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704Climate Change, Responsibility, and JusticeScience and Engineering Ethics 16 (3): 431-445. 2010.In this paper I make the following claims. In order to see anthropogenic climate change as clearly involving moral wrongs and global injustices, we will have to revise some central concepts in these domains. Moreover, climate change threatens another value that cannot easily be taken up by concerns of global justice or moral responsibility
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142Rational Egoism and Animal RightsEnvironmental Ethics 3 (2): 167-171. 1981.Jan Narveson has suggested that rational egoism might provide a defensible moral perspective that would put animals out of the reach of morality without denying that they are capable of suffering. I argue that rational egoism provides a principled indifference to the fate of animals at high cost: the possibility of principled indifference to the fate of “marginal humans.”
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78Klimawandel und globale Gerechtigkeit: Neues Problem, altes Paradigma?In Angela Kallhoff (ed.), Klimagerechtigkeit und Klimaethik, De Gruyter. pp. 23-38. 2015.
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87The “trivial neuron doctrine” is not trivialBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5): 841-842. 1999.I argue that the trivial neuron doctrine as characterized by Gold & Stoljar is not trivial; it appears to be inconsistent with property dualism as well as some forms of functionalism and externalism. I suggest that the problem is not so much with the particular way in which Gold & Stoljar draw the distinction as with the unruliness of the distinction itself. Their failure to see this may be why they misunderstand the views of the Churchlands.
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129On aims and methods of cognitive ethologyPhilosophy of Science Association 1992 110-124. 1992.In 1963 Niko Tinbergen published a paper, "On Aims and Methods of Ethology," dedicated to his friend Konrad Lorenz. Here Tinbergen defines ethology as "the biological study of behavior," and seeks to demonstrate "the close affinity between Ethology and the rest of Biology." Tinbergen identifies four major areas of ethology: causation, survival value, evolution, and ontogeny. Our goal is to attempt for cognitive ethology what Tinbergen succeeded in doing for ethology: to clarify its aims and meth…Read more
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New York UniversityDepartment of Philosophy
Animal Studies Initiative, Environmental Studies ProgramOther faculty (Postdoc, Visiting, etc)