Haig Khatchadourian

In a recent article, George Schlesinger adds his thoughts to the quite extensive literature on the Problem of Evil and the Problem of Suffering. What is noteworthy about this article is the fact that the author, after briefly discussing a number of familiar arguments for and against the traditional theistic conception of God as both omnipotent and perfectly good, attempts to dissolve the problem itself as a pseudo-problem. In the present paper I wish to try to show that Schlesinger's attempt fails, whether or not he is right in his conclusion that the problem of evil is not a genuine problem; and to raise, in the course of my criticism, certain fundamental questions that must be answered if the controversy between theists and their critics is to become logically capable of resolution. Further, in relation to and , I shall offer a very preliminary sketch of some of the fundamental terms or concepts involved in the discussion of the problem of evil and related issues of philosophical theology. I shall begin by saying a few things about Schlesinger's discussion of some of the familiar attempts of theists to resolve the problem, and the equally familiar attacks of the sceptics. I shall then pass to a criticism of Schlesinger's main thesis

Community and Communitarianism presents - and defends in detail - a care-centered ideal of a good and moral community: a form of social organization imbued with the virtues of a care-centered ethic, such as cooperation (in «teleological communities, » cooperation in the realization of communal goals); mutual concern and solidarity; sympathy and empathy; benevolence; a spirit of sacrifice; and affection, love, and caring. It is argued that a care-centered ethic, hence a care-centered community, needs to be constrained and fortified by equal respect for the participants' basic human right to be treated as moral subjects, together with fair and just treatment. Besides contributing to social philosophy, the book contributes significantly to ethics.

THE PAPER ANALYZES THE NATURE, FORMS AND PURPOSE OF JUST ETHICAL PUNISHMENT, LAYING DOWN THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR IT. THEY INCLUDE: (1) SELF-ADMINISTRATION OF PUNISHMENT; (2) PROPORTIONALITY OF PUNISHMENT (DEPRIVATION OF VALUES, MENTAL PAIN, ETC.) TO THE VICTIM’S DEPRIVATION OF VALUES AND HIS PAIN; (3) NON-INFLICTION OF PHYSICAL PAIN OR MENTAL CRUELTY; AND (4) THE PUNISHER’S MORAL ENTITLEMENT (AND PROPER EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT) TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER. THE CONCLUDING SECTION CONSIDERS WITTGENSTEIN’S VIEW THAT ETHICAL PUNISHMENT "MUST RESIDE IN THE (WRONG) ACTION ITSELF," AND THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF ETHICAL PUNISHMENT, RELATING THEM TO THE EARLIER DISCUSSION