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639The naturalists returnPhilosophical Review 101 (1): 53-114. 1992.This article reviews the transition between post-Fregean anti-naturalistic epistemology and contemporary naturalistic epistemologies. It traces the revival of naturalism to Quine’s critique of the "a priori", and Kuhn’s defense of historicism, and use the arguments of Quine and Kuhn to identify a position, "traditional naturalism", that combines naturalistic themes with the claim that epistemology is a normative enterprise. Pleas for more radical versions of naturalism are articulated, and brief…Read more
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322The nature of mathematical knowledgeOxford University Press. 1983.This book argues against the view that mathematical knowledge is a priori,contending that mathematics is an empirical science and develops historically,just as ...
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46The Myth of PurityIn Science, truth, and democracy, Oxford University Press. pp. 85-92. 2001.It is common to draw a distinction between pure research and applied research. When this distinction is examined, it is found that the only way to identify pure research is in terms of the possibility of successfully defending the value of that research; in short, the notion of pure research depends on our judgements of values.
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The many-sided conflict between religion and scienceIn William E. Mann (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Religion, Wiley-blackwell. 2008.
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106The Luddites' LamentsIn Science, truth, and democracy, Oxford University Press. 2001.By the same token, there are no good arguments for supposing that restricting inquiry will lead to the human good. The discussion of Chapters 12 and 13 constructs an argument for rejecting rival theologies, both those that hold that truth must be beneficial and those that regret the discoveries of past science. Well‐ordered science encourages a humble agnosticism.
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293The Poverty of Pluralism: A Reply to Sterelny and KitcherJournal of Philosophy 87 (3): 151-158. 1990.
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The knowledge businessIn Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, Cambridge University Press. 2006.
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51The Ideal of ObjectivityIn Science, truth, and democracy, Oxford University Press. pp. 29-42. 2001.The next step is to explore the possibility of scientific objectivity. It is argued that the supposed underdetermination of theory by evidence is not as intractable a problem as it has sometimes appeared, and that it does not prevent scientists from aspiring to objectivity.
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81The Hall of MirrorsProceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (2). 2005.
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79The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing: Changing Beliefs through Inquiry by Isaac Levi (review)Journal of Philosophy 90 (8): 425-432. 1993.
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The Foundations of MathematicsIn R. C. Olby, G. N. Cantor, J. R. R. Christie & M. J. S. Hodge (eds.), Companion to the History of Modern Science, Routledge. pp. 677--689. 1989.
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83The ethical projectHarvard University Press. 2011.Instead of conceiving ethical commands as divine revelations or as the discoveries of brilliant thinkers, we should see our ethical practices as evolving over tens of thousands of years, as members of our species have worked out how to live together and prosper. Here, Kitcher elaborates his radical vision of this millennia-long ethical project.
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119The Ends of the SciencesIn Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 208--229. 2004.
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53The Development of Analysis: A Case StudyIn The nature of mathematical knowledge, Oxford University Press. 1983.Concludes with a more sustained look at a single part of the history of mathematics, the development of analysis from the seventeenth century to the work of Dedekind, Cantor and Frege. The discussion is linked to the general account of Chapters 7–9.
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63The Apriorist ProgramIn The nature of mathematical knowledge, Oxford University Press. 1983.Can proofs yield a priori knowledge? In this chapter, we consider the ways in which a priori knowledge might be transmitted, and how the transmission process might fail.
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The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without IllusionsErkenntnis 44 (3): 379-395. 1996.
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69Toward a Defensible EmpiricismIn The nature of mathematical knowledge, Oxford University Press. 1983.The next stage is to set up the main question for the rest of the book: How is empirical mathematical knowledge possible? The outline of an answer is given: relatively simple experiences provide knowledge of elementary mathematics; the historical process extends the basic mathematical knowledge in extraordinary ways.
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583The advancement of science: science without legend, objectivity without illusionsOxford University Press. 1993.During the last three decades, reflections on the growth of scientific knowledge have inspired historians, sociologists, and some philosophers to contend that scientific objectivity is a myth. In this book, Kitcher attempts to resurrect the notions of objectivity and progress in science by identifying both the limitations of idealized treatments of growth of knowledge and the overreactions to philosophical idealizations. Recognizing that science is done not by logically omniscient subjects worki…Read more
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403Science, truth, and democracyOxford University Press. 2001.Striving to boldly redirect the philosophy of science, this book by renowned philosopher Philip Kitcher examines the heated debate surrounding the role of science in shaping our lives. Kitcher explores the sharp divide between those who believe that the pursuit of scientific knowledge is always valuable and necessary--the purists--and those who believe that it invariably serves the interests of people in positions of power. In a daring turn, he rejects both perspectives, working out a more reali…Read more
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58Subversive Truth and Ideals of ProgressIn Science, truth, and democracy, Oxford University Press. pp. 147-166. 2001.Well‐ordered science may seem too conservative, allowing people to resist views that they find uncomfortable. This chapter scrutinizes arguments for the claim that the truth is always valuable for us. Those arguments are found wanting.
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37Scientific SignificanceIn Science, truth, and democracy, Oxford University Press. pp. 63-82. 2001.Truth is one goal for the sciences. But the whole truth cannot be our goal. Hence there is an issue about which truths we aim for in inquiry. This chapter argues that any way of resolving that issue must depend on us and on our values.
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18Second ThouhtsPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101 (1): 353-389. 2012.This is a reply to the thoughtful comments offered about my work in other contributions to this volume
Philip Kitcher
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