J. Jeremy Wisnewski

This chapter extends the theme of poetic vision, its articulation, and its importance, beginning with this foundational thought: both Heidegger and Aristotle show us that the fundamental task of moral philosophy is not to construct arguments for particular views, and it is not to offer up rules for correctly carrying out actions. The work of these two philosophers, rather, shows us that morality requires a distinctive kind of seeing, and that this mode of perception cannot be reduced to its propositional content. Changing our moral point of view, then, is not something for which we can rely on argument alone. This chapter suggests, by exploring passages in some of the novels of Coetzee, that literature, rightly understood for its non-propositionally reduced ethical content, provides a better source for our moral imagination than does explicit argument.

In this paper, I take up the future extinction of humanity--a future the beginnings of which we have already set in motion. I examine our future extinction through the lens of the work of Günther Anders, former spouse to Hannah Arendt, cousin to Bertold Brecht, and one-time student of Heidegger. Anders argues that we have already lived through the apocalypse but have yet to realize it--we entered the apocalypse the moment we designed technology that could outperform us (and, indeed, extinguish us). Anders has nuclear weapons in mind, but his analysis extends naturally to anthropogenic climate change: our technological mastery yields a world beyond our comprehension and out of our control. I discuss some of the moral problems that arise in our situation, highlighting what I call ‘moral fatigue.’ I conclude by embracing some advice from William James’ “The Gospel of Relaxation.”

Saturday Night Live's comedy and philosophy have something fundamental in common: both re‐tune attention by challenging assumptions about the world and each other. Comedy reveals assumptions by exploiting them in exaggerated form – and boy do we have a lot of assumptions, particularly about race and racial identity. “Black Jeopardy” reminds people that many things affect identities, not just the putative race to which we belong. The “neighborhood” we're exposed to is one of pure fancy: a comedic rendering of all the stereotypes and biases that are carried by notion of “black.” In “Mr. Robinson's Neighborhood,” which appeared multiple times from Season 6 to Season 10, Eddie Murphy plays the ghetto version of Fred Rogers, from the PBS show Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood. The sketches usually end with Mr. Robinson leaving his apartment by fire escape, typically to avoid violence or arrest.

The most common argument in favor of torture in the current literature is the ticking bomb argument. It asks us to imagine a case where only torture can prevent the detonation of a bomb that will kill millions. In this paper, I argue that the seeming effectiveness of this argument rests on two things: 1) the underdetermined semantic content of the term ‘torture,’ and 2) a philosophical attitude that regards the empirical facts about torture as irrelevant. Once we pay attention to the facts about torture, and particularly about the role time plays in actual torture, the ticking bomb argument becomes incoherent, and hence cannot provide a basis for accepting torture.

My aim in the dissertation is to provide an argument for re-conceiving the way we understand theories of human agency, broadly construed. Traditional approaches to theories of agency have emphasized epistemological concerns when we attempt to spell out what constitutes human existence. My primary concern is to show that this traditional methodological premise concerning human agency is at best misleading, and at worst false. The traditional emphasis on the accuracy of a given theory of human agency has systematically obscured the normative dimension within said theories. Recognizing this normative dimension, I argue, allows us to see that a 'therapeutic' approach to theories of agency, be it in social science or in philosophy, is more appropriate to the explanandum. ;The key to the analysis I offer lurks in a threefold distinction between empirical propositions, constitutive rules, and recommendations for adopting constitutive rules. Most theories of agency present themselves as empirical assertions, capable of being verified or falsified. I argue that theories of human agency cannot be captured in this traditional manner. Human activity is characterized by an understanding of the actions in which agents engage. Theoretical reflection can shape this understanding by drawing our attention to what had hitherto remained unnoticed. To put this point polemically: our description of human agency can change the thing described. To claim that we are thus to construe theories of agency as articulating the constitutive rules of human practice, however, is too quick. One and the same activity can be captured under differing, or even incompatible, constitutive rules. Rules exist under interpretations, and interpretations emphasize differing features of the conduct they aim to capture. It is in virtue of this that we can view theoretical accounts of human agency as recommendations for understanding a range of human activity, or human agency generally, in a particular manner. Deciding between competing theories, then, amounts to deciding between competing recommendations. This suggests that we must assess theoretical accounts of agency in terms of the values we have, and not in terms of the epistemology we revere

Reeently, a man in Germany was put on trial for killing and consuming another German man. Disgust at this incident was exacerbated when the accused explained that he had placed an advertisement on the internet for someone to be slaughtered and eaten-and that his ‘vietim’ had answered this advertisement. In this paper, I will argue that this disturbing ease should not be seen as morally problematic. I will defend this view by arguing that (1) the so-called ‘vietim’ of this cannibalization is not in fact a victim of murder, and that (2) there is nothing wrong with cannibalism.

The first look at the philosophy behind Stephenie Meyer's bestselling _Twilight_ series Bella and Edward, and their family and friends, have faced countless dangers and philosophical dilemmas in Stephenie Meyer's _Twilight_ novels. This book is the first to explore them, drawing on the wisdom of philosophical heavyweights to answer essential questions such as: What do the struggles of "vegetarian" vampires who control their biological urge for human blood say about free will? Are vampires morally absolved if they kill only animals and not people? From a feminist perspective, is Edward a romantic hero or is he just a stalker? Is Jacob "better" for Bella than Edward? As absorbing as the Meyer novels themselves, _Twilight and Philosophy_: Gives you a new perspective on _Twilight_ characters, storylines, and themes Helps you gain fresh insights into the _Twilight _novels and movies Features an irresistible combination of vampires, romance, and philosophy _Twilight and Philosophy_ is a must-have companion for every _Twilight_ fan, whether you're new to the series or have followed it since the beginning.