•  42
    What do we do when we suspend judgement?
    Philosophical Issues 34 (1): 253-270. 2024.
    According to a classical view, suspension of judgement is, like belief and disbelief, a cognitive state. However, as some authors (Crawford 2022; Lord 2020; McGrath 2021a, 2021b; Sosa 2019, 2021) have pointed out, to suspend judgement is also to perform a certain mental action. The main goal of this article is to defend a precise account of the action that we take when we suspend our judgement: the Preventing Account. The Preventing Account has both the advantage of (i) accounting for familiar s…Read more
  •  83
    In the recent epistemological literature much has been written about the nature of suspending judgement or agnosticism. There has also been a surge of recent interest in the nature of ignorance. But what is the relationship between these two epistemically significant states? Prima facie, both suspension and ignorance seem to involve the lack of a correct answer to a question. And, again prima facie, there may be some intuitive attraction to the idea that when one is ignorant whether p, one ought…Read more
  •  1
    In several papers (2013, 2014, 2015) Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic responsibility, viz. our responsibility for our beliefs, is grounded in a specific form of reasons-responsiveness. The main purpose of this paper is to show that a subject’s belief can be responsive to reasons in this specific way without the subject being responsible for her belief. While this specific form of reasons-responsiveness might be necessary, it is not sufficient for doxastic responsibility.
  •  124
    This special issue arises from the observation that an exploration of the role of non-evidential considerations in epistemology through a broader lens is missing from the current landscape of philosophical research. The present collection of contributions fills this research gap by bringing together three central and much-discussed epistemological topics for which non-evidential considerations become relevant.
  • La justification des croyances testimoniales: le malentendu
    In Jean-Marie Chevalier & Benoît Gaultier (eds.), Connaître: Questions d’épistémologie contemporaine, Editions D'ithaque. pp. 231-252. 2014.
    Ce chapitre discute de la justification des croyances testimoniales, c’est-à-dire de la justification des croyances que nous adoptons en nous appuyant sur le témoignage d’autrui. Plus précisément, la question à laquelle cette contribution s’intéresse est celle des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes de la justification des croyances testimoniales. Il y a deux manières classiques, et soi-disant antagonistes, d’y répondre: la réponse réductionnisme et la réponse non-réductionniste. L’objectif de…Read more
  •  2
    Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Practical Stance
    Brill Studies in Skepticism. forthcoming.
    That we have practical reasons to believe certain propositions even if sceptical arguments are cogent is nothing new. As Hume puts it, if sceptical principles were steadily accepted, “men would remain in a total lethargy until their miserable lives came to an end through lack of food, drink and shelter.” (Enquiry, 12, 2). This heart-breaking projection fails to move contemporary epistemologists who, for the most part, brush off pragmatist stances on scepticism. In this paper, I argue that the pr…Read more
  •  95
    La justification des croyances mentalisme, accessibilisme et déontologisme
    RÉPHA, revue étudiante de philosophie analytique 5 39-53. 2012.
  • Passing the epistemic buck
    In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 46-66. 2018.
    While buck-passing accounts are widely discussed in the literature, there have been surprisingly few attempts to apply buck-passing analyses to specific normative domains such as aesthetics and epistemology. In particular, there have been very few works which have tried to provide complete and detailed buck-passing analyses of epistemic values and norms. These analyses are, however, both interesting and important. On the one hand, they can bring to the surface the advantages and difficulties of …Read more
  •  806
    Refusing the COVID-19 vaccine: What’s wrong with that?
    with Sebastian Https://Orcidorg Schmidt
    Philosophical Psychology 36 (6): 1102-1124. 2023.
    COVID-19 vaccine refusal seems like a paradigm case of irrationality. Vaccines are supposed to be the best way to get us out of the COVID-19 pandemic. And yet many people believe that they should not be vaccinated even though they are dissatisfied with the current situation. In this paper, we analyze COVID-19 vaccine refusal with the tools of contemporary philosophical theories of responsibility and rationality. The main outcome of this analysis is that many vaccine-refusers are responsible for …Read more
  •  79
    In Defence of the Normative Account of Ignorance
    Erkenntnis 1-15. forthcoming.
    The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it.
  •  74
    Ignorance and Its Disvalue
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 97 (3): 433-447. 2020.
    It is commonly accepted – not only in the philosophical literature but also in daily life – that ignorance is a failure of some sort. As a result, a desideratum of any ontological account of ignorance is that it must be able to explain why there is something wrong with being ignorant of a true proposition. This article shows two things. First, two influential accounts of ignorance – the Knowledge Account and the True Belief Account – do not satisfy this requirement. They fail to provide a satisf…Read more
  •  3
    The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought
    In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles, Routledge. 2020.
    Many philosophers have defended the view that we are subject to the following evidential ought: “One ought to believe in accordance with one's evidence.” Although they agree on this, a more fundamental question keeps dividing them: from where does the evidential ought derive its normative force? The instrinsicalist answer to this question is sometimes described as the claim that "there is a brute epistemic value in believing in accordance with one's evidence" (Cowie, 2014, 4005). But what does t…Read more
  •  142
    Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1): 199-216. 2020.
    Situations where it is not obvious which of two incompatible actions we ought to perform are commonplace. As has frequently been noted in the contemporary literature, a similar issue seems to arise in the field of beliefs. Cases of doxastic divergence are cases in which the subject seems subject to two divergent oughts to believe: an epistemic and a practical ought to believe. This article supports the moderate pragmatist view according to which subjects ought, all things considered, to hold the…Read more
  •  2
    The Pluralism of Justification
    In Coliva Annalisa & Pedersen Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding (eds.), Epistemic Pluralism, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 129-142. 2017.
    This article argues that “justification” denotes distinct technical properties in contemporary epistemology. It is structured as follows. Section 1 spells out a distinction between two ways of tackling the traditional question: “what is a justified belief?”. Sections 2 and 3 exploit some of the upshots of section 1 in order to show that classical reliabilism, accessibilism and presumably many other accounts of justification use the predicate “justified” in distinct technical ways. As we shall se…Read more
  • According to Sosa’s virtue epistemological account, an instance of (animal) knowledge is a belief that instantiates the property of being apt. The purpose of this contribution is, first, to show why this claim is, without further clarification, problematic. Briefly, an instance of knowledge cannot be identified to an apt belief because beliefs are states and aptness is a property that only actions —and no states— can exemplify. Second, I present the metaphysical amendment that the tenants of vir…Read more
  •  65
    Introduction
    Synthese 194 (5): 1427-1431. 2017.
  •  141
    In several papers (2013, 2014, 2015) Conor McHugh defends the influential view that doxastic responsibility, viz. our responsibility for our beliefs, is grounded in a specific form of reasons-responsiveness. The main purpose of this paper is to show that a subject’s belief can be responsive to reasons in this specific way without the subject being responsible for her belief. While this specific form of reasons-responsiveness might be necessary, it is not sufficient for doxastic responsibility.
  •  20
    Self-deception: New angles: Introduction
    Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (2): 4-10. 2018.
    Anne Meylan
  •  41
    Justification et rationalité des émotions
    Philosophiques 45 (2): 477-487. 2018.
    A la manière des expériences perceptuelles qui nous présentent des formes, des couleurs, des sons, des textures, etc. les émotions nous présentent des propriétés évaluatives. Ainsi, les émotions constituent un type d’expérience perceptuelle spécifique, un type qui nous donne accès à des valeurs (plutôt qu’à des propriétés non axiologiques). Cette théorie d’origine meinongienne doit beaucoup Christine Tappolet qui y consacre un second livre Emotions, Values and Agency que tous les amoureux des ch…Read more