standard' text for survey courses in ancient philosophy. Nothing on the market touches it for comprehensiveness, accuracy, and readability._* (*APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy). Fifteen years on, that prediction has been borne out, and the volume's preeminence as the leading anthology for the teaching of ancient philosophy still stands. The Fourth Edition features a completely revamped and expanded unit on the Presocratics and Sophists that draws on the wealth of new scholarship published on these fascinating thinkers over the past decade or more. At the core of this unit, as ever, are the fragments themselves--but now in thoroughly revised and, in some cases, new translations by Richard McKirahan and Patricia Curd, among them those of the recently published Derveni Papyrus.

Practices of Reason is an exploration of the epistemological, metaphysical, and psychological foundations of the Nicomachean Ethics. In a striking reversal of current orthodoxy, Professor Reeve argues that scientific-knowledge (episteme) is possible in ethics, that dialectic and understanding (nous) play essentially the same role in ethics as in an Aristotelian science, and that the distinctive role of practical wisdom (phronesis) is to use the knowledge of universals provided by science, dialectic, and understanding so as best to promote happiness (eudaimonia) in particular circumstances and to ensure a happy life. Turning to happiness itself, the author develops a new account of Aristotle's views on ends and functions, exposing their twofold nature. He argues that the activation of theoretical wisdom is primary happiness, and that the activation of practical wisdom - when it is for the sake of primary happiness - is happiness of a second kind. He concludes with an account of the virtues of character, external goods, and friends, and their place in the happy life. The book will be of interest to all those who have unanswered questions about the central arguments, concepts, and presuppositions of the Nicomachean Ethics.

This concise anthology of primary sources designed for use in an ancient philosophy survey ranges from the Presocratics to Plato, Aristotle, the Hellenistic philosophers, and the Neoplatonists. The Second Edition features an amplified selection of Presocratic fragments in newly revised translations by Richard D. McKirahan. Also included is an expansion of the Hellenistic unit, featuring new selections from Lucretius and Sextus Empiricus as well as a new translation, by Peter J. Anderson, of most of Seneca's De Providentia. The selections from Plotinus have also been expanded.

I examine the status of Aristotle’s science of soul and argue that it is trans-generic in the way that Aristotle's universal mathematics is. For just as the branches of the latter differ considerably, so too do the sciences of life: botany, zoology, psychology, and (in Aristotle’s view) astronomy and theology. Discovering the correct definition of soul, which is their starting point or first principle, as with other scientific starting points, involves both induction and dialectic. Induction uses scientific observation of living things to move toward this starting point. Dialectic enables the scientist to assemble endoxa, or reputable beliefs, that allow us to solve each puzzle (aporia) that clouds our understanding (nous) of the starting point that induction enables us to reach.