J. Jeremy Wisnewski

This chapter extends the theme of poetic vision, its articulation, and its importance, beginning with this foundational thought: both Heidegger and Aristotle show us that the fundamental task of moral philosophy is not to construct arguments for particular views, and it is not to offer up rules for correctly carrying out actions. The work of these two philosophers, rather, shows us that morality requires a distinctive kind of seeing, and that this mode of perception cannot be reduced to its propositional content. Changing our moral point of view, then, is not something for which we can rely on argument alone. This chapter suggests, by exploring passages in some of the novels of Coetzee, that literature, rightly understood for its non-propositionally reduced ethical content, provides a better source for our moral imagination than does explicit argument.

In this paper, I take up the future extinction of humanity--a future the beginnings of which we have already set in motion. I examine our future extinction through the lens of the work of Günther Anders, former spouse to Hannah Arendt, cousin to Bertold Brecht, and one-time student of Heidegger. Anders argues that we have already lived through the apocalypse but have yet to realize it--we entered the apocalypse the moment we designed technology that could outperform us (and, indeed, extinguish us). Anders has nuclear weapons in mind, but his analysis extends naturally to anthropogenic climate change: our technological mastery yields a world beyond our comprehension and out of our control. I discuss some of the moral problems that arise in our situation, highlighting what I call ‘moral fatigue.’ I conclude by embracing some advice from William James’ “The Gospel of Relaxation.”

Saturday Night Live's comedy and philosophy have something fundamental in common: both re‐tune attention by challenging assumptions about the world and each other. Comedy reveals assumptions by exploiting them in exaggerated form – and boy do we have a lot of assumptions, particularly about race and racial identity. “Black Jeopardy” reminds people that many things affect identities, not just the putative race to which we belong. The “neighborhood” we're exposed to is one of pure fancy: a comedic rendering of all the stereotypes and biases that are carried by notion of “black.” In “Mr. Robinson's Neighborhood,” which appeared multiple times from Season 6 to Season 10, Eddie Murphy plays the ghetto version of Fred Rogers, from the PBS show Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood. The sketches usually end with Mr. Robinson leaving his apartment by fire escape, typically to avoid violence or arrest.

The most common argument in favor of torture in the current literature is the ticking bomb argument. It asks us to imagine a case where only torture can prevent the detonation of a bomb that will kill millions. In this paper, I argue that the seeming effectiveness of this argument rests on two things: 1) the underdetermined semantic content of the term ‘torture,’ and 2) a philosophical attitude that regards the empirical facts about torture as irrelevant. Once we pay attention to the facts about torture, and particularly about the role time plays in actual torture, the ticking bomb argument becomes incoherent, and hence cannot provide a basis for accepting torture.

My aim in the dissertation is to provide an argument for re-conceiving the way we understand theories of human agency, broadly construed. Traditional approaches to theories of agency have emphasized epistemological concerns when we attempt to spell out what constitutes human existence. My primary concern is to show that this traditional methodological premise concerning human agency is at best misleading, and at worst false. The traditional emphasis on the accuracy of a given theory of human agency has systematically obscured the normative dimension within said theories. Recognizing this normative dimension, I argue, allows us to see that a 'therapeutic' approach to theories of agency, be it in social science or in philosophy, is more appropriate to the explanandum. ;The key to the analysis I offer lurks in a threefold distinction between empirical propositions, constitutive rules, and recommendations for adopting constitutive rules. Most theories of agency present themselves as empirical assertions, capable of being verified or falsified. I argue that theories of human agency cannot be captured in this traditional manner. Human activity is characterized by an understanding of the actions in which agents engage. Theoretical reflection can shape this understanding by drawing our attention to what had hitherto remained unnoticed. To put this point polemically: our description of human agency can change the thing described. To claim that we are thus to construe theories of agency as articulating the constitutive rules of human practice, however, is too quick. One and the same activity can be captured under differing, or even incompatible, constitutive rules. Rules exist under interpretations, and interpretations emphasize differing features of the conduct they aim to capture. It is in virtue of this that we can view theoretical accounts of human agency as recommendations for understanding a range of human activity, or human agency generally, in a particular manner. Deciding between competing theories, then, amounts to deciding between competing recommendations. This suggests that we must assess theoretical accounts of agency in terms of the values we have, and not in terms of the epistemology we revere

_A smart philosophical look at the cult hit television show, _Arrested Development__ _Arrested Development_ earned six Emmy awards, a Golden Globe award, critical acclaim, and a loyal cult following—and then it was canceled. Fortunately, this book steps into the void left by the show's premature demise by exploring the fascinating philosophical issues at the heart of the quirky Bluths and their comic exploits. Whether it's reflecting on Gob's self-deception or digging into Tobias's double entendres, you'll watch your favorite scenes and episodes of the show in a whole new way. Takes an entertaining look at the philosophical ideas and tensions in the show's plots and themes Gives you new insights about the Bluth family and other characters: Is George Michael's crush on his cousin unnatural? Is it immoral for Lindsay to lie about stealing clothes to hide the fact that she has a job? Are the pictures really of bunkers or balls? Lets you sound super-smart as you rattle off the names of great philosophers like Sartre and Aristotle to explain key characters and episodes of the show Packed with thought-provoking insights, _Arrested Development and Philosophy_ is essential reading for anyone who wants to know more about their late, lamented TV show. And it'll keep you entertained until the long-awaited _Arrested Development_ movie finally comes out. (Whenever _that_ is.)

In this paper, I defend the view that we can literally perceive the morally right and wrong, or something near enough. In defending this claim, I will try to meet three primary objectives: to clarify how an investigation into moral phenomenology should proceed, to respond to a number of misconceptions and objections that are most frequently raised against the very idea of moral perception, and to provide a model for how some moral perception can be seen as literal perception. Because I take “moral perception” to pick out a family of different experiences, I will limit myself to a discussion of the moral relevance of the emotions

In recent literature on moral perception, much attention has been paid to questions about the relationship between metaethical commitments and moral experience. Far less attention has been paid to the nature of moral perception, its context-sensitivity, and the role it might play in carrying out everyday tasks with decency and care. I would like to reflect on just these features of moral perception in the context of healthcare. I will argue that healthcare providers do in fact have at least an imperfect duty to develop their capacities to perceive with sympathy. I will further suggest, for some familiar reasons, that this development is not best accomplished through the model of adherence to ‘ethics codes.’

_Family Guy and Philosophy_ brings together low-brow, potty-mouthed, cartoon humor and high-brow philosophical reflection to deliver an outrageously hilarious and clever exploration of one of TV’s most unrelenting families. Ok, it’s not that high-brow. A sharp, witty and absurd exploration of one of television’s most unrelenting families, the stars of one of the biggest-selling TV series ever on DVD, now in its fourth season Tackles the perennial positions of _Family Guy_ at the same time as contemplating poignant philosophical issues Takes an introspective look at what this show can teach us about ethics, ego, religion, death, and of course, time-travel Considers whether _Family Guy_ is really a vehicle for conservative politics, and whether we should be offended by the show, as well as diving into the philosophy of the cast

abstract My aim in this paper is to argue that we have at least some obligations to the dead. After briefly considering some previous (unsuccessful) attempts to establish such obligations, I offer a reductio argument which establishes at least some obligations to the dead. Following this, the surprising extent of these obligations (given a few roughly Kantian assumptions) is considered. I then argue that there are and must be some significant limitations on the duties of the living in relation to the dead. My aim in this paper is not to sort out how we should deal with all of the particular cases in which the question of obligations to the dead emerge — in archaeological digs, research involving the newly dead, the execution of wills, or the fulfilment of last requests — but I will attempt to lay some groundwork for the future assessment of these questions.