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30Morgan on deductive explanation: A rejoinder (review)Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (4). 1976.This paper is mainly a response to Charles Morgan's criticisms (this journal, pp. 511-25) of the author's model of the (formal aspects of) explanation. It is claimed in the paper that with two modifications and some additional specifications the model withstands Morgan's criticisms
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31Theoretical conceptsSpringer Verlag. 1973.to that goal, and it is hoped that it will incorporate further works dealing in an exact way with interesting philosophical issues. Zurich, April 1973 Mario Bunge Preface In this book I have investigated the logical and methodological role of the much debated theoretical concepts in scientific theories. The philosophical viewpoint underlying my argumentation is critical scientific realism. My method of exposition has been to express ideas first in general terms and then to develop and elaborate …Read more
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728Cooperation and trust in group contextMind and Society 4 (1): 49-84. 2005.This paper is mainly about cooperation as a collective action in a group context (acting in a position or participating in the performance of a group task, etc.), although the assumption of the presence of a group context is not made in all parts of the paper. The paper clarifies what acting as a group member involves, and it analytically characterizes the ‘‘we-mode’’ (thinking and acting as a group member) and the ‘‘I-mode’’ (thinking and acting as a private person).
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304We will do it: An analysis of group-intentionsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2): 249-277. 1991.
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261Group beliefsSynthese 91 (3): 285-318. 1992.It is argued in this paper that there can be both normative and nonnormative, merely factual group beliefs. The former involve the whole social group in question, while the latter only relate to the distributions of personal beliefs within the group. The paper develops a detailed theory, called the positional account of group beliefs, to explicate normative, group-involving group beliefs. Normative group beliefs are characterized within this approach in terms of joint acceptances of views by the…Read more
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7Review of Keith Graham, Practical Reasoning in a Social World (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (9). 2002.
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23Collective acceptance and collective attitudes: on the socialIn Uskali Mäki (ed.), Fact and Fiction in Economics: Models, Realism and Social Construction, Cambridge University Press. pp. 269. 2002.
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1Douglas Walton: Practical reasoning, Goal-driven, knowledge-based, action-guiding argumentation (review)Theoria 58 (1): 92. 1992.
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87Philosophy and distributed artificial intelligence: The case of joint intentionIn N. Jennings & G. O'Hare (eds.), Foundations of Distributed Artificial Intelligence, Wiley. 1996.In current philosophical research the term 'philosophy of social action' can be used - and has been used - in a broad sense to encompass the following central research topics: 1) action occurring in a social context; this includes multi-agent action; 2) joint attitudes (or "we-attitudes" such as joint intention, mutual belief) and other social attitudes needed for the explication and explanation of social action; 3) social macro-notions, such as actions performed by social groups and properties …Read more
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David Braybrooke, ed., Social Rules: Origin; Character; Logic; Change Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 17 (1): 3-5. 1997.
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25Kommunikatives Handeln und kooperative ZieleAnalyse & Kritik 19 (2): 153-172. 1997.In this paper an account of communicative action is given from the point of view of communication as a cooperative enterprise. It is argued that there is communication both on the basis of shared collective goals and without them. It is also claimed that people can communicate without specifically formed illocutionary communicative intentions. Finally, the paper compares the account given in the article with Habermas’ theory of communicative action.
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721Collective Goals and Communicative ActionJournal of Philosophical Research 27 29-64. 2002.This paper gives an account of communicative action from the point of view of communication as a cooperative enterprise. It is argued that this is communication both on the basis of shared collective goals and without them. It is also argued that people can communicate without specifically formed illocutionary communicative intentions. The paper concludes by comparing the account given in the paper with Habermas’s theory of communicative action
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14Human Action and Its Explanation: A Study on the Philosophical Foundations of Psychology (review)Philosophical Review 88 (3): 464-467. 1979.
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32Cooperation as Joint ActionAnalyse & Kritik 33 (1): 65-86. 2011.The paper studies cooperation as joint action, where joint action can, first, be conceptualized either individualistically in terms of the participants' individual goals and beliefs that the joint action is taken to serve. This is individualistic or ‛I-mode’ cooperation. Special version of it is ‛ pro-group I-mode’ cooperation, where the goals are shared. Second, cooperation can be of the kind where a group of persons act together as a group in terms of the non-aggregative ‛ we’ that they form. …Read more
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Folk psychologyIn Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.), Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience, Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 227. 1994.
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16Rational Cooperation and Collective GoalsProtoSociology 8 260-291. 1996.It is argued that full-blown cooperation needs collective goals in a strong sense satisfying the "Collectivity Condition". According to this condition, a collective goal ist of the kind that necessarily, due of the goal-holders acceptance of the goal as their collective goal, if it is satisfied for one of the goal-holders it is satisfied for all the others. Not only collective goals but also other group-factors (such as possibly institutionalngroupmoden preferences and utilities) are argued to b…Read more
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71Beyond individual choice: Teams and frames in game theory , Michael bacharach; edited and with an introduction and a conclusion by Natalie gold and Robert Sugden. Princeton university press, princeton, 2006, XXIII + 214 pp (review)Economics and Philosophy 25 (1): 125-133. 2009.
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29Who Is Afraid of Group Agents and Group Minds?In Michael Schmitz, Beatrice Kobow & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Background of Social Reality, Springer. pp. 13--35. 2013.
Raimo Tuomela
(1940 - 2020)
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University of HelsinkiDepartment of Philosophy (Theoretical Philosophy, Practical Philosophy, Philosophy in Swedish)Retired faculty