Haig Khatchadourian

The article maintains, By appeal to documentary evidence relating to the creative processes of various artists, That the two major rival theories of the creative process--The "teleological" and the "propulsive" ("non-Teleological") theories--Are inadequate. Rather than always being goal-Directed or always propulsive, Creative processes exhibit a wide range of patterns. Six of them are considered. They range from works "which have been created without any, Or with scarcely any, (1) "vision" of the work-To-Be created, Even of the vaguest or most general kind, Or (2) any particular "purpose" that the work to be created is intended to serve" to "instances of artistic creation which start with (1) some definite, Quite specific and well-Worked out plan, Vision or blueprint of the work-To-Be-Created, And/or (2) some specific purpose which the work-To-Be-Created... Is intended to have." still other patterns probably obtain in films and in "indeterminate" art

Compensation and reparation are two parts or forms of compensatory or corrective justice. This essay aims, first, to distinguish, define, and analyze these two forms as against distributive and penal justice; and, second, to provide a moral justification of a system or social practice of compensation and of reparation, drawing on the ideas of Aristotle, William Blackstone, Bernard Boxill, John Rawls, and James Sterba. Then, by applying the results of the analysis to the first genocide of the twentieth century, the Armenian genocide, it illustrates certain difficulties in realizing reparative justice when the wrongful injury is perpetrated by a sovereign state, and it emphasizes the paramount importance in such cases of the acknowledgment of wrong by the perpetrator.

ABSTRACT The paper addresses the fundamental issue of the morality of terrorism. It distinguishes four types of terrorism—‘predatory,’‘retaliatory,’‘political’and ‘moralistic’—and argues that in all of them terrorism (in a ‘descriptive,’value‐neutral sense of the word) is always wrong. After a short introductory section the paper considers in some detail the conceptual problem of defining ‘terrorism’. Next it considers the possible application to terrorism, with the necessary modifications, of two main conditions of a ‘just war’; viz. the Principles of Discrimination and of Proportion. It argues that these conditions support the paper's central contention. Additional support is then found in the concept and principles of human rights. In the final section the paper evaluates utilitarian arguments brought forth by Kai Nielsen in Violence and Terrorism: its uses and abuses, in support of so‐called ‘revolutionary terrorism’. Throughout the discussion is illustrated by some actual examples from the recent past.

In order to determine what are the metaphysical presuppositions of science, we have to first define the terms ‘presupposition’ and ‘metaphysics’ or ‘metaphysical’. We shall begin with the former.Arthur Pap in his article Does Science Have Metaphysical Presuppositions? discusses two senses of the term. A presupposition may be a necessary condition: p presupposes q, dt = p implies q, i.e. not-g implies not-p. a premise or a rule of inference used in deriving a belief. Thus in this sense, p presupposes q means that if q were false, then the belief in p would cease to be grounded.

In a recent article, George Schlesinger adds his thoughts to the quite extensive literature on the Problem of Evil and the Problem of Suffering. What is noteworthy about this article is the fact that the author, after briefly discussing a number of familiar arguments for and against the traditional theistic conception of God as both omnipotent and perfectly good, attempts to dissolve the problem itself as a pseudo-problem. In the present paper I wish to try to show that Schlesinger's attempt fails, whether or not he is right in his conclusion that the problem of evil is not a genuine problem; and to raise, in the course of my criticism, certain fundamental questions that must be answered if the controversy between theists and their critics is to become logically capable of resolution. Further, in relation to and , I shall offer a very preliminary sketch of some of the fundamental terms or concepts involved in the discussion of the problem of evil and related issues of philosophical theology. I shall begin by saying a few things about Schlesinger's discussion of some of the familiar attempts of theists to resolve the problem, and the equally familiar attacks of the sceptics. I shall then pass to a criticism of Schlesinger's main thesis

THE PAPER ANALYZES THE NATURE, FORMS AND PURPOSE OF JUST ETHICAL PUNISHMENT, LAYING DOWN THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR IT. THEY INCLUDE: (1) SELF-ADMINISTRATION OF PUNISHMENT; (2) PROPORTIONALITY OF PUNISHMENT (DEPRIVATION OF VALUES, MENTAL PAIN, ETC.) TO THE VICTIM’S DEPRIVATION OF VALUES AND HIS PAIN; (3) NON-INFLICTION OF PHYSICAL PAIN OR MENTAL CRUELTY; AND (4) THE PUNISHER’S MORAL ENTITLEMENT (AND PROPER EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT) TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER. THE CONCLUDING SECTION CONSIDERS WITTGENSTEIN’S VIEW THAT ETHICAL PUNISHMENT "MUST RESIDE IN THE (WRONG) ACTION ITSELF," AND THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF ETHICAL PUNISHMENT, RELATING THEM TO THE EARLIER DISCUSSION