•  7
    New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Dummett (edited book)
    Atlanta: Rodopi. 1998.
    Ever since the publication of 'Truth' in 1959 Sir Michael Dummett has been acknowledged as one of the most profoundly creative and influential of contemporary philosophers. His contributions to the philosophy of thought and language, logic, the philosophy of mathematics, and metaphysics have set the terms of some of most fruitful discussions in philosophy. His work on Frege stands unparalleled, both as landmark in the history of philosophy and as a deep reflection on the defining commitments of …Read more
  • Manipulating colour : pounding an almond
    In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. 2006.
  •  276
    Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3): 89-100. 2001.
  •  152
    Cogito Ergo Sum: Christopher Peacocke and John Campbell: II—Lichtenberg and the Cogito
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3): 361-378. 2012.
    Our use of ‘I’, or something like it, is implicated in our self-regarding emotions, in the concern to survive, and so seems basic to ordinary human life. But why does that pattern of use require a referring term? Don't Lichtenberg's formulations show how we could have our ordinary pattern of use here without the first person? I argue that what explains our compulsion to regard the first person as a referring term is our ordinary causal thinking, which requires us to find a persisting object as t…Read more
  •  446
    The Ownership of Thoughts
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1): 35-39. 2002.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 35-39 [Access article in PDF] The Ownership of Thoughts John Campbell Keywords: schizophrenia, thought insertion, immunity to error through misidentification. SYDNEY SHOEMAKER FORMULATED a basic point about first-person, present-tense ascriptions of psychological states when he declared that they are, in general, immune to error through misidentification (Shoemaker 1984). Assuming Shoem…Read more
  •  12
    What Is It to Know What ‘I’ Refers To?
    The Monist 87 (2): 206-218. 2004.
    We can make a distinction between the conceptual role of the first person and the reference of the first person. By ‘conceptual role’ I mean the use that is made of the term: the kinds of procedures that we use in verifying judgements using the term and the kinds of actions we perform on the basis of judgements involving the term. In “Self-Notions,” Perry talks about conceptual role using the phrase, ‘epistemic/pragmatic relations’. He says there are “normally self-informative” ways of getting i…Read more
  •  210
    What is it to know what 'I' refers to?
    The Monist 87 (2): 206-218. 2004.
    We can make a distinction between the conceptual role of the first person and the reference of the first person. By ‘conceptual role’ I mean the use that is made of the term: the kinds of procedures that we use in verifying judgements using the term and the kinds of actions we perform on the basis of judgements involving the term. In “Self-Notions,” Perry talks about conceptual role using the phrase, ‘epistemic/pragmatic relations’. He says there are “normally self-informative” ways of getting i…Read more
  •  199
    The metaphysics of perception
    Philosophical Issues 17 (1). 2007.
  •  319
    Ordinarily, if you say something like “I see a comet,” you might make a mistake about whether it is a comet that you see, but you could not be right about whether it is a comet but wrong about who is seeing it. There cannot be an “error of identification” in this case. In making a judgement like, “I see a comet,” there are not two steps, finding out who is seeing the thing and finding out what it is that is being seen, so that you could go wrong at either step. The only place to go wrong is in y…Read more
  •  18
    Sense, Reference and Selective Attention
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 55-98. 1997.
  •  318
    Sense, Reference and Selective Attention
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (71): 55-98. 1997.
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1997), 55-74, with a reply by Michael Martin
  •  63
    Sense and consciousness
    In Grazer Philosophische Studien, Atlanta: Rodopi. pp. 195-211. 1998.
    On a classical conception, knowing the sense of a proposition is knowing its truth-condition, rather than simply knowing how to verify the proposition, or how to find its implications (whether deductive implications or implications for action). But knowing the truth-condition of a proposition is not unrelated to your use of particular methods for verifying the proposition, or finding its implications. Rather, your knowledge of the truth-condition of the proposition has to justify the use of part…Read more
  •  227
    Molyneux's question
    Philosophical Issues 7 301-318. 1996.
    in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception (Philosophical Issues vol. 7) (Atascadero: Ridgeview 1996), 301-318, with replies by Brian Loar and Kirk Ludwig
  •  20
    Joint Attention and the First Person
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 123-136. 1998.
    It is sometimes said that ordinary linguistic exchange, in ordinary conversation, is a matter of securing and sustaining joint attention. The minimal condition for the success of the conversation is that the participants should be attending to the same things. So the psychologist Michael Tomasello writes, ‘I take it as axiomatic that when humans use language to communicate referentially they are attempting to manipulate the attention of another person or persons.’ I think that this is an extreme…Read more
  •  542
    Reference and Consciousness
    Oxford University Press. 2002.
    John Campbell investigates how consciousness of the world explains our ability to think about the world; how our ability to think about objects we can see depends on our capacity for conscious visual attention to those things. He illuminates classical problems about thought, reference, and experience by looking at the underlying psychological mechanisms on which conscious attention depends.
  •  52
    Causation in Psychology
    Harvard University Press. 2020.
    "A blab droid is a robot with a body shaped like a pizza box, a pair of treads, and a smiley face. Guided by an onboard video camera, it roams hotel lobbies and conference centers, asking questions in the voice of a seven-year-old. "Can you help me?" "What is the worst thing you've ever done?" "Who in the world do you love most?" People pour their hearts out in response. This droid prompts the question of what we can hope from social robots. Might they provide humanlike friendship? Philosopher J…Read more
  •  67
    Joint attention and simulation
    In Jerome Dokic & Joelle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. 2002.
  •  734
    A simple view of colour
    In John J. Haldane & C. Wright (eds.), Reality: Representation and Projection, Oxford University Press. pp. 257-268. 1993.
    Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that..
  •  144
    Control variables and mental causation
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1pt1): 15-30. 2010.
    I introduce the notion of a ‘control variable’ which gives us a way of seeing how mental causation could be an unproblematic case of causation in general, rather than being some sui generis form of causation. Psychological variables may be the control variables for a system for which there are no physical control variables, even in a deterministic physical world. That explains how there can be psychological causation without physical causation, even in a deterministic physical world.
  •  4
    Nutrient dynamics of the southern and northern BOREAS boreal forests
    with S. E. Trumbore, S. T. Gower, A. Hunter, J. Vogel, H. Veldhuis, J. Harden, J. M. Norman, and C. J. Kucharik
    The objective of this study was to compare nutrient concentration, distribution, and select components of nutrient budgets for aspen, jack pine, and black spruce forest ecosystems at the BOReal Ecosystem Atmosphere Study, southern and northern study areas near Candle Lake, Saskatchewan and Thompson, Manitoba, Canada, respectively. The vegetation in the aspen, black spruce, and jack pine stands contained 70-79%, 53-54%, and 58-67% of total ecosystem carbon content, respectively. Soil nitrogen, ca…Read more
  •  50
    C. Peacocke, "Sense and Content" (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 36 (43): 278. 1986.