Philip Kitcher

Abusing Science is a manual for intellectual self-defense, the most complete available for presenting the case against Creationist pseudo-science. It is also a lucid exposition of the nature and methods of genuine science. The book begins with a concise introduction to evolutionary theory for non-scientists and closes with a rebuttal of the charge that this theory undermines religious and moral values. It will astonish many readers that this case must still be made in the 1980s, but since it must, Philip Kitcher makes it irresistibly and forcefully. Not long ago, a federal court struck down an Arkansas law requiring that "scientific" Creationism be taught in high school science classes. Contemporary Creationists may have lost one legal battle, but their cause continues to thrive. Their efforts are directed not only at state legislatures but at local school boards and textbook publishers. As Kitcher argues in this rigorous but highly readable book, the integrity of science is under attack. The methods of inquiry used in evolutionary biology are those which are used throughout the sciences. Moreover, modern biology is intertwined with other fields of science—physics, chemistry, astronomy, and geology. Creationists hope to persuade the public that education in science should be torn apart to make room for a literal reading of Genesis. Abusing Science refutes the popular complaint that the scientific establishment is dogmatic and intolerant, denying "academic freedom" to the unorthodox. It examines Creationist claims seriously and systematically, one by one, showing clearly just why they are at best misguided, at worst ludicrous.

In Proofs and Refutations, Imre Lakatos proposed to reorient the philosophy of mathematics. He suggested abandoning the search for a foundation for mathematics in favor of providing a methodology for mathematics. This essay attempts to pursue the methodological project in a different fashion. It sketches the long history of mathematics, and reflects on the kinds of benefits attained in a number of important transitions. It argues that these advances embody quite different gains. While diverging from Lakatos’s quasi-Popperian framework for mathematical progress, I conclude that his proposed reorientation of the philosophy of mathematics would be an advance that is long overdue.

_The Rich and the Poor_ is part chronicle, part analysis of a disturbing sea-change: the abandonment of ethics in public policy. Seventy years ago, it was possible for serious thinkers, including some in the governments of affluent nations, to consider policies for raising living standards worldwide. Today, by contrast, the principal policy questions revolve around how to stay on top in a dog-eat-dog world. Philip Kitcher, one of the world’s most eminent philosophers, offers a new account of how ethics and politics should mix. The world needs to explore and reprioritize ethical questions, through inclusive deliberation that is both factually informed and mutually engaged with other perspectives. Achieving that end is hard, but without aspiring to it, we are likely to condemn our successors to lives of great hardship. Climate change demands global cooperation of a kind that can only be obtained by returning to ethical inquiry. The divorce between ethics and economics threatens disaster for all.

An intuitive argument for scientific realism suggests that our successes in predicting and intervening would be inexplicable if the theories that generate them were not approximately true. This argument faces many objections, some of which are briefly addressed in this paper, and one of which is treated in more detail. The focal criticism alleges that appeals to success cannot deliver conclusions that parts of science are true in the sense of truth‐as‐correspondence that realists prefer. The paper responds to that criticism, in versions proposed by Michael Williams, Michael Levin, and, especially, Paul Horwich, by arguing that critics typically stop at a shallow level of psychological explanation. If we probe more deeply we discover a genuine explanatory role for correspondence truth.

This three-part essay begins with a diagnosis of the career of general philosophy of science in the tradition begun by Hempel’s reform of logical positivism. Since 1950, Anglophone philosophy of science has largely sought general accounts of confirmation, theory and explanation. It has not found them. Instead it has assembled some valuable tools for exploring problems in the natural and social sciences, and has put them to work in a range of useful studies. The second part of the essay pursues the question of whether there is a successor project to the general investigations that Hempel inspired. I argue that there are difficult methodological questions about collective inquiry that have largely been neglected. Attempts to answer these questions should expand the resources for philosophical understanding of scientific knowledge. The third part focuses on the situation of the sciences within society. Can scientific research be divorced from the interests of a broader public? Can its conclusions be generated in neglect of the evidential standards accepted by non-scientists? I argue for a development of the ideal of well-ordered science, and for the understanding of science (singular!) as one institution among others. Conceiving matters in this way recovers important themes from the neglected pragmatist tradition.Este ensayo en tres partes comienza con un diagnóstico de la trayectoria de la filosofía general de la ciencia, tal como se cultiva en la tradición que se origina con la reforma hempeliana del positivismo lógico. Desde 1950, la filosofía anglófona de la ciencia ha buscado enfoques generales sobre teorías, confirmación y explicación. Ha reunido, en cambio, algunas herramientas valiosas para explorar problemas en las ciencias naturales y sociales, aplicándolas en un buen número de estudios útiles. La segunda parte del ensayo se ocupa de la cuestión de si hay algún proyecto continuador del tipo de investigación general inspirada por Hempel. Sostengo que se han ignorado algunas cuestiones metodológicas difíciles sobre la investigación colectiva. Los intentos para responder a estas cuestiones debieran ampliar nuestros recursos para comprender filósoficamente el conocimiento científico. La tercera parte se ocupa de la la situación de las ciencias en la sociedad. ¿Puede la investigación científica divorciarse de los intereses del público general? ¿Pueden sus conclusiones ignorar el tipo de evidencia que aceptan los no científicos? Defiendo un desarrollo del ideal de una ciencia bien ordenada y una concepción de la ciencia (¡en singular!) como una institución entre otras. Este enfoque recuperar temas importantes de la olvidada tradición pragmatista.

The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge develops and defends an empiricist approach to mathematical knowledge. After offering an account of a priori knowledge, it argues that none of the available accounts of a priori mathematical knowledge is viable. It then constructs an approach to the content of mathematical statements, viewing mathematics as grounded in our manipulations of physical reality. From these crude beginnings, mathematics unfolds through the successive modifications of mathematical practice, spurred by the presence of unsolved problems. This process of unfolding is considered in general, and illustrated by considering the historical development of analysis from the seventeenth century to the end of the nineteenth.

The Human Genome Project (henceforth HGP) arouses strong feelings. Enthusiasts view it as the culmination of the extraordinary progress of molecular biology during the past half century and as the beginnings of a revolutionized biology and medicine (Gilbert 1992, Caskey 1992). Detractors charge that it is wasteful, misguided, and pregnant with possibilities for social harm (Lewontin 1992, Hubbard and Wald 1993). In a short paper it is plainly impossible to explore all the sources of disagreement. My aim will be to consider the debate about the purely scientific merit of the HGP, to sketch the nature of the short-term issues which the project raises, and, finally, to identify what I take to be the deepest and most difficult questions.The official goals of the HGP are to map and sequence the human genome, and the genomes of other organisms (so-called “model organisms”).

"The overall aim of this book is to understand the character of moral progress, so that making moral progress may become more systematic and secure, less chancy and less bloody. Drawing on three historical examples - the abolition of chattel slavery, the expansion of opportunities for women, and the increasing acceptance of same-sex love - it asks how those changes were brought about, and seeks a methodology for streamlining the kinds of developments that occurred. Moral progress is conceived as pragmatic progress, progress from rather than progress to, achieved by overcoming the problems and limits of the current situation. Two kinds of problems are distinguished: problems of exclusion, found when the complaints of some people are ignored; and problems of false consciousness, present when the oppressed adopt judgments from the ambient society and do not protest their condition. The proposed methodology advocates procedures for listening to voiced complaints and for systematically reviewing the way in which particular self-conceptions, ideals and identities are taken to be appropriate for various groups of people. Through outlining a picture of moral practice, at both the individual and the societal levels, the book seeks to orient moral philosophy away from metaethical questions of realism and towards moral methodology"--