Haig Khatchadourian

Compensation and reparation are two parts or forms of compensatory or corrective justice. This essay aims, first, to distinguish, define, and analyze these two forms as against distributive and penal justice; and, second, to provide a moral justification of a system or social practice of compensation and of reparation, drawing on the ideas of Aristotle, William Blackstone, Bernard Boxill, John Rawls, and James Sterba. Then, by applying the results of the analysis to the first genocide of the twentieth century, the Armenian genocide, it illustrates certain difficulties in realizing reparative justice when the wrongful injury is perpetrated by a sovereign state, and it emphasizes the paramount importance in such cases of the acknowledgment of wrong by the perpetrator.

The article maintains, By appeal to documentary evidence relating to the creative processes of various artists, That the two major rival theories of the creative process--The "teleological" and the "propulsive" ("non-Teleological") theories--Are inadequate. Rather than always being goal-Directed or always propulsive, Creative processes exhibit a wide range of patterns. Six of them are considered. They range from works "which have been created without any, Or with scarcely any, (1) "vision" of the work-To-Be created, Even of the vaguest or most general kind, Or (2) any particular "purpose" that the work to be created is intended to serve" to "instances of artistic creation which start with (1) some definite, Quite specific and well-Worked out plan, Vision or blueprint of the work-To-Be-Created, And/or (2) some specific purpose which the work-To-Be-Created... Is intended to have." still other patterns probably obtain in films and in "indeterminate" art

ABSTRACT The paper addresses the fundamental issue of the morality of terrorism. It distinguishes four types of terrorism—‘predatory,’‘retaliatory,’‘political’and ‘moralistic’—and argues that in all of them terrorism (in a ‘descriptive,’value‐neutral sense of the word) is always wrong. After a short introductory section the paper considers in some detail the conceptual problem of defining ‘terrorism’. Next it considers the possible application to terrorism, with the necessary modifications, of two main conditions of a ‘just war’; viz. the Principles of Discrimination and of Proportion. It argues that these conditions support the paper's central contention. Additional support is then found in the concept and principles of human rights. In the final section the paper evaluates utilitarian arguments brought forth by Kai Nielsen in Violence and Terrorism: its uses and abuses, in support of so‐called ‘revolutionary terrorism’. Throughout the discussion is illustrated by some actual examples from the recent past.