•  35
    Kriegel on Brentano on Value and Fittingness
    European Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
  •  21
    Nihilism and the Epistemic Profile of Moral Judgment
    In Aaron Zimmerman, Karen Jones & Mark Timmons (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology, . 2019.
    Moral nihilism is the view that there are no moral facts or moral truths. It is the ontological component of moral error theory, which is the best-known and most comprehensive metaethical theory that involves moral nihilism. My main aim is to discuss some consequences of endorsing moral error theory or believing to some degree that moral error theory is true. In §2, I consider the implications for ordinary moral thought and discourse and the epistemological consequences for moral theorizing. In …Read more
  •  24
    Just as we can be more or less certain that there is extraterrestrial life or that Goldbach’s conjecture is correct, we can be more or less certain about normative matters, such as whether euthanasia is permissible or whether utilitarianism is true. However, accommodating the phenomenon of degrees of normative certitude is a difficult challenge for non-cognitivist and expressivist views, according to which normative judgements are desire-like attitudes rather than beliefs. Several attempts have …Read more
  •  34
  •  11
    Are there moral facts? According to moral nihilism, the answer is no. Some moral nihilists are moral error theorists, who think that moral judgements purport to refer to moral facts, but since there are no moral facts, moral judgements are uniformly false or untrue. Terence Cuneo has recently raised an original and potentially very serious objection to moral error theory. According to Cuneo’s ‘normative theory of speech’, normative facts, some of which are moral facts, are crucially involved in …Read more
  •  1
    Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism
    In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6, Oxford University Press. 2011.
  •  1
    The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory (edited book)
    with Iwao Hirose
    Oxford University Press. 2015.
    Value theory, or axiology, looks at what things are good or bad, how good or bad they are, and, most fundamentally, what it is for a thing to be good or bad. Questions about value and about what is valuable are important to moral philosophers, since most moral theories hold that we ought to promote the good. This Handbook focuses on value theory as it pertains to ethics, broadly construed, and provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary debates pertaining not only to philosophy but also to…Read more
  •  126
    What Matters in Metaethics
    Analysis 79 (2): 341-349. 2019.
  •  23
    Moral Practice after Error Theory: Negotiationism
    In Richard Joyce & Richard Garner (eds.), The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously, Routledge. pp. 113-130. 2019.
    We first deal with a few preliminary matters and discuss what-if any-distinct impact belief in moral error theory should have on our moral practice. Second, we describe what is involved in giving an answer to our leading question and take notice of some factors that are relevant to what an adequate answer might look like. We also argue that the specific details of adequate answers to our leading question will depend largely on context. Third, we consider three extant answers to our leading quest…Read more
  •  60
    Moral and Epistemic Error Theory : The Parity Premise Reconsidered
    In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 107-121. 2018.
    Many moral error theorists hold that moral facts are irreducibly normative. They also hold that irreducible normativity is metaphysically queer and conclude that there are no irreducibly normative reasons and consequently no moral facts. A popular response to moral error theory utilizes the so-called ‘companions in guilt’ strategy and argues that if moral reasons are irreducibly normative, then epistemic reasons are too. This is the Parity Premise, on the basis of which critics of moral error th…Read more
  •  55
    Debunking arguments in metaethics are often presented as particularly challenging for non‐naturalistic versions of moral realism. The first aim of this paper is to explore and defend a response on behalf of non‐naturalism. The second aim of the paper is to argue that although non‐naturalism’s response is satisfactory, this does not mean that debunking arguments are metaethically uninteresting. They have a limited and indirect role to play in the exchange between non‐naturalists and moral error t…Read more
  •  30
    Hume on Is and Ought, by Pigden Charles R. : Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. xiv + 352, £74.00 (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4): 821-824. 2013.
    No abstract
  •  72
    The Metaphysics of Reasons
    In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, Oxford University Press. pp. 255-274. 2018.
  •  34
    Essays in Moral Skepticism (review)
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. forthcoming.
    _ Source: _Page Count 6
  •  40
    Two Kinds of Ethical Intuitionism: Brentano’s and Reid’s
    The Monist 100 (1): 106-119. 2017.
    This paper explores Franz Brentano’s metaethics by comparing it to Thomas Reid’s. Brentano and Reid share a commitment to moral realism and they are both aptly classified as intuitionists concerning moral knowledge and the nature of moral judgment. However, their respective versions of intuitionism are importantly different, in ways that reflect more general differences between their respective epistemological views. Sections III and IV of the paper focus more exclusively on Brentano’s metaethic…Read more
  •  52
    Skorupski’s Middle Way in Metaethics
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1): 192-200. 2012.
  •  13
    Revisiting the Tropic of Value: Reply to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2): 412-422. 2003.
    In this paper, I defend the view that the values of concrete objects and persons are reducible to the final values of tropes. This reductive account has recently been discussed and rejected by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen. I begin by explaining why the reduction is appealing in the first place. In my rejoinder to Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen I defend trope-value reductionism against three challenges. I focus mainly on their central objection, that holds that the reduction is untenable sinc…Read more
  •  68
    This article is a response to critical articles by Daan Evers, Bart Streumer, and Teemu Toppinen on my book Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence. I will be concerned with four main topics. I shall first try to illuminate the claim that moral facts are queer, and its role in the argument for moral error theory. In section 2, I discuss the relative merits of moral error theory and moral contextualism. In section 3, I explain why I still find the queerness argument concerning supervenienc…Read more
  •  30
    Error Theory in Metaethics
    In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics, Routledge. pp. 58-71. 2017.
  •  179
    Brentano and the Buck-Passers
    with Sven Danielsson
    Mind 116 (463). 2007.
    According to T. M. Scanlon's 'buck-passing' analysis of value, x is good means that x has properties that provide reasons to take up positive attitudes vis-à-vis x. Some authors have claimed that this idea can be traced back to Franz Brentano, who said in 1889 that the judgement that x is good is the judgement that a positive attitude to x is correct ('richtig'). The most discussed problem in the recent literature on buckpassing is known as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem (the WKR problem): i…Read more
  •  47
    The Personal and the Fitting
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (3): 341-352. 2014.
    This paper is a critical notice of a recent significant contribution to the debate about fitting attitudes and value, namely Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen’s Personal Value . In this book, Rønnow-Rasmussen seeks to analyse the notion of personal value—an instance of the notion of good for a person—in terms of fitting attitudes. The paper has three main themes: Rønnow-Rasmussen’s discussion of general problems for fitting attitude analyses; his formulation of the fitting attitude analysis of personal valu…Read more
  •  15
    Review of Simon Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts (Oxford University Press, 2013) (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. forthcoming.
  •  18
    In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity, Oxford University Press. pp. 164. 2009.
  •  137
    Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4): 365-378. 2009.
    According to ‘Fitting Attitude’ (FA) analyses of value, for an object to be valuable is for that object to have properties—other than its being valuable—that make it a fitting object of certain responses. In short, if an object is positively valuable it is fitting to favour it; if an object is negatively valuable it is fitting to disfavour it. There are several variants of FA analyses. Some hold that for an object to be valuable is for it to be such that it ought to be favoured; others hold that…Read more
  •  118
    Moral particularism is commonly presented as an alternative to ‘principle- or rule-based’ approaches to ethics, such as consequentialism or Kantianism. This paper argues that particularists' aversions to consequentialism stem not from a structural feature of consequentialism per se, but from substantial and structural axiological views traditionally associated with consequentialism. Given a particular approach to value, there need be no conflict between moral particularism and consequentialism. …Read more
  •  181
    Expressivism and moral certitude
    Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235): 202-215. 2009.
    Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed 'ecumenical' versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates bot…Read more