J. Jeremy Wisnewski

Saturday Night Live's comedy and philosophy have something fundamental in common: both re‐tune attention by challenging assumptions about the world and each other. Comedy reveals assumptions by exploiting them in exaggerated form – and boy do we have a lot of assumptions, particularly about race and racial identity. “Black Jeopardy” reminds people that many things affect identities, not just the putative race to which we belong. The “neighborhood” we're exposed to is one of pure fancy: a comedic rendering of all the stereotypes and biases that are carried by notion of “black.” In “Mr. Robinson's Neighborhood,” which appeared multiple times from Season 6 to Season 10, Eddie Murphy plays the ghetto version of Fred Rogers, from the PBS show Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood. The sketches usually end with Mr. Robinson leaving his apartment by fire escape, typically to avoid violence or arrest.

abstract My aim in this paper is to argue that we have at least some obligations to the dead. After briefly considering some previous (unsuccessful) attempts to establish such obligations, I offer a reductio argument which establishes at least some obligations to the dead. Following this, the surprising extent of these obligations (given a few roughly Kantian assumptions) is considered. I then argue that there are and must be some significant limitations on the duties of the living in relation to the dead. My aim in this paper is not to sort out how we should deal with all of the particular cases in which the question of obligations to the dead emerge — in archaeological digs, research involving the newly dead, the execution of wills, or the fulfilment of last requests — but I will attempt to lay some groundwork for the future assessment of these questions.

The most common argument in favor of torture in the current literature is the ticking bomb argument. It asks us to imagine a case where only torture can prevent the detonation of a bomb that will kill millions. In this paper, I argue that the seeming effectiveness of this argument rests on two things: 1) the underdetermined semantic content of the term ‘torture,’ and 2) a philosophical attitude that regards the empirical facts about torture as irrelevant. Once we pay attention to the facts about torture, and particularly about the role time plays in actual torture, the ticking bomb argument becomes incoherent, and hence cannot provide a basis for accepting torture.

Reeently, a man in Germany was put on trial for killing and consuming another German man. Disgust at this incident was exacerbated when the accused explained that he had placed an advertisement on the internet for someone to be slaughtered and eaten-and that his ‘vietim’ had answered this advertisement. In this paper, I will argue that this disturbing ease should not be seen as morally problematic. I will defend this view by arguing that (1) the so-called ‘vietim’ of this cannibalization is not in fact a victim of murder, and that (2) there is nothing wrong with cannibalism.

My aim in the dissertation is to provide an argument for re-conceiving the way we understand theories of human agency, broadly construed. Traditional approaches to theories of agency have emphasized epistemological concerns when we attempt to spell out what constitutes human existence. My primary concern is to show that this traditional methodological premise concerning human agency is at best misleading, and at worst false. The traditional emphasis on the accuracy of a given theory of human agency has systematically obscured the normative dimension within said theories. Recognizing this normative dimension, I argue, allows us to see that a 'therapeutic' approach to theories of agency, be it in social science or in philosophy, is more appropriate to the explanandum. ;The key to the analysis I offer lurks in a threefold distinction between empirical propositions, constitutive rules, and recommendations for adopting constitutive rules. Most theories of agency present themselves as empirical assertions, capable of being verified or falsified. I argue that theories of human agency cannot be captured in this traditional manner. Human activity is characterized by an understanding of the actions in which agents engage. Theoretical reflection can shape this understanding by drawing our attention to what had hitherto remained unnoticed. To put this point polemically: our description of human agency can change the thing described. To claim that we are thus to construe theories of agency as articulating the constitutive rules of human practice, however, is too quick. One and the same activity can be captured under differing, or even incompatible, constitutive rules. Rules exist under interpretations, and interpretations emphasize differing features of the conduct they aim to capture. It is in virtue of this that we can view theoretical accounts of human agency as recommendations for understanding a range of human activity, or human agency generally, in a particular manner. Deciding between competing theories, then, amounts to deciding between competing recommendations. This suggests that we must assess theoretical accounts of agency in terms of the values we have, and not in terms of the epistemology we revere

The first look at the philosophy behind Stephenie Meyer's bestselling Twilight series Bella and Edward, and their family and friends, have faced countless dangers and philosophical dilemmas in Stephenie Meyer's Twilight novels. This book is the first to explore them, drawing on the wisdom of philosophical heavyweights to answer essential questions such as: What do the struggles of "vegetarian" vampires who control their biological urge for human blood say about free will? Are vampires morally absolved if they kill only animals and not people? From a feminist perspective, is Edward a romantic hero or is he just a stalker? Is Jacob "better" for Bella than Edward? As absorbing as the Meyer novels themselves, Twilight and Philosophy: Gives you a new perspective on Twilight characters, storylines, and themes Helps you gain fresh insights into the Twilight novels and movies Features an irresistible combination of vampires, romance, and philosophy Twilight and Philosophy is a must-have companion for every Twilight fan, whether you're new to the series or have followed it since the beginning.

In this paper I argue that Arthur Fine and Martin Heidegger present responses to the dispute between realism and antirealism that are remarkably close in character. Both claim that this dispute arises from a failure to take seriously our everyday experience of things in the world. I argue that it is useful to note the similarity between Fine and Heidegger for two distinct reasons: 1) their view provides a viable alternative to the current realist/antirealist dispute–an alternative that has not been given its due, and 2) it allows us to build a bridge between two seemingly distinct traditions