•  63
    Joint attention and simulation
    In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. 2002.
  •  554
    A simple view of colour
    In John J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection, Oxford University Press. pp. 257-268. 1993.
    Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
  •  126
    Control variables and mental causation
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1): 15-30. 2010.
    I introduce the notion of a ‘control variable’ which gives us a way of seeing how mental causation could be an unproblematic case of causation in general, rather than being some sui generis form of causation. Psychological variables may be the control variables for a system for which there are no physical control variables, even in a deterministic physical world. That explains how there can be psychological causation without physical causation, even in a deterministic physical world.
  •  53
    The Problem of Spatiality for a Relational View of Experience
    Philosophical Topics 44 (2): 105-120. 2016.
    It’s often said that relational view of experience can’t provide an explanation of mode of presentation phenomena: the idea is that if experience is characterized merely as a relation to an object, then we can’t make sense of the idea that one and the same object can be given in perception in many different ways. I show that we can address this problem by looking at the causal structure in relational experience. Experience of an object is caused by experience of particular properties it has, suc…Read more
  •  2
    Nutrient dynamics of the southern and northern BOREAS boreal forests
    with S. E. Trumbore, S. T. Gower, A. Hunter, J. Vogel, H. Veldhuis, J. Harden, J. M. Norman, and C. J. Kucharik
    The objective of this study was to compare nutrient concentration, distribution, and select components of nutrient budgets for aspen, jack pine, and black spruce forest ecosystems at the BOReal Ecosystem Atmosphere Study, southern and northern study areas near Candle Lake, Saskatchewan and Thompson, Manitoba, Canada, respectively. The vegetation in the aspen, black spruce, and jack pine stands contained 70-79%, 53-54%, and 58-67% of total ecosystem carbon content, respectively. Soil nitrogen, ca…Read more
  •  48
    C. Peacocke, "Sense and Content" (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 36 (43): 278. 1986.
  •  121
    Joint attention and common knowledge
    In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 287--297. 2005.
    This chapter makes the case for a relational version of an experientialist view of joint attention. On an experientialist view of joint attention, shifting from solitary attention to joint attention involves a shift in the nature of your perceptual experience of the object attended to. A relational analysis of such a view explains the latter shift in terms of the idea that, in joint attention, it is a constituent of your experience that the other person is, with you, jointly attending to the obj…Read more
  •  12
    The Structure of Time in Autobiographical Memory
    European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2): 105-118. 1997.
  • Reference and Consciousness
    Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214): 191-194. 2004.
  •  139
    Manipulating colour: Pounding an Almond
    In T. S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press. pp. 31--48. 2006.
    It seems a compelling idea that experience of colour plays some role in our having concepts of the various colours, but in trying to explain the role experience plays the first thing we have to describe is what sort of colour experience matters here. I will argue that the kind of experience that matters is conscious attention to the colours of objects as an aspect of them on which direct intervention is selectively possible. As I will explain this idea, it is a matter of being able to use experi…Read more
  •  111
    1. The spatial perception requirementCassam surveys arguments for what he calls the ‘Spatial Perception Requirement’ . This is the following principle: " SPR: In order to perceive that something is the case and thereby to know that it is the case one must be capable of spatial perception. " A couple of preliminary glosses. By ‘spatial perception’ Cassam means either perception of location, or perception of specifically spatial properties of an object, such as its size and shape. Second, Cassam t…Read more
  •  179
    I set out two theses. The first is Lynn Robertson’s: (a) spatial awareness is a cause of object perception. A natural counterpoint is: (b) spatial awareness is a cause of your ability to make accurate verbal reports about a perceived object. Zenon Pylyshyn has criticized both. I argue that nonetheless, the burden of the evidence supports both (a) and (b). Finally, I argue conscious visual perception of an object has a different causal role to both: (i) non-conscious perception of the object, and…Read more
  •  213
  •  199
    Suppose your conscious life were surgically excised, but everything else left intact, what would you miss? In this situation you would not have the slightest idea what was going on. You would have no idea what there is in the world around you; what the grounds are of the potentialities and threats are that you are negotiating. Experience of your surroundings provides you with knowledge of what is there: with your initial base of knowledge of what the things are that you are thinking and talking …Read more
  •  250
    Transparency vs. revelation in color perception
    Philosophical Topics 33 (1): 105-115. 2005.
    What knowledge of the colors does perception of the colors provide? My first aim in this essay is to characterize the way in which color experience seems to provide knowledge of colors. This in turn tells us something about what it takes for there to be colors. Color experience provides knowledge of the aspect of the world that is being acted on when we, or some external force, act on the color of an object and thus make a difference to the experiences of people looking at it. It is in this sens…Read more
  •  219
    Ordinary common sense suggests that we have just one set of shape concepts that we apply indifferently on the bases of sight and touch. Yet we understand the shape concepts, we know what shape properties are, only because we have experience of shapes. And phenomenal experience of shape in vision and phenomenal experience of shape in touch seem to be quite different. So how can the shape concepts we grasp and use on the basis of vision be the same as the shape concepts we grasp and use on the bas…Read more
  •  259
    Sensorimotor Knowledge and Naïve Realism (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3). 2008.
    No Abstract
  •  462
    Reference and Consciousness
    Oxford University Press. 2002.
    John Campbell investigates how consciousness of the world explains our ability to think about the world; how our ability to think about objects we can see depends on our capacity for conscious visual attention to those things. He illuminates classical problems about thought, reference, and experience by looking at the underlying psychological mechanisms on which conscious attention depends.
  •  66
    Sensory experience seems to be the basis of our knowledge of mind-independent things. The puzzle is to understand how that can be: how does our sensory experience enable us to conceive of them as mind-independent? This book is a debate between two rival approaches to understanding the relationship between concepts and sensory experience.
  •  74
  •  44
    Joint Attention and the First Person
    In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Cambridge University Press. 1998.
    It is sometimes said that ordinary linguistic exchange, in ordinary conversation, is a matter of securing and sustaining joint attention. The minimal condition for the success of the conversation is that the participants should be attending to the same things. So the psychologist Michael Tomasello writes, ‘I take it as axiomatic that when humans use language to communicate referentially they are attempting to manipulate the attention of another person or persons.’ I think that this is an extreme…Read more
  •  1
    Relational vs Kantian responses to Berkeley's puzzle
    In Johannes Roessler, Hemdat Lerman & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Perception, Causation, and Objectivity, Oxford University Press. 2011.