University of California, Berkeley
Mathematics
PhD, 1994
CV
Oxford, England, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
  •  297
    Indestructibility and the level-by-level agreement between strong compactness and supercompactness
    with Arthur W. Apter
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 67 (2): 820-840. 2002.
    Can a supercompact cardinal κ be Laver indestructible when there is a level-by-level agreement between strong compactness and supercompactness? In this article, we show that if there is a sufficiently large cardinal above κ, then no, it cannot. Conversely, if one weakens the requirement either by demanding less indestructibility, such as requiring only indestructibility by stratified posets, or less level-by-level agreement, such as requiring it only on measure one sets, then yes, it can.
  •  109
    Tall cardinals
    Mathematical Logic Quarterly 55 (1): 68-86. 2009.
    A cardinal κ is tall if for every ordinal θ there is an embedding j: V → M with critical point κ such that j > θ and Mκ ⊆ M. Every strong cardinal is tall and every strongly compact cardinal is tall, but measurable cardinals are not necessarily tall. It is relatively consistent, however, that the least measurable cardinal is tall. Nevertheless, the existence of a tall cardinal is equiconsistent with the existence of a strong cardinal. Any tall cardinal κ can be made indestructible by a variety o…Read more
  •  241
    Pointwise definable models of set theory
    with David Linetsky and Jonas Reitz
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 78 (1): 139-156. 2013.
    A pointwise definable model is one in which every object is \loos definable without parameters. In a model of set theory, this property strengthens $V=\HOD$, but is not first-order expressible. Nevertheless, if \ZFC\ is consistent, then there are continuum many pointwise definable models of \ZFC. If there is a transitive model of \ZFC, then there are continuum many pointwise definable transitive models of \ZFC. What is more, every countable model of \ZFC\ has a class forcing extension that is po…Read more
  •  387
    Gap forcing: Generalizing the lévy-Solovay theorem
    Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 5 (2): 264-272. 1999.
    The Lévy-Solovay Theorem [8] limits the kind of large cardinal embeddings that can exist in a small forcing extension. Here I announce a generalization of this theorem to a broad new class of forcing notions. One consequence is that many of the forcing iterations most commonly found in the large cardinal literature create no new weakly compact cardinals, measurable cardinals, strong cardinals, Woodin cardinals, strongly compact cardinals, supercompact cardinals, almost huge cardinals, huge cardi…Read more
  •  95
    Algebraicity and Implicit Definability in Set Theory
    with Cole Leahy
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 57 (3): 431-439. 2016.
    We analyze the effect of replacing several natural uses of definability in set theory by the weaker model-theoretic notion of algebraicity. We find, for example, that the class of hereditarily ordinal algebraic sets is the same as the class of hereditarily ordinal definable sets; that is, $\mathrm{HOA}=\mathrm{HOD}$. Moreover, we show that every algebraic model of $\mathrm{ZF}$ is actually pointwise definable. Finally, we consider the implicitly constructible universe Imp—an algebraic analogue o…Read more
  •  116
    Infinite Time Decidable Equivalence Relation Theory
    with Samuel Coskey
    Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 52 (2): 203-228. 2011.
    We introduce an analogue of the theory of Borel equivalence relations in which we study equivalence relations that are decidable by an infinite time Turing machine. The Borel reductions are replaced by the more general class of infinite time computable functions. Many basic aspects of the classical theory remain intact, with the added bonus that it becomes sensible to study some special equivalence relations whose complexity is beyond Borel or even analytic. We also introduce an infinite time ge…Read more
  •  134
    The Wholeness Axioms and V=HOD
    Archive for Mathematical Logic 40 (1): 1-8. 2001.
    If the Wholeness Axiom wa $_0$ is itself consistent, then it is consistent with v=hod. A consequence of the proof is that the various Wholeness Axioms are not all equivalent. Additionally, the theory zfc+wa $_0$ is finitely axiomatizable
  •  80
    Resurrection axioms and uplifting cardinals
    with Thomas A. Johnstone
    Archive for Mathematical Logic 53 (3-4): 463-485. 2014.
    We introduce the resurrection axioms, a new class of forcing axioms, and the uplifting cardinals, a new large cardinal notion, and prove that various instances of the resurrection axioms are equiconsistent over ZFC with the existence of an uplifting cardinal.
  •  420
    Infinite time Turing machines
    with Andy Lewis
    Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (2): 567-604. 2000.
    Infinite time Turing machines extend the operation of ordinary Turing machines into transfinite ordinal time. By doing so, they provide a natural model of infinitary computability, a theoretical setting for the analysis of the power and limitations of supertask algorithms.
  •  116
    Destruction or preservation as you like it
    Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 91 (2-3): 191-229. 1998.
    The Gap Forcing Theorem, a key contribution of this paper, implies essentially that after any reverse Easton iteration of closed forcing, such as the Laver preparation, every supercompactness measure on a supercompact cardinal extends a measure from the ground model. Thus, such forcing can create no new supercompact cardinals, and, if the GCH holds, neither can it increase the degree of supercompactness of any cardinal; in particular, it can create no new measurable cardinals. In a crescendo of …Read more
  •  119
    Set-theoretic geology
    with Gunter Fuchs and Jonas Reitz
    Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 166 (4): 464-501. 2015.
  •  247
    Utilitarianism in Infinite Worlds
    Utilitas 12 (1): 91. 2000.
    Recently in the philosophical literature there has been some effort made to understand the proper application of the theory of utilitarianism to worlds in which there are infinitely many bearers of utility. Here, we point out that one of the best, most inclusive principles proposed to date contradicts fundamental utilitarian ideas, such as the idea that adding more utility makes a better world
  •  139
    Superstrong and other large cardinals are never Laver indestructible
    with Joan Bagaria, Konstantinos Tsaprounis, and Toshimichi Usuba
    Archive for Mathematical Logic 55 (1-2): 19-35. 2016.
    Superstrong cardinals are never Laver indestructible. Similarly, almost huge cardinals, huge cardinals, superhuge cardinals, rank-into-rank cardinals, extendible cardinals, 1-extendible cardinals, 0-extendible cardinals, weakly superstrong cardinals, uplifting cardinals, pseudo-uplifting cardinals, superstrongly unfoldable cardinals, Σn-reflecting cardinals, Σn-correct cardinals and Σn-extendible cardinals are never Laver indestructible. In fact, all these large cardinal properties are superdest…Read more
  •  133
    The lottery preparation
    Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 101 (2-3): 103-146. 2000.
    The lottery preparation, a new general kind of Laver preparation, works uniformly with supercompact cardinals, strongly compact cardinals, strong cardinals, measurable cardinals, or what have you. And like the Laver preparation, the lottery preparation makes these cardinals indestructible by various kinds of further forcing. A supercompact cardinal κ, for example, becomes fully indestructible by
  •  153
    P^f NP^f for almost all f
    Mathematical Logic Quarterly 49 (5): 536. 2003.
    We discuss the question of Ralf-Dieter Schindler whether for infinite time Turing machines Pf = NPf can be true for any function f from the reals into ω1. We show that “almost everywhere” the answer is negative
  •  163
    Generalizations of the Kunen inconsistency
    with Greg Kirmayer and Norman Lewis Perlmutter
    Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (12): 1872-1890. 2012.
    We present several generalizations of the well-known Kunen inconsistency that there is no nontrivial elementary embedding from the set-theoretic universe V to itself. For example, there is no elementary embedding from the universe V to a set-forcing extension V[G], or conversely from V[G] to V, or more generally from one set-forcing ground model of the universe to another, or between any two models that are eventually stationary correct, or from V to HOD, or conversely from HOD to V, or indeed f…Read more