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88Two Ways of Explaining ActionsRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55 25-42. 2004.In my Practical Reality I argued that the reasons for which we act are not to be conceived of as psychological states of ourselves, but as real states of the world. The main reason for saying this was that only thus can we make sense of the idea that it is possible to act for a good reason. The good reasons we have for doing this action rather than that one consist mainly of features of the situations in which we find ourselves; they do not consist in our believing certain things about those sit…Read more
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129In my Practical Reality I argued that the reasons for which we act are not to be conceived of as psychological states of ourselves, but as real states of the world. The main reason for saying this was that only thus can we make sense of the idea that it is possible to act for a good reason. The good reasons we have for doing this action rather than that one consist mainly of features of the situations in which we find ourselves; they do not consist in our believing certain things about those sit…Read more
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The Theory of Motivating StatesIn Practical Reality, Oxford University Press. 2000.Argues that cognitivism is the best form of psychologism; that is, that Humean accounts of motivation in terms of belief–desire combinations should be rejected in favour of cognitive ones that take motivating states to consist entirely of beliefs. Desire is understood as a state of being motivated, and is therefore not a state that motivates, even though motivation without desire is impossible.
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15Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (edited book)Oxford University Press. 1998.This new edition of Berkeley's Three Dialogues, specially designed to be accessible to the student reader, provides a comprehensive philosophical introduction, and analysis of the text, a glossary, detailed endnotes, and a full bibliography with guidance on further reading. Published alongside Berkeley's other masterpiece, the Principles of Human Knowledge, this new edition aims to give the reader a thorough introduction to the central ideas of one of the world's greatest philosophers.
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54The Presidential Address: Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of MotivationProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95. 1995.Jonathan Dancy; I *—The Presidential Address: Why there is really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95
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21Two Conceptions of Moral RealismAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60 (1): 167-206. 1986.
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335Should we pass the buck?Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47 159-173. 2000.My topic is the relation between the right and the good. I introduce it by relating some aspects of the debate between various British intuitionists in the first half of the present century. In Principia Ethica G. E. Moore claimed that to be right is to be productive of the greatest good. He wrote ‘This use of “right”, as denoting what is good as a means, whether or not it be also good as an end, is indeed the use to which I shall confine the word’ . By the time he wrote his Ethics he seems to h…Read more
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126Should We Pass the Buck?In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent work on intrinsic value, Springer. pp. 33--44. 2005.
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57Supervenience, virtues and consequences: A commentary onknowledge in perspective by Ernest SosaPhilosophical Studies 78 (3). 1995.
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Rationality, Value, and MeaningIn Ethics without principles, Oxford University Press. 2004.Suggests that particularist conceptions of rationality, in general, can be applied to the philosophy of language. Semantic competence does not require that each distinct semantic unit makes the same contribution in all contexts. Distinguishes weak and strong forms of compositionalism, arguing for the former.
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256Response to Mark Schroeder’s Slaves of the passions (review)Philosophical Studies 157 (3): 455-462. 2012.Response to Mark Schroeder’s Slaves of the passions Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9656-3 Authors Jonathan Dancy, The University of Reading, Reading, UK Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
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151Reasons, Relevance and Salience: A Response to HookwayPhilosophical Studies 130 (1): 71-79. 2006.This paper responds to Christopher Hookway’s article, “Reasons for Belief, Reasoning, Virtue.”
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106Reading Parfit (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 1997._ Reading Parfit _ brings together some of the most distinguished scholars in the field to discuss and critique Derek Parfit's outstanding work, _ Reasons and Persons, _
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34Review: Précis of "Practical Reality" (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2). 2003.
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Reasons for ActionIn Practical Reality, Oxford University Press. 2000.Introduces various distinctions: between the reasons why we should act, those for which we act, and the reasons why we act. It also distinguishes between Humeanism and anti‐Humeanism in the theory of motivation, psychologism, and anti‐psychologism in the theory of motivation, internalism, and externalism and desire‐based and value‐based theories of normative reasons.
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137Reasons and rationalityIn Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason, Oxford University Press. pp. 93--112. 2009.
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Reasons and BeliefsIn Practical Reality, Oxford University Press. 2000.Argues that normative reasons, whether moral or prudential, are states of affairs rather than the agent's beliefs—a form of normative realism. It considers arguments to the contrary by H. A. Prichard, among others.
