-
36Hume on Is and Ought, by Pigden Charles R. : Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. xiv + 352, £74.00 (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4): 821-824. 2013.No abstract
-
123The Metaphysics of ReasonsIn Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Oxford University Press. pp. 255-274. 2018.This chapter focuses exclusively on normative reasons. Normative reasons count in favor of actions and attitudes like beliefs, desires, feelings, and emotions. Section 11.2 explores the common ground concerning the metaphysics of reasons. We shall see that the really controversial metaphysical issues in metanormative theorizing about reasons arise with respect to the metaphysics of the reason relation. The two subsequent sections therefore go beyond the common ground and consider competing accou…Read more
-
54Essays in Moral Skepticism (review)International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. forthcoming._ Source: _Page Count 6
-
70Two Kinds of Ethical Intuitionism: Brentano’s and Reid’sThe Monist 100 (1): 106-119. 2017.This paper explores Franz Brentano’s metaethics by comparing it to Thomas Reid’s. Brentano and Reid share a commitment to moral realism and they are both aptly classified as intuitionists concerning moral knowledge and the nature of moral judgment. However, their respective versions of intuitionism are importantly different, in ways that reflect more general differences between their respective epistemological views. Sections III and IV of the paper focus more exclusively on Brentano’s metaethic…Read more
-
25Skorupski’s Middle Way in MetaethicsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1): 192-200. 2012.
-
26Revisiting the Tropic of Value: Reply to Rabinowicz and Rønnow‐RasmussenPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2): 412-422. 2003.In this paper, I defend the view that the values of concrete objects and persons are reducible to the final values of tropes. This reductive account has recently been discussed and rejected by Rabinowicz and R0nnow‐Rasmussen (2003). I begin by explaining why the reduction is appealing in the first place. In my rejoinder to Rabinowicz and R0nnow‐Rasmussen I defend trope‐value reductionism against three challenges. 1 focus mainly on their central objection, that holds that the reduction is untenab…Read more
-
101On the Defensibility and Believability of Moral Error Theory : Reply to Evers, Streumer, and ToppinenJournal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4): 461-473. 2016.This article is a response to critical articles by Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen on my book Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim that moral facts are queer, and its role in the argument for moral error theory. In section 2, I discuss the relative merits of moral error theory and moral contextualism. In section 3, I explain why I still find the queerness argument concerning supervenienc…Read more
-
82Error Theory in MetaethicsIn Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 58-71. 2017.Error theories have been proposed and defended in several different areas of philosophy. In addition to ethics, there are error theories about numbers, color, free will, and personal identity. Moral error theories differ in scope. Theories at one end of the spectrum take normative judgments in general—of which moral judgments are a subclass—to be uniformly false, whereas theories at the other end of the spectrum take only a subclass of moral judgments—example those concerning duty and obligation…Read more
-
176Are desires de dicto fetishistic?Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45 (1). 2002.In The Moral Problem Michael Smith presents what he claims is a decisive argument against moral externalism. Smith's claims that (i) moral externalists are committed to explain the connection between moral beliefs and moral motivation in terms of de dicto desires, and (ii) de dicto desires to perform moral acts amounts to moral fetishism. The argument is spelled out and the difference between desires de dicto and desires de re explained. The tenability of the fetishist argument (as it has been n…Read more
-
67Thinking About Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan DancyPhilosophical Quarterly 64 (257): 672-675. 2014.
-
69Against the Being For Account of Normative CertitudeJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (2): 1-8. 2012.Just as we can be more or less certain about empirical matters, we can be more or less certain about normative matters. Recently, it has been argued that this is a challenge for noncognitivism about normativity. Michael Smith presented the challenge in a 2002 paper and James Lenman and Michael Ridge responded independently. Andrew Sepielli has now joined the rescue operation. His basic idea is that noncognitivists should employ the notion of being for to account for normative certitude. We shall…Read more
-
85Précis of Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, DefenceJournal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4): 397-402. 2016._ Source: _Volume 13, Issue 4, pp 397 - 402 Moral error theorists and moral realists agree about several disputed metaethical issues. They typically agree that ordinary moral judgments are beliefs and that ordinary moral utterances purport to refer to moral facts. But they disagree on the crucial ontological question of whether there are any moral facts. Moral error theorists hold that there are not and that, as a consequence, ordinary moral beliefs are systematically mistaken and ordinary moral…Read more
-
560In defense of moral error theoryIn Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics, Palgrave-macmillan. 2010.My aim in this essay is largely defensive. I aim to discuss some problems for moral error theory and to offer plausible solutions. A full positive defense of moral error theory would require substantial investigations of rival metaethical views, but that is beyond the scope of this essay. I will, however, try to motivate moral error theory and to clarify its commitments. Moral error theorists typically accept two claims – one conceptual and one ontological – about moral facts. The conceptual cla…Read more
-
1387Brentano's MetaethicsIn Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School, Routledge. pp. 187-195. 2017.This chapter explains Franz Brentano's metaethical theory and how it purports to deal with such difficulties. Brentano explains correctness in emotions by analogy with correctness in judgements. For a judgement to be correct is for it to concord with a judgement made by someone who judges with self-evidence (Evidenz). Self-evident judgements are guaranteed to be correct, and they are based either on "inner perception" or on presentations of objects that are rejected apodictically. Brentano's met…Read more
-
181The wrong kind of solution to the wrong kind of reason problemUtilitas 21 (2): 225-232. 2009.The so-called Wrong Kind of Reason (WKR) problem for Scanlon's account of value has been much discussed recently. In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provides a highly useful critique of extant proposed solutions to the WKR problem and suggests a novel solution of his own. In this note I offer a critique of Lang's solution and respond to some criticisms Lang directs at a Brentano-style approach suggested by Sven Danielsson and me
-
91Regimenting ReasonsTheoria 61 (3): 203-214. 2005.The Belief‐Desire model (the B‐D model) of reasons for action has been subject to much criticism lately. Two of the most elaborate and trenchant expositions of such criticisms are found in recent works by Jonathan Dancy (2000) and Fred Stoutland (2002). In this paper we set out to respond to the central pieces of their criticisms. For this purpose it is essential to sort out and regiment different senses in which the term ‘reason’ may be used. It is necessary to go beyond common philosophical pr…Read more
-
169G. E. Moore on goodness and reasonsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4). 2006.Several proponents of the 'buck-passing' account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section…Read more
-
63A Particular Consequentialism: Why Moral Particularism and Consequentialism Need Not ConflictUtilitas 15 (2): 194-205. 2003.Moral particularism is commonly presented as an alternative to ‘principle- or rule-based’ approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism or Kantianism. This paper argues that particularists' aversions to consequentialism stem not from a structural feature of consequentialismper se, but from substantial and structural axiological views traditionally associated with consequentialism. Given a particular approach to (intrinsic) value, there need be no conflict between moral particularism and consequ…Read more
-
85The ethics of care and empathy • by M. SloteAnalysis 69 (1): 190-192. 2009.Most moral philosophers who have recently expressed sympathy with feminist or ‘care-based’ perspectives on ethical theory have thought that such perspectives can make valuable contributions to more comprehensive ethical theories. Few have thought that an ethics of care can offer a complete normative theory. However, Michael Slote is one of the ambitious few. In his recent book, The Ethics of Care and Empathy, he seeks to show that a care-based perspective can do a lot of service in first-order m…Read more
-
11Review of Robert Audi, The Good in the right: A Theory of Inuition and Intrinsic Value (review)Philosophical Review 115 (4): 540-542. 2006.
-
3Reasons and the new non-naturalismIn Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of reason: new essays in the philosophy of normativity, Oxford University Press. 2009.
-
19Moral Error: History, Critique, DefenceOxford University Press UK. 2017.Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and so all moral claims are false. Part I explores the historical context of the debate; Part II assesses J. L. Mackie's famous arguments; Part III defends error theory against challenges and considers its implications for our moral thinking.
-
23Essays in Moral Skepticism, written by Richard JoyceInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (1): 66-71. 2018._ Source: _Page Count 6
-
273Brentano and the Buck-PassersMind 116 (463). 2007.According to T. M. Scanlon's 'buck-passing' analysis of value, x is good means that x has properties that provide reasons to take up positive attitudes vis-à-vis x. Some authors have claimed that this idea can be traced back to Franz Brentano, who said in 1889 that the judgement that x is good is the judgement that a positive attitude to x is correct ('richtig'). The most discussed problem in the recent literature on buckpassing is known as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem (the WKR problem): i…Read more
-
64Revisiting the tropic of value: Reply to Rabinowicz and rønnow-RasmussenPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2). 2003.In this paper, I defend the view that the values of concrete objects and persons are reducible to the final values of tropes. This reductive account has recently been discussed and rejected by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen (2003). I begin by explaining why the reduction is appealing in the first place. In my rejoinder to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen I defend trope-value reductionism against three challenges. I focus mainly on their central objection, that holds that the reduction is untenab…Read more
-
79Projectivism and Error in Hume’s EthicsHume Studies 37 (1): 19-42. 2011.This essay argues that while Hume believes both that morality is grounded in our ordinary moral practices, sentiments, and beliefs, and that moral properties are real, he also holds that ordinary moral thinking involves systematically erroneous beliefs about moral properties. These claims, on their face, seem difficult to square with one another but this paper argues that on Hume’s view, they are reconcilable. The reconciliation is effected by making a distinction between Hume’s descriptive meta…Read more