-
9Philoponus, Diodorus, and PossibilityClassical Quarterly 48 (1): 327-327. 1998.The definition here ascribed to Philo is entirely in line with what we know of Philo from else where: Alex. Aphr. in APr. 184.6–10; Simp, in Cat. 195.33–196.5; Boethius, in de Int. 234.10–15. The same is not true of the definition here ascribed to Diodorus. For Diodorus, we are told elsewhere, defined the possible as that which either is or will be so: Cic. Fat. 13, 17; Plu. de Stoic rep. 1055d-e; Alex. Aphr. in APr. 183.42–184.5; Boethius, in de Int. 234.22–4,412.16–7. Something has therefore g…Read more
-
1Plato: Alcibiades (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2001.The Alcibiades was widely read in antiquity as the very best introduction to Plato. Alcibiades in his youth associated with Socrates, and went on to a spectacularly disgraceful career in politics. When Socrates was executed for 'corrupting the young men', Alcibiades was cited as a prime example. This dialogue represents Socrates meeting the charming but intellectually lazy Alcibiades as he is about to enter adult life, and using all his wiles in an attempt to win him for philosophy. In spite of …Read more
-
180Language, thought, and falsehood in ancient Greek philosophyRoutledge. 1991.CONTRASTING PREJUDICES TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD How can one say something false? How can one even think such a thing? Since, for example, all men are mortal, ...
-
62Names, verbs and quantification againPhilosophy 74 (3): 439-440. 1999.There are enormous differences between quantifying name-variables only, quantifying verb-variables only, and quantifying both. These differences are found only in the logic of polyadic predication; and this presumably is why Richard Gaskin thinks that they distinguish names from transitive verbs only, and not from verbs generally. But that thought is mistaken: these differences also distinguish names from intransitive verbs. They thus vindicate the common idea that on the difference between name…Read more
-
29Philoponus, Diodorus, and PossibilityClassical Quarterly 48 (01): 327-. 1998.The definition here ascribed to Philo is entirely in line with what we know of Philo from else where: Alex. Aphr. in APr. 184.6–10; Simp, in Cat. 195.33–196.5; Boethius, in de Int. 234.10–15. The same is not true of the definition here ascribed to Diodorus. For Diodorus, we are told elsewhere, defined the possible as that which either is or will be so: Cic. Fat. 13, 17; Plu. de Stoic rep. 1055d-e; Alex. Aphr. in APr. 183.42–184.5; Boethius, in de Int. 234.22–4,412.16–7. Something has therefore g…Read more
-
34Ethics in Plato's RepublicRoyal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 19-32. 1986.Why should I be just? What have I to gain if I am decent, honest, moral, upright, fair and truthful? Other people benefit if I am just, but do I? And doesn't it seem clear that sometimes the benefit that other people receive from my being just is a benefit received at my expense? Perhaps then I have no adequate reason to be just. Perhaps if I have any sense I will not bother.
-
43Robin le poidevin (ed.) Questions of time and tense. (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1998). Pp. XII+293. £35.00 hbkReligious Studies 35 (2): 229-240. 1999.
-
83Being, Identity and TruthPhilosophical Quarterly 44 (174): 117. 1994.Philosophers have met with many problems in discussing the interconnected concepts being, identity, and truth, and have advanced many theories to deal with them. Professor Williams argues that most of these problems and theories result from an inadequate appreciation of the ways in which the words `be', `same', and `true' work. By means of linguistic analysis he shows that being and truth are not properties, and identity is not a relation. He is thus able to demystify a number of metaphysical is…Read more
-
89Critical notice of Richard Gaskin's The Unity of the PropositionAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1). 2010.This Article does not have an abstract
-
5Francis Jeffry Pelletier, Parmenides, Plato and the Semantics of Not-Being (review)Philosophy in Review 13 (2): 108-111. 1993.
-
2Aristotle on Modality, IISupplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1): 163-178. 2000.
-
1Is Anything Absolutely Wrong?In David S. Oderberg & Jacqueline A. Laing (eds.), Human lives: critical essays on consequentialist bioethics, St. Martin's Press. pp. 39--57. 1997.
-
18A Note on Zeno B3In Jan T. J. Srzednicki (ed.), Initiatives in Logic, M. Nijhoff. pp. 81--83. 1987.
-
Trinity CollegeFellow, Senior College Lecturer, Director of Studies
-
Cambridge UniversitySenior Lecturer
Hartford, Connecticut, United States of America
Areas of Interest
History of Western Philosophy |