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5The reasons-responsiveness account of doxastic responsibility and the basing relationErkenntnis 84 (4): 877-893. 2019.In several papers (2013, 2014, 2015) Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic responsibility, viz. our responsibility for our beliefs, is grounded in a specific form of reasons-responsiveness. The main purpose of this paper is to show that a subject’s belief can be responsive to reasons in this specific way without the subject being responsible for her belief. While this specific form of reasons-responsiveness might be necessary, it is not sufficient for doxastic responsibility.
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3The Normative Ground of the Evidential OughtIn Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles, Routledge. 2020.Many philosophers have defended the view that we are subject to the following evidential ought: “One ought to believe in accordance with one's evidence.” Although they agree on this, a more fundamental question keeps dividing them: from where does the evidential ought derive its normative force? The instrinsicalist answer to this question is sometimes described as the claim that "there is a brute epistemic value in believing in accordance with one's evidence" (Cowie, 2014, 4005). But what does t…Read more
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2Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Practical StanceBrill Studies in Skepticism. forthcoming.That we have practical reasons to believe certain propositions even if sceptical arguments are cogent is nothing new. As Hume puts it, if sceptical principles were steadily accepted, “men would remain in a total lethargy until their miserable lives came to an end through lack of food, drink and shelter.” (Enquiry, 12, 2). This heart-breaking projection fails to move contemporary epistemologists who, for the most part, brush off pragmatist stances on scepticism. In this paper, I argue that the pr…Read more
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2The Pluralism of JustificationIn Coliva Annalisa & Pedersen Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 129-142. 2017.This article argues that “justification” denotes distinct technical properties in contemporary epistemology. It is structured as follows. Section 1 spells out a distinction between two ways of tackling the traditional question: “what is a justified belief?”. Sections 2 and 3 exploit some of the upshots of section 1 in order to show that classical reliabilism, accessibilism and presumably many other accounts of justification use the predicate “justified” in distinct technical ways. As we shall se…Read more
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1Virtue-Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge: Classical and New ProblemsIn Heather D. Battaly (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 317-329. 2018.This first part of this chapter presents the virtue-reliabilist answer to the classical value problems of knowledge. According to this solution, the reason why knowledge is a better cognitive state than what falls short of it —viz. mere true and true+Gettierized beliefs— is as follows: when a subject knows, she deserves credit for her true belief. The second part of this chapter is devoted to showing that this solution cannot be extended to solve the " new " value problem, that is to say, the pr…Read more
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1L’évaluation de l’auto duperie : Butler, Clifford et la philosophie contemporaineRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 143 357-370. 2018.
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La justification des croyances. Mentalisme, accessibilisme et déontologismeRepha 5 1-13. 2012.L’objectif de cet article est de clarifier les relations qu’entretiennent trois théories de la justification des croyances, toutes considérées comme des théories internalistes 1 : la conception déontique (le déontologisme), la conception accessibiliste (l’accessibilisme) et la conception mentaliste (le mentalisme). Nous expliquerons qu’en dépit de ce que l’on pourrait penser à première vue l’adoption de l’accessibilisme n’implique pas celle du mentalisme. Dans un second temps, nous montrerons po…Read more
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Passing the epistemic buckIn Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 46-66. 2018.While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly few attempts to apply buck-passing analyses to specific normative domains such as aesthetics and epistemology. In particular, there have been very few works which have tried to provide complete and detailed buck-passing analyses of epistemic values and norms. These analyses are, however, both interesting and important. On the one hand, they can bring to the surface the advantages and difficulties of …Read more
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Knowledge is extrinsically apt belief. Virtue epistemology and the temporal objectionIn Christoph Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches, Cambridge University Press. 2020.
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Knowledge is extrinsically apt belief. Virtue-epistemology and the temporal objectionIn Chris Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue Epistemology. forthcoming.According to Sosa’s virtue epistemological account, an instance of (animal) knowledge is a belief that instantiates the property of being apt. The purpose of this contribution is, first, to show why this claim is, without further clarification, problematic. Briefly, an instance of knowledge cannot be identified to an apt belief because beliefs are states and aptness is a property that only actions —and no states— can exemplify. Second, I present the metaphysical amendment that the tenants of vir…Read more
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La justification des croyances testimoniales: le malentenduIn Jean-Marie Chevalier & Benoît Gaultier (eds.), Connaître: Questions d’épistémologie contemporaine, Editions D'ithaque. pp. 231-252. 2014.Ce chapitre discute de la justification des croyances testimoniales, c’est-à-dire de la justification des croyances que nous adoptons en nous appuyant sur le témoignage d’autrui. Plus précisément, la question à laquelle cette contribution s’intéresse est celle des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes de la justification des croyances testimoniales. Il y a deux manières classiques, et soi-disant antagonistes, d’y répondre: la réponse réductionnisme et la réponse non-réductionniste. L’objectif de…Read more
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La métaphysique, c’est la science de l’être en tant qu’être, ou bien?In Olivier Massin & Anne Meylan (eds.), Aristote chez les Helvètes: Douze essais de métaphysique helvétique, Ithaque. pp. 1-3. 2014.
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L'intéressantIn Emma Tieffenbach & Julien Deonna (eds.), Petit dictionnaire des valeurs, Ithaque. pp. 178-186. 2018.
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La justification des croyances testimoniales: le malentenduIn Jean-Marie Chevalier & Benoît Gaultier (eds.), Connaître: Questions d’épistémologie contemporaine, Editions D'ithaque. pp. 231-252. 2014.Ce chapitre discute de la justification des croyances testimoniales, c’est-à-dire de la justification des croyances que nous adoptons en nous appuyant sur le témoignage d’autrui. Plus précisément, la question à laquelle cette contribution s’intéresse est celle des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes de la justification des croyances testimoniales. Il y a deux manières classiques, et soi-disant antagonistes, d’y répondre: la réponse réductionnisme et la réponse non-réductionniste. L’objectif de…Read more
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Doxastic justification and CreditworthinessIn Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance, Routledge. 2022.
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Responsabilité de croire et impossibilité de croire à volontéIn Laurent Jaffro (ed.), Croit-on comme on veut? Histoire d'une controverse. Collection: Analyse et Philosophie, Vrin. pp. 223-239. 2013.Sommes-nous, au moins occasionnellement, responsables de nos croyances ? Une chose est sûre, en pratique, nous considérons souvent que tel est le cas. Mais l’attribution d’une telle responsabilité est problématique dans la mesure où les croyances ne sont pas des états mentaux que nous contrôlons comme nous contrôlons, par exemple, nos actions. Cet article est consacré à préciser, à expliquer et à défendre l’affirmation selon laquelle les croyances ne sont pas des états mentaux que nous pouvons …Read more
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University of ZürichAssistant Professor
Zürich, Canton of Zürich, Switzerland
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |