J. Jeremy Wisnewski

My aim in the dissertation is to provide an argument for re-conceiving the way we understand theories of human agency, broadly construed. Traditional approaches to theories of agency have emphasized epistemological concerns when we attempt to spell out what constitutes human existence. My primary concern is to show that this traditional methodological premise concerning human agency is at best misleading, and at worst false. The traditional emphasis on the accuracy of a given theory of human agency has systematically obscured the normative dimension within said theories. Recognizing this normative dimension, I argue, allows us to see that a 'therapeutic' approach to theories of agency, be it in social science or in philosophy, is more appropriate to the explanandum. ;The key to the analysis I offer lurks in a threefold distinction between empirical propositions, constitutive rules, and recommendations for adopting constitutive rules. Most theories of agency present themselves as empirical assertions, capable of being verified or falsified. I argue that theories of human agency cannot be captured in this traditional manner. Human activity is characterized by an understanding of the actions in which agents engage. Theoretical reflection can shape this understanding by drawing our attention to what had hitherto remained unnoticed. To put this point polemically: our description of human agency can change the thing described. To claim that we are thus to construe theories of agency as articulating the constitutive rules of human practice, however, is too quick. One and the same activity can be captured under differing, or even incompatible, constitutive rules. Rules exist under interpretations, and interpretations emphasize differing features of the conduct they aim to capture. It is in virtue of this that we can view theoretical accounts of human agency as recommendations for understanding a range of human activity, or human agency generally, in a particular manner. Deciding between competing theories, then, amounts to deciding between competing recommendations. This suggests that we must assess theoretical accounts of agency in terms of the values we have, and not in terms of the epistemology we revere