Mark Glouberman

Though, in view of Descartes' challenge to the epistemological credentials of "reason" early in the Meditations, one expects him to resist the claim that the professedly invulnerable cogito argument works through the suppressed premise "Everything that thinks, exists," interpreters have been hard-pressed to convert comprendre here into pardonner. Loath to convict Descartes of confusing a psychological point about inferential process with a logical one about the conditions for validity, many are driven to implausible construals, for example, the ingenious performative construal, on which "cogito" does not express a premise. In this fast-paced study Jerrold Katz, calling on his Chomsky-inspired theorising about natural languages, offers a via media. At the core is the thesis that validity is not always a matter of logical form--hence a rejection of the view whose contemporary prestige derives from Frege. According to Katz, the validity of analytic entailments is a function not of logical form but of the senses of the contributing linguistic elements. The cogito argument, Katz maintains, falls into this class. Thus, comprendre avec pardonner: Descartes is not being evasive when he holds that there is an argumentational move from "cogito" to "sum" while denying that the argument, as presented, is enthymematic.

1. The distinction between the functions of sense and intellect in cognition is first given its modern form by Kant. According to one influential commentator, Jonathan Bennett, “Kant’s breakthrough” in fact consists precisely in liberating himself from his predecessors’ misconceptions in this regard. It is true that the categorial duality of receptivity and spontaneity—of intuition and concept—is not to be found in the major classical writings prior to Kant. In its place, one encounters a relativized distinction. The empiricist Hume, for example, describes a conceptual element or “idea” as differing only in “vivacity” from an item of sensory intake or “impression,” and the rationalist Leibniz says of a state of “pure” intellection that it differs from a perceptual state in being clear of the residuum of cognitive “confusion” which taints the latter.

Unhappy with a recent submission of mine, a referee for a journal specialising in the history of philosophy wagged a finger at what he or she called my ‘hermeneutical principles’. Though I am no stranger to the collegial woodshed, my initial reaction was nonetheless one of surprise. For had I then been asked about interpretive methodology I would have scoffed. The construer’s best course, I would have said, is to nose about the texts until some rough shape begins to emerge from the murk, and to inch forward in an effort to block in details, frequently doubling back for more nosing about. Isn’t this —fill, back, adjust, refill, back again, re-adjust—a counsel of anti-method?

For placing the contrast of certainty and uncertainty at the philosophical center, Descartes is charged with Michael Dummett with mistakenly subordinating the study of language and meaning to epistemology. But Dummett's knowledge-theoretic reading of the certainty/uncertainty duality is as erroneous as the tradition it inherits is long. The Cartesian demand for certainty and critique of uncertainty in mature writings like the Meditations has a definite semantic character. Cartesian uncertainty, construed aright, anticipates Dummett's putatively original idea of a non-reductive yet non-realist semantics for standard factual claims asserted on the basis of sense-evidence. There is an internal relation, in Descartes' philosophy, between a repudiation of uncertainty and a repudiation of a non-realist conception of the world.

Registrants for the academic study of philosophy, expecting an encounter with special cognitive products, regal truths, are soon enough disabused. Philosophy, its supposedly special access to the structure of things exploded, is relegated to sundry tasks of intellectual hygiene. I track down the source of the unrealistic view, anatomising what has a strong claim to be regarded as the regal enterprise’s inau¬gural reasoning—in Plato. When professionals consider the successor activity that is called ‘philosophy,’ they should therefore wonder about the label. The deposition of she who was once known as Queen of the Sciences is, I argue, really the end of philosophy. Does the prevail¬ing professional attitude attest to mere nostalgia? In fact, the view of philo¬sophy as (say) conceptual enquiry inherits some of the fantasy. To the extent that continued use of the label is internally justified, that signals a deeper mistake on the part of the users about the truth.

RÉSUMÉ: La Bible éclaire la distinction kantienne entre les apparences et les choses en soi. Les deux récits bibliques de la création, dans Genèse 1 et 2, offrent différentes analyses ontologiques, et seule la deuxième est, comme les apparences de Kant, relative à la condition humaine. Mais, tandis que l’autre région dont Kant parle est sans caractérisation positive, la Bible décrit amplement le monde tel qu’il est avant l’avènement des hommes et des femmes. La Bible traite de ce domaine du point de vue de l’infra-humain. Cette approche essentiellement anthropologique de l’idée des apparences clarifie l’idéalisme transcendantal.

To what extent is conceptual analysis under strict semantic control? In an effort to show that conceptual structure transcends the linguistic dimension proper, the tensions within, and between, several current treatments of the concept red are revealed and explored. It is argued that certain extra-semantic factors — factors, broadly speaking, which concern the manner in which a concept applier interacts with the world as an extralinguistic agent - provide a backdrop against which conceptual analysis guided by language in a strict sense must be deepened and tested.

Examining Kant's critical philosophy, this study focusses upon its dialectical constitution and gauging its implications. It attempts to determine the meaning of the critical system more by determining the dialectical and rhetorical influences on Kant by focussing on its manifest reasoning. The volume begins by taking stock of meta-physical and meta-interpretive materials; then goes on to examine the major doctrines of the first Critique; and finally draws wider morals for Kant specifically and for philosophy generally.

Il se peut du point de vue des etudiants qui s'approchent de la position contextuelle de Descartes, qu'il accepte la distinction reelle entre l'esprit et le corps parce qu'il n'a pas percu comment une forme d'explicarion mecanique-materialiste pourrait etre appropriee aux phenomenes psychologiques. Mais on pourrait demander la signification de cette proposition en ce qui concerne le raisonnement de Descartes pour Pactualite du dualisme. Je demontre que son raisonnement dans les Meditations est defectueux relatif a un probleme theorique emanant de 1' argumentation du cogito. Sum est deduit de cogito. Si c'est le cas, pourquoi Descartes pretend-t-il que celui-la est la premiere certitude? Comme j'explique, cogito c'est clair, mais ce n'est pas distinct; mais sum, c'est Pun et l'autre-et, a cause de cela, possede les qualites necessaires. Mais le caractere particulier du sum possede une variete speciale, et le raisonnement subsequent de Descartes que le sujet reflechissant n'est pas materiel echoue de cette ambiguite. Le cartesianisme sans dualisme n'est pas done un cercle sans un centre